G.R. No. 193809. March 23, 2015.

FACTS:

Respondents filed complaints for forcible entry with damages against petitioners for unlawfully squatting and taking possession of several portions of land.  The petitioners allegedly planted crops, erected makeshift shelters, and continued to plant and/or improve the shelters without the consent and/or against the will of the respondents.The respondents anchored their alleged prior possession on the fact that they have applied title for the land as shown by a certification authorizing land survey

Petitioners contended that they have already been in possession of the land for more than two years when the complaints were filed. 

The MTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. 

The RTC reversed the decision of MTC and ruled that the respondents were the actual occupants of the property long before the petitioners had taken possession of the same property.  

The respondents sought the execution of the RTC judgment. The petitioners filed an Extremely Urgent Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.

The CA issued a TRO but denied petitioners’ application for a preliminary injunction. The CA, without necessarily resolving the petition on the merits, held that the petitioners were not entitled to the relief demanded

ISSUE:

Whether CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it denied the petitioners’ prayer for preliminary injunction.

HELD:

YES, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the injunctive relief prayed for by the petitioners. A review of the records, however, shows that the 

1. CA ignored relevant facts that would have justified the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 
2. CA also denied the prayer for preliminary injunction without giving the factual and legal bases for such denial.

Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a preliminary injunction may be granted when the following have been established:

1. That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consist in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
2. That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
3. That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual

1. In a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not required to submit conclusive and complete evidence. He is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint. 

In this case, the petitioners have adequately shown their entitlement to a preliminary injunction. First, the relief demanded consists in restraining the execution of the RTC decision ordering their ejectment from the disputed land. Second, their ejectment from the land from which they derive their source of livelihood would work injustice to the petitioners. Finally, the execution of the RTC decision is probably in violation of the rights of the petitioners, tending to render the MTC judgment dismissing the forcible entry cases ineffectual.
2. Moreover, the court in granting or dismissing an application for a writ of preliminary injunction based on the pleadings of the parties and their respective evidence must state in its order the findings and conclusions based on the evidence and the law. This is to enable the appellate court to determine whether the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in resolving, one way or the other, the plea for injunctive relief.

G.R. No. 179665. April 3, 2013.

DOCTRINE:

A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights. A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant’s showing of two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury.

FACTS:

China Banking granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc. (SBI), which amounted to P139,999,234.34, exclusive of interests and other charges. To secure the loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBC’s favor several surety agreements and contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of land.

SBI and MFII have made various requests to CBC for restructuring of the loan,  reduction of interests and penalties. In response, CBC explained that the increase in the interest were voluntarily and willingly signed by the parties.

Claiming that the interests, penalties and charges imposed by CBC were iniquitous and unconscionable and to enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure proceedings, SBI and MFII filed a Complaint “To Compel Execution of Contract and for Performance and Damages, With Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order”

The RTC granted the application of SBI and MFII for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court held that SBI and MFII were able to sufficiently comply with the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ.

The CA ruled that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction had no basis and the trial court simply relied on the imposition by CBC of the interest rates to the loans obtained by SBI and MFII. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not plaintiffs have the right to ask for an injunctive writ in order to prevent defendant bank from taking over their properties.

HELD:

NO.  First, there is NO clear right that warrants the extraordinary protection of an injunctive writ has been shown by SBI and MFII to exist in their favor, the first requirement for the grant of a preliminary injunction has not been satisfied. 

SBI and MFII do not have a right to prevent the creditor-mortgagee CBC from foreclosing on the mortgaged properties simply on the basis of alleged “usurious, exorbitant and confiscatory rate of interest.” In a usurious loan with mortgage, the right to foreclose the mortgage subsists, and this right can be exercised by the creditor upon failure by the debtor to pay the debt due. 

In addition, the default of SBI and MFII to pay the mortgage indebtedness disqualifies them from availing of the equitable relief that is the injunctive writ. SBI’s default or failure to settle its obligation is a breach of contractual obligation which tainted its hands and disqualified it from availing of the equitable remedy of preliminary injunction. As SBI is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, so is MFII. The accessory follows the principal. The accessory obligation of MFII as accommodation mortgagor and surety is tied to SBI’s principal obligation to CBC and arises only in the event of SBI’s default. Thus, MFII’s interest in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is necessarily prejudiced by SBI’s wrongful conduct and breach of contract.

Neither has there been a showing of irreparable injury. An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.

G.R. No. 141853. February 7, 2001.

FACTS:

On March 21, 1994, Idolor secured a loan of 520,000 and executed a Real Estate Mortgage with the right of extrajudicial foreclosure in favor of De Guzman. Due to Idolor’s failure to settle the account, De Guzman filed a complaint which resulted in “Kasunduang Pagaayos. Despite the extension provided, Idolor failed to comply with the undertaking. De Guzman filed an extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage pursuant to the parties’ agreement. On May 23, 1997, the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to respondent De Guzman, as the highest bidder. the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997.

On June 25, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of Sheriffs Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction against private respondents. She alleged irregularity and lack of notice in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings subject of the real estate mortgage.

The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
Spouses de Guzman filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking annulment of the trial court’s order. The CA granted the petition and annulled the assailed writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner has no more proprietary right to the issuance of the writ of injunction. YES

HELD: 

YES. The petitioner has no more proprietary right to speak of over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction.  Petitioner had one year from the registration of the sheriff’s sale to redeem the property but she failed to exercise her right on or before June 23, 1998, thus spouses de Guzman are now entitled to a conveyance and possession of the foreclosed property. When the petitioner filed her complaint for annulment of sheriff’s sale against private respondents with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on June 25, 1998, she failed to show sufficient interest or title in the property sought to be protected as her right of redemption had already expired on June 23, 1998, i.e. two (2) days before the filing of the complaint. 

It is always a ground for denying injunction that the party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the ultimate relief sought—in other words, that she shows no equity. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.

Notes: 

Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated.

G.R. No. 195229. October 9, 2012

FACTS:

Antipolo (candidate for Mayorality) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (3) consecutive terms.

COMELEC Second Division hold that Aratea, the duly elected Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, should be declared Mayor pursuant to the Local Government Code’s rule on succession.

While Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration is pending with COMELEC en banc, Lonzanida and Efren Aratea (Aratea) were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor. Aratea wrote to the DILG to allow him to take the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales since Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office . Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as “the permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases pending before the [COMELEC].”

The COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections.

Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because Lonzanida.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether Aratea is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
2. Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or made a false material representation under Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio

HELD:

1. NO. Antipolo, the alleged “second placer,” should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.

The nature of the eligibility requirements for a local elective office and the disqualifications that may apply to candidates necessarily create distinctions on the remedies available, on the effects of lack of eligibility and on the application of disqualification.

2. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy. The Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a “Section 78” petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. 

Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the three-term limit rule, or his conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, does not constitute a ground for a petition under Section 68. 

Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections—Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.