FACTS

Northern Theatrical, a domestic corporation, is operating a movie house in Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Domingo De la Cruz, one of it employee, was hired as a special guard to maintain the entrance of the cinema and so as the peace and order of the premises.

In July 4 of 1941, a man named Benjamin Martin wanted to crash the entrance of the movie house. Infuriated by the refusal of plaintiff De la Cruz to let him in without first providing himself with a ticket, Martin attacked him with a bolo. De la Cruz defended himself as best he could until he was cornered, at which moment to save himself he shot the gate crasher, resulting in the latter’s death. Domingo was charged with homicide before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte which was dismissed. He was again accused of the same crime of homicide of the same Court which he was finally acquitted. He demanded from his former employer reimbursement of his expenses but was refused, after which he filed the present action against the movie corporation to recover not only the amounts he had paid his lawyers but also moral damages said to have been suffered, due to his worry, his neglect of his interests and his family as well in the supervision of the cultivation of his land, a total of P1 5,000. The case was dismissed for the reason that he has no cause of action.

FACTS

The Ford truck of petitioner Roberto Tan Ting driven by Abelardo Bautista, the other petitioner, and the Volkswagen delivery panel truck owned by respondent Federico O. Borromeo, Inc. (hereinafter called Borromeo) were involved in a traffic accident which was caused by the negligence of petitioners. Quintin Delgado, a helper in Borromeo’s delivery panel truck, sustained injuries which resulted in his instantaneous death. Borromeo had to pay Delgado’s widow the sum of P4,444 representing the compensation (death benefit) and funeral expenses due Delgado under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Borromeo, filed a suit to recover the compensation and funeral expenses it paid to the widow of Quintin. However, during the trial neither of the petitioners and counsel appeared contended that they had substantial defense since there was no contractual relationship between the parties, whether express or implied.

FACTS:

P. J. O’Brien instituted an action to in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover of Leung Ben the sum of P15,000, alleged to have been lost by the plaintiff to the defendant in a series of gambling, banking, and percentage games. against the property of the defendant, on the ground that the latter was about to depart from the Philippine Islands with intent to defraud his creditors. The plaintiff  asked for an attachment against the property of the defendant, on the ground that the latter was about to depart from the Philippine Islands with intent to defraud his creditors. The attachment was issued. The petitioner, Leung Ben, moved the court to quash the attachment for the reason that attachment was issued requires that there should be a “cause of action arising upon contract, express or implied.” The contention of the petitioner is that the statutory action to recover money lost at gaming is not such an action as is contemplated in this provision, and he insists that the original complaint shows on its face that the remedy of attachment is not available in aid thereof; that the Court of First Instance acted in excess of its jurisdiction in granting the writ of attachment; that the petitioner has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise; and that consequently the writ of certiorari supplies the appropriate remedy for this relief.

FACTS

On December 28, 1990, respondent and petitioner entered into a contract for the supply of labor, materials, and technical supervision for (3) job orders. Rizal agreed to pay P2,944,000.00 for the job orders while RS Tomas undertook to complete the project within 120 days and 10% of the contract price amount for damages for any delay.

RS Tomas failed to fulfill the commitment, thus requested for an extension – despite the lapse of eleven months from the time of the effectivity of the contract entered into between respondent and petitioner, the latter had not completed the projects. Through counsel, the respondent found out that the  financial status of petitioners showed that it could no longer complete the projects as agreed upon which made them decide to terminate the contract.