G.R. No. 244815, February 02, 2021.

FACTS:

In 2012, the PICCI Board of Directors (BOD) approved the grant of PBB for the year 2012 to all PICCI employees at P10,000.00 each or in the total amount of P840,000.00. The PBB was given in recognition of the successful hosting of the events at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC).  The ATL and the SA issued the ND disallowing the payment of the PBB and declared that it constitutes an irregular transaction under COA Circular No. 2012-003. They ordered the settlement of the disallowed amount. 

PICCI maintained the following arguments: 

1. PICCI is not covered by E.O. No. 80 and its implementing guidelines since its parent company, the BSP, enjoys fiscal autonomy under Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653;
2. PICCI is not within the jurisdiction of the DBM since it does not derive its budget from the GAA, but from the BSP
3. The COA failed to show “dishonest purpose” or “moral obliquity” so as to constitute bad faith on the part of the petitioners when they approved the payment and certified the availability of funds and completeness of supporting documents for the grant of the PBB.

The COA agreed with the COA-CGS that as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the BSP, the PICCI’s budget is subject to DBM’s review.  The COA reminded that the disbursement of public funds must always conform to and comply with the existing rules and regulations, to which business judgment rule must yield. It rejected the petitioners’ claim of good faith and concluded that the petitioners are presumed to have knowledge of the legal infirmities in the grant of said bonus.

ISSUES: 

1. Whether or not the COA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that E.O. No. 80 and its implementing guidelines apply to PICCI.
2. Whether or not the COA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it found that the petitioners did not act in good faith when they approved and/or certified the grant of the PBB.

HELD: 

1. The PICCI is not covered by E.O. No. 80. The PICCI is a government corporation, wholly-owned by the BSP, that manages and operates the PICC, the premiere facility in hosting for local and international conventions, meetings, exhibitions, and social events.

The fiscal autonomy of the BSP accentuates its role as the country’s independent central authority. The MB then is granted the authority to adopt an annual budget for and authorize such expenditures by the BSP as are in the interest of its effective administration and operations in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations. Since the MB adopts an annual budget for the BSP and, as a matter of course, the PICCI, it is incongruous, if not absurd, to place the BSP under the jurisdiction of the DBM and subject its budget to the DBM’s review and approval.

While generally, GOCCs, including government instrumentalities exercising corporate powers and government financial institutions, fall under the jurisdiction of the GCG, the BSP and its subsidiary PICCI are unequivocally excluded from the GCG’s authority. But this is not to say that the BSP and its subsidiary PICCI necessarily come under the jurisdiction of the DBM. To the mind of the Court, we would be trampling on the BSP’s fiscal and administrative autonomy if we go by such logic.

2. YES. There is no showing that the grant of the PBB strained the government coffers in this case. The PICCI was issued an ND for failure to comply with the conditions imposed in the implementing guidelines of E.O. No. 80, when it need not subscribe to said E.O. in the first place. Hence, the petitioners, as approving and certifying officers, cannot be held civilly liable for the PBB released to the PICCI employees.

A.M. No. 20-08-05-SC

FACTS:

The instant administrative matter stemmed from the Blacklisting Order dated 20 May 2019 issued by the Department of Health (DOH) against JBros Construction Corporation (JBROS) for alleged irregularities and failure to deliver on Phase II of its “Barangay Health Stations Project.” JBROS contested the blacklisting order by filing separate petitions in two (2) Regional Trial Courts, with said courts issuing contrasting orders.

First, JBROS filed a Petition for Certiorari with application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Status Quo Ante Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC of Manila. Presiding Judge Renato Z. Encisco denied the prayer of JBROS for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. JBROS withdrew the case.

JBROS refiled the case designating it as a “Petition for Interim Measure of Protection in Aid of Arbitration under the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act (R.A. No. 9285)” with an urgent motion for ex parte issuance of a 20-day Temporary Restraining Order of Protection (TROP). The case was raffled to Branch 27, RTC, Manila. Judge Patrimonio-Soriaso issued a writ of preliminary injunction directing the DOH to desist from implementing the termination of the contract, recall the blacklisting order and submit a Delisting Order to the GPPB notifying it of the delisting of JBROS. The DOH, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has since filed a Motion for Inhibition and a Motion for Reconsideration. 

OCA found sufficient grounds to make Judge Soriaso administratively liable when she issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the earlier dismissal order of Judge Enciso in violation of the doctrine of judicial stability and her failure to recognize that JBROS had committed forum shopping. 

Judge Soriaso disavowed any liability to the charge of violation of forum shopping claiming that the two petitions, the one filed before the sala of Judge Enciso and the other in her sala, were two different cases that do not preclude one another, thereby concluding that no violation was made. Also, Judge Soriaso avers she did not violate the doctrine of judicial stability when she took cognizance of the special proceeding, the civil case before Judge Enciso being already dismissed; thus no outstanding order was contradicted by her grant of the writ of preliminary injunction. Lastly, she raises good faith and argues that she did not know of the existence of the case filed before the sala of Judge Enciso and the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was based on the facts presented during the hearing.

ISSUE: 

Whether Judge Soriaso be made administratively liable for violating the doctrine of judicial stability as well as the rule on forum shopping.

HELD: 

YES. The doctrine of judicial stability or the doctrine of non­interference states that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. The rationale for the same is founded on the concept of jurisdiction – verily, a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment. Here, if Judge Soriaso had just heeded the information provided by the DOH regarding the existence of the earlier decision of Judge Enciso, she would have been more circumspect in the eventual issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction realizing the ruse propagated by JBROS to get a favorable judgment.

Jurisprudentially, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.  Here, while the nomenclature used was different, both cases seek the same outcome. Also, both cases involve the same parties. Lastly, the same evidence is required to prove both cases. The OCA is, therefore, correct in finding Judge Soriaso guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the rule on forum shopping and the doctrine of judicial stability.

The Court resolves to impose a fine amounting to Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) for gross ignorance of the rules of procedure and another Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for violating Administrative Circular No. 7-99.

G.R. No. 246679, June 11, 2021.

FACTS: 

The respondents filed their respective motions for reconsideration impugning the 2019 Decision of Supreme Court and argued that 

1. The Court erred in ruling that Tallado’s removal constitutes as valid interruption of his term sufficient to break the three-term limit rule imposed on local candidates. They point out that the petitioner’s resort to appeal and the eventual modification of the administrative penalty imposed on him shows the lack of permanence of his ouster as governor and should be insufficient to warrant an interruption of his term. 
2. Respondents urge the Court to consider his absence in office as preventive suspension, as the Ombudsman (OMB) Rules provide.
3. They claim that for the Court to allow such construction to continue would reward corrupt and unscrupulous politicians to escape the grasp of the three-term prohibition. 

ISSUES: 

1. Whether the orders of dismissal against the petitioner did not create a permanent, but only a temporary, vacancy

2. Whether the Court’s construction would reward corrupt politicians who will perpetuate their term by escaping the constitutional term limits.

HELD: 

The Court DENIES all motions for reconsideration for lack of merit.

1.  NO.  When an elective local public officer is administratively dismissed by the 0MB and his penalty subsequently modified to another penalty, like herein petitioner, the period of dismissal cannot just be nonchalantly dismissed as a  period for preventive suspension considering that, in fact, his term is effectively interrupted. During said period, petitioner cannot claim to be Governor as his title is  stripped of him by the 0MB despite the pendency of his appeal. Neither does he exercise the power of the office. Said title and power are already passed to the Vice Governor. He also cannot claim that the exercise of his power is merely suspended since it is  not.

Under Section 44 of the LGC, a permanent vacancy arises whenever an elective local officicl;l fills a higher-vacant office, or refuses to assume office, or fails to qualify, or dies, or is removed from office, or voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. In contrast, Section 46 of the LGC enumerates as resulting in a temporary vacancy in the office of the local chief executive leave of absence, travel abroad, and suspension from office. Although Section 46 of the LGC specifically states that the causes of a temporary vacancy are not limited to such circumstances, what is evident is that the enumeration therein share something in common, which is that there is a definite term to be re-assumed. However, the petitioner’s dismissals, even if still not final, were not akin to the instances enumerated in Section 46 of the LGC because the loss of his title to the office denied him the expectancy to re-assume his term.

In the 2019 Decision, dismissal orders of the OMB against petitioner served as permanent removal from office and was not merely temporary. From his dismissal until the Court of Appeals’ modification of his penalty to suspension, petitioner neither had title nor powers to wield as governor of Camarines Norte.

2. NO. The Court’s conclusion is but an application of established jurisprudential concepts and was never intended to reward corrupt politicians who escape dismissal. The OMB ‘s dismissal order is immediately executory and, once executed, the public officer ceases to have title for the time being. Hence, it  should be considered as an interruption of his term. The fact that the public official is  not an ideal one, considering his administrative baggage, does not deprive him of the law’s application.

Imposition of an administrative penalty does not automatically disqualify a public officer from running for public office. Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code does not disqualify a person from running even if he was previously administratively sanctioned.

Lastly, the Court’s construction cannot be construed as a  reward for corrupt politicians as it does not guarantee their prolonged grips on power. It must be remembered that they are still subject to competitive and recurring democratic elections wherein the people decide their political fate. It is presumptuous to say that upon the Court’s decision, public officials would automatically claim their stakes in certain government positions for the foreseeable future. With or without the application of the three-term limit rule, their political futures are still uncertain.

G.R. No. 179786. July 24, 2013

FACTS:

ISSUES:

HELD: