Vda. de Bogacki vs. Inserto

No. L-39187. January 30, 1982
Ponente: Concepcion JR, J.,

FACTS

The private respondent, Maria Emma Luz Bogacki (Maria Emma), is the owner of four parcels of land situated in Iloilo City over which her mother, herein petitioner Anulina Ledesma Vda. de Bogacki (Anulina) has a usufruct of one-sixth (1/6) each of the said parcels of land. Due to a misunderstanding, Maria Emma left the home of her mother and the latter took possession of all these properties exclusively for herself, without sharing with Maria Emma the rentals she obtained from the said properties. 

As a consequence, Maria Emma filed an action for partition with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against her mother Anulina. The CFI decided in favor of Maria Emma and since no tangible assets or properties were available to satisfy the money judgment, usufructuary rights were sold at a public auction. The petitioner took no action thereon such that the orders issued have already become final and executory when she filed the instant petition.

Anulina filed for an instant petition for the annulment of the order as well as the levy on execution and the sale at public auction of the petitioner’s usufructuary rights based on the following grounds. 

(1) Usufruct of a surviving spouse cannot be alienated for family reasons pursuant to Art. 321 of the Civil Code; 

Art. 321. The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and in whose company he lives; but if the child, with the parent’s consent, should live independently from them, he shall be considered as emancipated for all purposes relative to said property, and he shall have over it dominion usufruct and administration.

(2) The usufruct, which she had confined to a single area of about 500 square meters, equivalent to 1/6 of the total area of the lots of the private respondent on which she has a usufruct, and where she had constructed a residential house, is a homestead and therefore, exempt from execution according to Sec-12(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 

Section 12(a) of Rule 39 – Under this section, the debtor’s family home constituted in accordance with the Civil Code, or in the absence thereof, the homestead in which he resides, and the land necessarily used in connection therewith, both not exceeding in value P3,000.00, shall be exempt from execution.

ISSUE

(1) Whether or not there was abuse of discretion in the levy and sale on execution of the petitioner’s usufructuary rights and the issuance of the writ of possession based on the grounds relied by the petitioner

RULING

Ruling of the CFI:

The Court orders the defendant to limit her right of usufruct to one-sixth (1/6) each of all these portions of the land and to turn over to the plaintiff 5/6 of all that she had previously collected from the lots not beyond ten years before this date.  No appeal was taken from said decision and a writ of execution was issued on March 3, 1971. But, since no tangible assets or properties were available to satisfy the money judgment, the plaintiff therein asked the Court that a levy be made on the usufructuary rights of the defendant.

The petitioner filed an instant petition to the Supreme Court for the annulment of the order as well as the levy on execution and the sale at public auction of the petitioner’s usufructuary rights, and to restrain the respondents from dispossessing her of the said usufruct. 

Ruling of the SC:

(1) Usufruct of a surviving spouse cannot be alienated for family reasons pursuant to Art. 321 of the Civil Code;

NO.The usufruct of a widow may be transferred, assigned or otherwise disposed of by her as she may please, like any other hereditary property, and hence, an interest in real property which can be sold upon execution. 

Article 321 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked by the petitioner because the usufructuary rights mentioned in this article are those enjoyed by parents over the property of their unemancipated children under their custody, and not those enjoyed by the petitioner which are those of a widow, constituted on the property of her late husband as her share in the estate of the latter. In the case of the private respondent who has already attained the age of majority, is married, and living independently of the petitioner, the usufruct is extinguished.

(2) The residential house constructed on her usufructuary rights over shall be exempt from execution under Sec-12(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

NO. The execution was not enforced against the petitioner’s “homestead” or residential house, but on her usufructuary rights over the lots belonging to the private respondent. The residential house constructed by the petitioner on the land of the private respondent is but an improvement on the property which the usufructuary may remove upon extinguishment of the usufruct, if it be possible to do so without damage to the property.

DOCTRINE

The usufruct of a widow may be transferred, assigned or otherwise disposed of by her as she may please, like any other hereditary property, and hence, an interest in real property which can be sold upon execution.