G.R. No. 194488. February 11, 2015.

FACTS:

Petitioner Reyes, filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, for easement of right of way against respondents, Spouses Valentin. Petitioner alleged that respondents’ 1,500-square-meter property surrounded her property and that it was the only adequate outlet from her property to the highway. A 113-square-meter portion of respondents’ property was also the “point least prejudicial to the [respondents].

The respondents despite demands and willingness to pay the amount, respondents refused to accede to the petitioner’s claims. They contended that the isolation of petitioner’s property was due to her mother’s own act of subdividing the property among her children without regard to the pendency of an agrarian case between her and her tenants. The property chosen by the petitioner as an easement was also the most burdensome for respondents. Respondents pointed to an open space that connected the petitioner’s property to another public road.

The RTC denied the prayer and noted that the proposed right of way would pass through improvements, such as the respondents’ garage, garden, and grotto. The trial court also noted the existence of an irrigation canal that limited access to the public road

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner has the compulsory easement of right of way over the respondents’ property.

HELD:

NO. Petitioner failed to satisfy the Civil Code requirements for the grant of easement rights

The acts of petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest necessarily affect petitioner’s rights over the property. One of the requirements for the grant of an easement of right of way is that the isolation of the property is not due to the acts of the dominant estate’s owners. Assuming, however, that petitioner or her mother did not cause the isolation of petitioner’s property, petitioner still cannot be granted the easement of right of way over the proposed portion of respondents’ property. This is because she failed to satisfy the requirements for an easement of right of way under the Civil Code. Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code provide the requisites of an easement of right of way:

1. An immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons, and is without adequate outlet to a public highway;
2. Payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the surrounding immovable;
3. The isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner’s acts; and
4. The proposed easement of right of way is established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance of the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

An easement of right of way is a real right. When an easement of right of way is granted to another person, the rights of the property’s owner are limited. An owner may not exercise some of his or her property rights for the benefit of the person who was granted the easement of right of way. Hence, the burden of proof to show the existence of the above conditions is imposed on the person who seeks the easement of right of way. 

Petitioner failed to establish that there was no adequate outlet to the public highway and that the proposed easement was the least prejudicial to respondents’ estate. There is an adequate exit to a public highway. In Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos, the convenience of the dominant estate’s owner is not the basis for granting an easement of right of way, especially if the owner’s needs may be satisfied without imposing the easement.Based on the Ocular Inspection Report, petitioner’s property had another outlet to the highway. In between her property and the highway or road, however, is an irrigation canal, which can be traversed by constructing a bridge, similar to what was done by the owners of the nearby properties. The outlet referred to in the Ocular Inspection Report may be longer and more inconvenient to petitioner because she will have to traverse other properties and construct a bridge over the irrigation canal before she can reach the road. However, these reasons will not justify the imposition of an easement on respondents’ property because her convenience is not the gauge in determining whether to impose an easement of right of way over another’s property.

Imposing an easement on the part of respondents’ property for petitioner’s benefit would cost respondents not only the value of the property but also the value of respondents’ opportunity to use the property as a garage or a garden with a grotto.

G.R. No. 195540. March 13, 2013

DOCTRINE:

The new redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.

FACTS:

In 1985, Goldenway Merchandising executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Equitable PCI Bank over 3 of its real properties. The mortgage secured the Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) loan granted by respondent to petitioner and was duly registered.

As petitioner failed to settle its loan obligation –  

1. respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on December 13, 2000. 
2. In a public auction, the mortgaged properties were sold for P3,500,000.00 to respondent. Accordingly, a Certificate of Sale was issued on January 26, 2001.
3. On February 16, 2001, the Certificate of Sale was registered and inscribed on TCT Nos. T-152630, T-151655 and T-214528.

On March 8, 2001, petitioner offered to redeem the foreclosed properties by tendering a check in the amount of P3,500,000.00. However, petitioner was told that such redemption is no longer possible because the certificate of sale had already been registered. The foreclosed properties had already been consolidated in favor of respondent and that new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondent on March 9, 2001.

On December 7, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the respondent, asserting that it is the one-year period of redemption under Act No. 3135 which should apply and not the shorter redemption period provided in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8791. That applying Section 47 of R.A. 8791 to the real estate mortgage executed in 1985 would result in the impairment of obligation of contracts and violation of the equal protection clause under the Constitution.

The RTC rendered its decision dismissing the complaint as well as the counterclaim. It noted that the issue of the constitutionality of Sec. 47 of R.A. No. 8791 was never raised by the petitioner during the pre-trial and the trial.

The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. According to the CA, petitioner failed to justify why Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 should be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE/S: 

Whether applying Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 to the present case would be a substantial impairment of its vested right of redemption under the real estate mortgage contract.

HELD:

NO. Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.

Petitioner’s claim that Section 47 infringes the equal protection clause as it discriminates mortgagors/property owners who are juridical persons is equally bereft of merit. The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate.

The legislature clearly intended to shorten the period of redemption for juridical persons whose properties were foreclosed and sold in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135. The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons was based on the nature of the properties foreclosed―whether these are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year redemption period is retained, or used for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner of these acquired assets. It must be underscored that the General Banking Law of 2000, crafted in the aftermath of the 1997 Southeast Asian financial crisis, sought to reform the General Banking Act of 1949 by fashioning a legal framework for maintaining a safe and sound banking system.

The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.32 Settled is the rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government.

Notes:

The law governing cases of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. Section 6 thereof provides:

SEC. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; xxx 

However, Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 otherwise known as “The General Banking Law of 2000” which took effect on June 13, 2000, amended Act No. 3135.

XXXX

Notwithstanding Act 3135, juridical persons whose property is being sold pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure, shall have the right to redeem the property in accordance with this provision until, but not after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale with the applicable Register of Deeds which in no case shall be more than three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. Owners of property that has been sold in a foreclosure sale prior to the effectivity of this Act shall retain their redemption rights until their expiration. 

G.R. No. 207976. November 14, 2018

FACTS:

Planters Development Bank (Planters Bank) granted two (2) loans to respondent Lubiya Agro Industrial Corporation (Lubiya) in the amounts of P6,500,000.00 and P5,000,000.00, respectively. The said loans were secured by real estate mortgages over two (2) parcels of land with improvements thereon located in General Santos City.

When Lubiya defaulted, Planters Bank sent a letter dated June 8, 1998 to it demanding payment and informing the latter that failure to heed such demand shall prompt Planters Bank to institute a legal action against it. Due to Libuya’s failure to settle its obligation, Planters Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the properties offered as security by Lubiya. In the public auction, Planters Bank emerged as the sole and highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale was thereafter issued in its favor and recorded with the Registry of Deeds on November 11, 1998.

On January 23, 2001, Lubiya filed a complaint for nullification of the loan agreement, foreclosure proceedings, and damages xx on Planters Bank’s alleged failure to furnish Lubiya with notices regarding the foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged properties despite being obligated in their mortgage contract to do so.

Lubiya moved for a summary judgment alleging that no genuine issues exist as to the material facts of the case. The RTC granted the motion however, the summary judgment was adversed to Lubiya as the RTC dismissed its complaint against Planters Bank.

The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and nullified the foreclosure sale.

Lubiya insists that the demand letter dated June 8, 1998, which Lubiya received on June 24, 1998 prior to the auction sale on October 6, 1998, duly satisfied the notice requirement agreed upon by the parties.

ISSUE:

whether or not the lack of personal notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings upon the mortgagor renders foreclosure null and void.

HELD:

As a general rule, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary. Section 3 of Act No. 313514 governing extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages only requires the 1) posting of the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale in three public places; and 2) publication of the said notice in a newspaper of general circulation. 

Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality and city.

However, despite the above provisions of the law, the parties to a mortgage contract are not precluded from imposing additional stipulations. This includes the requirement of personal notification to the mortgagor of any action relative to the mortgage contract, such as the institution of an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding. Thus, the exception to the rule is when the parties stipulate that personal notice is additionally required to be given the mortgagor. Failure to abide by the general rule, or its exception, renders the foreclosure proceedings null and void. 

The June 8, 1998 demand letter that Planters Bank sent to Lubiya satisfies the bank’s additional obligation to provide personal notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale to the mortgagor. The purpose of stipulations of such nature is to precisely apprise the mortgagors of any action which the mortgagees might take on the mortgaged properties in order to accord the former of an opportunity to safeguard their rights. Thus, when Planters Bank failed to send the notice of foreclosure sale to Lubiya, it committed a contractual breach sufficient to render the foreclosure sale on October 6, 1998 null and void. Besides, the loan agreements and mortgage contracts are standard contracts of adhesion prepared by petitioner itself. If the parties did not intend to require personal notice in addition to the statutory requirements of posting and publication, the said provision should not have been included in the mortgage contracts.

G.R. No. 217426. December 4, 2017

FACTS:

The respondent is engaged in the business of recruiting Filipino workers for deployment to Saudi Arabia. The petitioner is authorized to conduct medical examinations of prospective applicants for overseas employment. Respondent referred prospective applicant Jonathan V. Raguindin (Raguindin) to the petitioner for a pre-deployment medical examination. The petitioner cleared Raguindin and found him “fit for employment,” as evidenced by a Medical Report.
Respondent deployed Raguindin to Saudi Arabia, allegedly incurring expenses of P84,373.41. Unfortunately, when Raguindin underwent another medical examination in Saudi Arabia, he purportedly tested positive for HCV or the hepatitis C virus. This leads to repatriation.