Law School Notes

International Broadcasting Corporation, Inc. vs. Amarilla

GR No. 162775;  Oct.  27, 2006 DOCTRINE: Pensions, retirement, and separation are exempt from WHT when the employer maintained a  “reasonable private benefit plan” Approved by the BIRRetirees have been in the service for 10 yearsThe retiree has not previously availed a privilege under the retirement benefit FACTS: Four (4) employees retired (years – 1995, 1998(2), 1996) from the company and received, on staggered basis, their retirement benefits under the 1993 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) A P1,500.00 salary increase was given to all employees of the company, current and retired, effective July 1994. However, when the four retirees demanded theirs, petitioner refused and instead informed them that their differentials would be used to offset the tax due on their retirement benefits in accordance with the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). The four (4) retirees filed separate complaints for unfair labor practice and non-payment of backwages before the NLRC. The complainants averred that their retirement benefits are exempt from income tax under Article 32 of the NIRC. Petitioner averred that under Section 21 of the NIRC, the retirement benefits received by employees from their employers constitute taxable income. While retirement benefits are exempt from taxes under Section 28(b) of said Code, the law requires that such benefits received should be in accord with a reasonable retirement plan duly registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) after compliance with the requirements therein enumerated. Since its retirement plan in the 1993 CBA was not approved by the BIR, complainants were liable for income tax on their retirement benefits. The NLRC held that the benefits of the retirement plan under the CBAs were subject to tax as the scheme was not approved by the BIR. However, it had also been the practice of petitioner to give retiring employees their retirement pay without tax deductions and there was no justifiable reason for the respondent to deviate from such practice. ISSUES:  1. whether the retirement benefits of respondents are part of their gross income because the retirement plan under the CBA was not approved by the BIR 2. Whether the petitioner is bound and obliged to pay the withholding taxes on their retirement benefits HELD: 1. YES. the retirement benefits of respondents are part of their gross income subject to taxes. NIRC; Sec. 28. Gross Income. –  b) Exclusions from gross income. – The following items shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under this Title:(7) Retirement benefits, pensions, gratuities, etc. – (A) Retirement benefits received by officials and employees of private firms whether individuals or corporate, in accordance with a reasonable private benefit plan maintained by the employer: Provided, That the retiring official or employee has been in the service of the same employer for at least ten (10) years and is not less than fifty years of age at the time of his retirement: Provided, further, That the benefits granted under this subparagraph shall be availed of by an official or employee only once. For purposes of this subsection, the term “reasonable private benefit plan” means a pension, gratuity, stock bonus or profit-sharing plan maintained by an employer for the benefit of some or all of his officials or employees, where contributions are made by such employer for officials or employees, or both, for the purpose of distributing to such officials and employees the earnings and principal of the fund thus accumulated, and wherein it is provided in said plan that at no time shall any part of the corpus or income of the fund be used for, or be diverted to, any purpose other than for the exclusive benefit of the said official and employees. Revenue Regulation No. 12-86, the implementing rules of the foregoing provisions, provides: (b) Pensions, retirements and separation pay. – Pensions, retirement and separation pay constitute compensation subject to withholding tax, except the following:(1) Retirement benefit received by official and employees of private firms under a reasonable private benefit plan maintained by the employer, if the following requirements are met:(i) The retirement plan must be approved by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;(ii) The retiring official or employees must have been in the service of the same employer for at least ten (10) years and is not less than fifty (50) years of age at the time of retirement; and(iii) The retiring official or employee shall not have previously availed of the privilege under the retirement benefit plan of the same or another employer. Thus, for the retirement benefits to be exempt from the withholding tax, the taxpayer is burdened to prove the concurrence of the following elements: (1) a reasonable private benefit plan is maintained by the employer; (2) the retiring official or employee has been in the service of the same employer for at least 10 years; (3) the retiring official or employee is not less than 50 years of age at the time of his retirement; and (4) the benefit had been availed of only once.  Respondents were qualified to retire optionally from their employment with petitioner. However, there is no evidence on record that the 1993 CBA had been approved or was ever presented to the BIR; hence, the retirement benefits of respondents are taxable. 2. NO. Under the CBA, it is not obliged to pay for the taxes on the respondents’ retirement benefits.The CBA has no provision where petitioner obliged itself to pay the taxes on the retirement benefits of its employees. However, petitioner did not withhold the taxes due on their retirement benefits because it had obliged itself to pay the taxes due thereon. This was done to induce respondents to agree to avail of the optional retirement scheme.  Petitioner had agreed to shoulder such taxes to entice them to voluntarily retire early, on its belief that this would prove advantageous to it. Respondents agreed and relied on the commitment of petitioner. For petitioner to renege on its contract with respondents simply because its new management had found the same disadvantageous would amount to a breach…

BIR vs. First E-Bank Tower Condominium Corp.,

GR No. 215801 dated January 15, 2020 FACTS: The First E-Bank filed the petition below for declaratory relief seeking to declare as invalid Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 65-2012 entitled “Clarifying the Taxability of Association Dues, Membership Fees and Other Assessments/ Charges Collected by Condominium Corporations”.  The First E-Bank essentially alleged: It was a non-stock non-profit condominium corporation. RMC No. 65-2012 burdened the owners of the condominium units with income tax and VAT on their own money which they exclusively used for the maintenance and preservation of the building and its premises. RMC No. 65-2012 was oppressive and confiscatory because it required condominium unit owners to produce additional amounts for the thirty-two percent (32%) income tax and twelve percent (12%) VAT. ISSUES: (1) whether association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges collected by a condominium corporation in the usual course of trade or business shall be subject under income tax.  (2) Compare the definition of income.  HELD: 1. NO. RMC No. 65-2012 is invalid for ordaining that “gross receipts of condominium corporations including association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges are subject to VAT, income tax and income payments made to it are subject to applicable withholding taxes.  First, The collection of association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges is purely for the benefit of the condominium owners. It is a necessary incident to the purpose to effectively oversee, maintain, or even improve the common areas of the condominium as well as its governance. As held in Yamane “[t]he profit motive in such cases is hardly the driving factor behind such improvements,  if  it were contemplated at all. Any profit that would be derived under such circumstances would merely be incidental, if  not accidental.” More, a condominium corporation is especially formed for the purpose of holding title to the common area and exists only for the benefit of the condominium owners. In order to constitute “income,” there must be realized “gain.” Clearly, because of the nature of membership fees and assessment dues as funds inherently dedicated for the maintenance, preservation, and upkeep of the clubs’ general operations and facilities, nothing is to be gained from their collection.  This stands in contrast to the fees received by recreational clubs coming from their income-generating facilities, such as bars, restaurants, and food concessionaires, or from income-generating activities, like the renting out of sports equipment, services, and other accommodations: In these latter examples, regardless of the purpose of the fees’ eventual use, gain is already realized from the moment they are collected because capital maintenance, preservation. or upkeep is not their pre-determined purpose. As such, recreational clubs are generally free to use these fees for whatever purpose they desire and thus, considered as unencumbered “fruits” coming from a business transaction. Second, In defining taxable income, Section 31 of RA 8424 states: Section 31. Taxable Income Defined.- The term taxable income means the pertinent items of gross income specified in this Code, less the deductions and/or personal and additional exemptions, if any, authorized for such types of income by this Code or other special laws. Gross income means income derived from whatever source, including compensation for services; the conduct of trade or business or the exercise of a profession; dealings in property; interests; rents; royalties; dividends; annuities; prizes and winnings; pensions; and a partner’s distributive share in the net income of a general professional partnership, among others (Sec. 32)  On December 19, 2017, Section 31 was amended by Republic Act No. 10963 (RA 10963 )44 (The TRAIN Law). The provision now reads: Sec. 31. Taxable Income Defined. The term “taxable income” means the pertinent items of gross income specified in this Code, less deductions if any, authorized for such types of income by this Code or other special laws. There is no substantial difference between the original definition under RA 8424 and the subsequent definition under the TRAIN Law. The only difference is that the phrase “and/or personal and additional exemptions” was deleted. Still, both the former and current definitions are consistent— ‘taxable income’ refers to “the pertinent items of gross income specified in this Code.”Section 32 of RA 8424 does not include association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges collected by condominium corporations as sources of gross income. The subsequent amendment under the TRAIN Law substantially replicates the old Section 32. Clearly, RMC No. 65-2012 expanded, if not altered, the list of taxable items in the law. RMC No. 65-2012, therefore, is void. Besides, where the basic law and a rule or regulation are in conflict, the basic law prevails. 2. There is no substantial difference between the original definition under RA 8424 and the subsequent definition under the TRAIN Law. The only difference is that the phrase “and/or personal and additional exemptions” was deleted. Still, both the former and current definitions are consistent— ‘taxable income’ refers to “the pertinent items of gross income specified in this Code.”

Manila Mandarin Hotels, Inc. vs. CIR

CTA Case No. 5046 dated March 24, 1997 FACTS: Petitioner received an assessment notice demanding the payment of deficiency value-added and percentage taxes. Petitioner protested abd alleged that the tax deficiencies arose due to the imposition of the tax on deposits made by its clients for the use of the hotel facilities. Petitioner contends that these deposits, if not applied against hotel bills is not subject to percentage tax because these deposits partake of the nature of a security deposit which cannot be classified as income. ISSUE: Whether deposits made by petitioner’s hotel clients should not be treated as part of Its gross income. HELD: YES. Under the realization principle, revenue is generally recognized when both of the following conditions are met: (a) the earning process is complete or virtually complete, and (b) an exchange has taken place. This principle requires that revenue must be earned before It is recorded. Thus, the amounts received in advance are not treated as revenue of the period in which they are received but as revenue of the future period or periods in which they are earned. These amounts are carried as unearned revenue, that is, liabilities to transfer goods or future until the earning render services in the process is complete. As explained by the witness Ms. Fernando, its collection is in the nature of a security deposit to ensure that the other party will perform his end of the contract. It is only upon the use of the reserved facilities or the default of the reserving guest to cancel the reservation on time that the deposit is clearly convertible to revenues. Since the deposits are payment for future services it cannot be treated as part of its gross income unti the earning process Is complete.

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Associations, Inc. vs. Romulo;

G. R. No. 160756. March 9, 2010 FACTS: Petitioner assails the validity of the imposition of minimum corporate income tax (MCIT) on corporations and creditable withholding tax (CWT) on sales of real properties classified as ordinary assets. Petitioner argues that the MCIT under Section 27(E) of RA 8424 is unconstitutional because it is highly oppressive, arbitrary and confiscatory which amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law. It explains that gross income as defined under said provision only considers the cost of goods sold and other direct expenses; other major expenditures, such as administrative and interest expenses which are equally necessary to produce gross income, were not taken into account. Thus, pegging the tax base of the MCIT to a corporation’s gross income is tantamount to a confiscation of capital because gross income, unlike net income, is not “realized gain.” the collection of CWT on the sale of real properties categorized as ordinary assets is contrary to law as (a) they ignore the different treatment by RA 8424 of ordinary assets and capital assets and second; (b) Secretary of Finance has no authority to collect CWT, much less, to base the CWT on the gross selling price or fair market value of the real properties classified as ordinary assets. ISSUES: Whether the tax base of the MCIT to a corporation’s gross income is tantamount to a confiscation of capital because gross income unlike net income is not realized gain HELD: NO. For income to be taxable, the following requisites must exist: there must be gain;the gain must be realized or received andthe gain must not be excluded by law or treaty from taxation. Certainly, an income tax is arbitrary and confiscatory if it taxes capital because capital is not income. In other words, it is income, not capital, which is subject to income tax. However, the MCIT is not a tax on capital. The MCIT is imposed on gross income which is arrived at by deducting the capital spent by a corporation in the sale of its goods, i.e., the cost of goods and other direct expenses from gross sales. Clearly, the capital is not being taxed. Furthermore, the MCIT is not an additional tax imposition. It is imposed in lieu of the normal net income tax, and only if the normal income tax is suspiciously low. The MCIT merely approximates the amount of net income tax due from a corporation, pegging the rate at a very much reduced 2% and uses as the base the corporation’s gross income. In sum, petitioner failed to support, by any factual or legal basis, its allegation that the MCIT is arbitrary and confiscatory. The Court cannot strike down a law as unconstitutional simply because of its yokes. Taxation is necessarily burdensome because, by its nature, it adversely affects property rights. The party alleging the law’s unconstitutionality has the burden to demonstrate the supposed violations in understandable terms

CIR vs. Shinko Electric Industries Co., Ltd.,

GR No. 226287 dated July 6, 2021 FACTS: Respondent Shinko is a Philippine-registered representative office of a Japanese corporation.  It is licensed in the Philippines as a representative office to “undertake activities such as but not limited to information dissemination, promotion of the parent company’s products, quality control of products as well as all other activities which may be legally undertaken by a representative office. Assessments for deficiency income tax and VAT were issued against Shinko.  Shinko argued that it is a representative office of a foreign corporation, and, as such, it does not derive income from sources within the Philippines. Hence, it is not liable for deficiency income tax and VAT, as well as the compromise penalty. The CIR claimed that since Shinko is engaged in the “promotion of the parent company’s product” as stated in its SEC Registration, it should be taxed as a Regional Operating Headquarter (ROHQ) which derives income from the Philippines. The CTA Division declared Shinko is a representative office treated as an RHQ that is exempt from income tax and is not liable to pay VAT. CTA EB denied the CIR’s Motion for Reconsideration The CIR maintains that Shinko should be treated as a taxable ROHQ because it renders “qualifying services” as enumerated in Section 22(EE) of the NIRC, as amended ISSUE: Whether Shinko is liable for the assessed deficiency income tax and VAT. HELD: NO. Section 23(F) of the NIRC, as amended, states that “[a] foreign corporation, whether engaged or not in trade or business in the Philippines, is taxable only on income derived from sources within the Philippines.” As discussed, a representative office, such as Shinko, does not engage in income-generating activities in the Philippines. Thus, akin to an RHQ, a representative office is considered exempt from income tax and VAT. The amounts subject of the assessment are not considered income and thus, cannot be subject to income tax and VAT.  Further, in defining income, the Court in case of Madrigal and Paterno v. Rafferty and Concepcion differentiated it from capital and said that “[t]he essential difference between capital and income is that capital is a fund; income is a flow. A fund of property existing at an instant of time is called capital. A flow of services rendered by that capital by the payment of money from it or any other benefit rendered by a fund of capital in relation to such fund through a period of time is called income. Capital is wealth, while income is the service of wealth.” Thus, an income tax is arbitrary and confiscatory if it taxes capital because capital is not income. In other words, it is income, not capital, which is subject to income tax. Likewise, case law instructs that for income to be taxable, the following requisites must exist: (1) there must be gain; (2) the gain must be realized or received; and (3) the gain must not be excluded by law or treaty from taxation. The amounts considered by the CIR as Shinko’s income actually came from the subsidies remitted by its head office abroad, for Shinko’s operations in the Philippines. Certainly, these remittances cannot be considered as income because they are not payment for the services rendered by Shinko. They cannot be regarded as a gain realized by Shinko or a flow of fruits from Shinko’s labor. At the very least, the remittances Shinko received as subsidy from its parent company can only be regarded as capital which is intended for the continued operation of a representative office in the Philippines, and from which no income tax may be collected or imposed. The subsidy given to Shinko was not derived in relation to any sale, barter or exchange of goods or services in the course of trade or business. The subsidy was not in payment for goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged by Shinko.77 As such, the subsidy Shinko received from its parent company cannot be subject to VAT.


GR No. 228539 dated June 26, 2019 FACTS:  The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued RMC No. 35-2012 which provides-  income of recreational clubs from whatever source, including but not limited to membership fees, assessment dues, rental income, and service fees are subject to income tax.the gross receipts of recreational clubs including but not limited to membership fees, assessment dues, rental income, and service fees are subject to VAT.  Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC seeking to declare RMC No. 35-2012 invalid, unjust, oppressive, confiscatory, and in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.  ANPC argued that in issuing RMC No. 35-2012, the BIR acted beyond its rule-making authority in interpreting that payments of membership fees, assessment dues, and service fees are considered as income subject to income tax, as well as a sale of service that is subject to VAT,  The RTC denied the petition for declaratory relief[24] and upheld the validity and constitutionality of RMC No. 35-2012. ISSUE: Whether all income generated from whatever source, including membership fees, assessment dues, rental income, and service fees. (a) all income generated from whatever source shall be liable for income tax and (b) gross receipts subject to VAT. HELD: NO. The Court DECLARES that membership fees, assessment dues, and fees of similar nature collected by clubs which are organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofit purposes do not constitute as: (a) “the income of recreational clubs from whatever source” that are “subject to income tax”; and (b) part of the “gross receipts of recreational clubs” that are “subject to [Value Added Tax].” RMC No. 35-2012 erroneously foisted a sweeping interpretation that membership fees and assessment dues are sources of income of recreational clubs from which income tax liability may accrue, The distinction between “capital” and “income” is well-settled in our jurisprudence. As held in the early case of Madrigal v. Rafferty, “capital” has been delineated as a “fund” or “wealth,” as opposed to “income” being “the flow of services rendered by capital” or the “service of wealth”. Income as contrasted with capital or property is to be the test. The essential difference between capital and income is that capital is a fund; income is a flow. Capital is wealth, while income is the service of wealth. Case law provides that in order to constitute “income,” there must be realized “gain.” Clearly, because of the nature of membership fees and assessment dues as funds inherently dedicated for the maintenance, preservation, and upkeep of the clubs’ general operations and facilities, nothing is to be gained from their collection. Further, given these recreational clubs’ non-profit nature, membership fees and assessment dues cannot be considered as funds that would represent these clubs’ interest or profit from any investment. In fact, these fees are paid by the clubs’ members without any expectation of any yield or gain (unlike in stock subscriptions), but only for the above-stated purposes and in order to retain their membership therein. In fine, for as long as these membership fees, assessment dues, and the like are treated as collections by recreational clubs from their members as an inherent consequence of their membership, and are, by nature, intended for the maintenance, preservation, and upkeep of the clubs’ general operations and facilities, then these fees cannot be classified as “the income of recreational clubs from whatever source” that are “subject to income tax.” Instead, they only form part of capital from which no income tax may be collected or imposed. It is a well-enshrined principle in our jurisdiction that the State cannot impose a tax on capital as it constitutes an unconstitutional confiscation of property.

Aces Philippines Cellular Satellite Corporation

GR No. 226680 dated January 30, 2023 FACTS: The case involved two parties—Aces Philippines (a subsidiary of PLDT) and Aces International Limited, a company incorporated in Bermuda (Aces Bermuda).  Through a couple of agreements, Aces Bermuda provided satellite services to Aces Philippines, wherein Aces Bermuda sold satellite communications time to Aces Philippines, which in turn, became the exclusive distributor of these satellite communications time to its subscribers in the Philippines. For the satellite communications time it uses, Aces Philippines would then pay Aces Bermuda satellite air time fees. Aces Bermuda owned the satellite, along with its control center in Indonesia. Aces Philippines owned the gateway facilities inside the Philippines which received the calls and routed them to local subscribers. The process is –  The satellite receives and beams signals from space, upon instructions from its control center in Indonesia (Step 1),The Philippine gateway receives the signals and routes it to its local subscribers (Step 2). In 2007, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) audited and subsequently assessed Aces Philippines for unpaid withholding taxes, essentially claiming that the satellite air time fees received by Aces Bermuda, a non-resident foreign corporation, were taxable in the Philippines. Aces Philippines argued that the income from these payments was not sourced from the Philippines because Aces Bermuda: (a) performed the relevant service completely outside of the Philippines;  (b) id not own any equipment in the Philippines. Aces Philippines claimed that the income-producing activity is the receipt and beaming of satellite signals—which all happen outside the Philippines, since the satellite is in outer space and its control center was in Indonesia. And since those all happen outside the Philippines, then it’s not taxable here. ISSUES:  Are satellite services provided by a non-resident foreign satellite operator taxable in the Philippines? any income from these gateway facilities could not be attributed to Aces Bermuda because Aces Philippines is the owner of the gateway facilities in the Philippines, not Aces Bermuda HELD: 1. YES. For the Court, the income-producing activity was the entire process, ending in Step 2 or the gateway’s receipt of the call as routed by the satellite. And as the gateways were in the Philippines, then it was taxable in the Philippines. The Court reasoned that the income-generating activity took place only upon the gateway’s receipt of the call in the Philippines for two reasons: Only when the gateway receives the call was the service completed or delivered, and The inflow of economic benefits from the Philippines to Aces Bermuda On the Court’s reasoning on the completion of service, it stated that the different steps in the Aces System should not be taken piece-meal and in isolation because everything was inter-connected based on the agreements between Aces Bermuda and Aces Philippines. Aces Bermuda undertook to provide satellite communication time to Aces Philippines, and it could only do so by the gateway’s receipt of the call here in the Philippines. On the inflow of economic benefits, the Court noted that the satellite air time fees accrued only when the satellite air time was delivered (i.e. upon the gateway’s receipt of the call) to Aces Philippines. This accrual of fees signified the inflow of economic benefits: since Aces Philippines and its end-users who benefited from the Aces System were here, then the income-generating activity were situated here as well. 2. NO. it didn’t matter who owned the facilities because these were constructed primarily to serve the needs and requirements of the Aces System. Without these facilities, the entire system would be for naught. The income generation, the Court said, was dependent on the operations of these facilities in the Philippines, regardless if it was owned or not by the foreign entity. DOCTRINE: Payments for satellite services are subject to income tax

Saint Wealth Ltd. vs. BIR

GR Nos. 252965 & 254102 dated December 7, 2021 DOCTRINE: POGO licensees derive no income from the sources within the Philippines because the “activity” that produces income occurs and is located outside the territory of the Philippines FACTS: From 2016, the Philippines began regulating online gaming hubs, specifically the Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators (POGOs). Thus, on September 1, 2016, the PAGCOR issued the Rules and Regulations for Philippine Offshore Gaming Operations.  In 2017, the BIR issued RMC No. 102-2017,  which recognized that online activity is sufficient to constitute doing business in the Philippines, and clarified the taxability of POGOs. Under RMC No. 102-2017, Licensees must pay  a five percent (5%) franchise tax, in lieu of all other taxes, for their income arising from their gaming operations. Such franchise tax is based on their entire gross gaming revenues. For income arising from non-gaming operations, Licensees must pay normal income tax, value-added tax (VAT), and other applicable taxes In addition, RMC No. 64-2020 was issued which impose requirements for POGO registration and BIR clearance In 2020, during the pandemic, the Bayanihan 2 Law outlines the sources of funding for the COVID-19 measures which includes – a five percent (5%) franchise tax based on the gross bets or turnovers earned by POGOs.  Saint Wealth Ltd. (Saint Wealth), an offshore-based POGO licensee, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the constitutionality of RMC No. 64-2020 as it violates   the fundamental principle of situs of taxation. Under Philippine tax laws, non-­resident foreign corporations are only liable to pay taxes on income received from sources within the Philippines. However, Saint Wealth’s income is derived from sources outside the Philippines since all of its operations are located abroad. Therefore, it should not be subjected to any Philippine tax. the rule on uniformity of taxation because it treats differently offshore-based POGO licensees from other foreign corporations which are not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines. Other off-shore POGO licensees filed a petition to declare Bayanihan 2 unconstitutional because it whimsically disregards the principle of territoriality in taxation. Similar to Section 11(f) of the Bayanihan 2 Law, Section 11(g) also violates the principle of territoriality in taxation because it taxes “non-gaming” income of offshore-based POGO licensees derived from sources abroad. The BIR stated that the tax impositions on POGO licensees do not violate the principles of situs and uniformity of taxation. The principle of situs of taxation only applies to income taxation. Clearly, such principle does not apply in the imposition of franchise tax – the tax imposed upon POGO licensees. Assuming arguendo that the principle of situs of taxation applies, the revenues of POGOs are still subject to tax because  income-producing activity of POGOs is its entire gaming operations, therefore, taxable in the Philippine jurisdiction ISSUE: Whether offshore-based POGO licensees are liable to pay income tax, VAT, and other applicable taxes for income derived from their non-gaming operations. HELD: NO. The BIR can only Impose Income Tax Upon Income Derived from the Philippines; VAT can only be Imposed for Services and Goods Consumed in the Philippines. The offshore-based POGO licensees derive no income from the sources within the Philippines because the “activity” which produces income occurs and is located outside the territory of the Philippines. Indeed, the flow of wealth or the income-generating activity – the placing of bets less the amount of payout – transpires outside the Philippines. Section 42(A) of the NIRC provides the guidelines in determining what income is derived from sources within the Philippines, while Section 42(C) thereof identifies what income is sourced without. The test is to determine if the income originated from the Philippines. The source of an income is the property, activity or service that produced the income. For the source of income to be considered as coming from the Philippines, it is sufficient that the income is derived from activity within the Philippines. In BOAC, the Court held that, while the actual transportation would occur outside the Philippines, the sale of tickets in the Philippines already constituted a taxable activity. Applying the rulings of BOAC, offshore-based POGO licensees derive no income from the sources within the Philippines because the “activity” that produces income occurs and is located outside the territory of the Philippines. Under the POGO Rules and Regulations, POGOs are entities which provide and participate in offshore gaming services. Offshore gaming has three components: 1. Prize consisting of money or something else of value which can be won under the rules of the game; 2. A player who: being located outside of the Philippines and not a Filipino citizen, enters the game remotely or takes any step in the game by means of a communication device capable of accessing an electronic communication network such as the or undertakes to give, a monetary payment or other valuable consideration to enter in the course of, or for, the game; and 3. The winning of a prize is decided by chance. All these three components do not involve and are not performed within the Philippine territory. None of these components likewise deals with Filipino citizens. To reiterate, the placing of bets occurs outside the Philippines; the players must not be Filipino citizens, or within the Philippines; and the payment of the prize also occurs outside of the Philippines. The only transaction entered into by these offshore-based POGO licensees are the service contracts with these service providers located in the Philippines. Justice Dimaampao also observed the necessity to discuss the other jurisprudential tests to ascertain whether a resident foreign corporation is “doing” or “engaging in” or “transacting” business in the Philippines, to determine the taxability of POGOs, particularly offshore-based POGO licensees, within the jurisdiction of the Philippines.Substance Test – the true test in determining whether a foreign corporation is transacting business “seems to be whether [it] is continuing the body or substance of the business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another.”Contract Test – transactions entered…

CIR vs. British Overseas Airways Corporation

GR Nos. L-65773-74 dated April 30, 1987 FACTS: BOAC, a resident foreign corporation, was “engaged in” business in the Philippines. BOAC has appointed a ticket sales agent in the Philippines  which is engaged in (1) selling and issuing tickets; (2) breaking down the whole trip into series of trips—each trip in the series corresponding to a different airline company; (3) receiving the fare from the whole trip; and (4) consequently allocating to the various airline companies on the basis of their participation in the services CIR, assessed BOAC for deficiency income taxes covering the years 1959 to 1963. BOAC paid this assessment under protest. BOAC filed a claim for refund of the amount of P858,307.79, which claim was denied by the CIR.  BOAC filed a petition for review with the Tax Court assailing the assessment and praying for the refund of the amount paid. The Tax Court reversed the ClR for the reason that the proceeds of sales of BOAC passage tickets in the Philippines do not constitute as income from Philippine sources “since no service of carriage of passengers or freight was performed by BOAC within the Philippines” ISSUE:  Whether or not the revenue derived by private respondent British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) from sales of tickets in the Philippines for air transportation, while having no landing rights here, constitute income of BOAC from Philippine sources, and, accordingly, taxable. HELD: YES. the sale of tickets in the Philippines is the activity that produces the income. The tickets exchanged hands here and payments for fares were also made here in Philippine currency. The situs of the source of payments is the Philippines. The flow of wealth proceeded from, and occurred within, Philippine territory, enjoying the protection accorded by the Philippine government. In consideration of such protection, the flow of wealth should share the burden of supporting the government. Section 37(a) of the Tax Code, which enumerates items of gross income from sources within the Philippines, namely: (1) interest, (2) dividends, (3) service, (4) rentals and royalties, (5) sale of real property, and (6) sale of personal property, does not mention income from the sale of tickets for international transportation. However, that does not render it less an income from sources within the Philippines. Section 37, by its language, does not intend the enumeration to be exclusive. It merely directs that the types of income listed therein be treated as income from sources within the Philippines. DOCTRINE: The absence of flight operations to and from the Philippines is not determinative of the source of income or the situs of income taxation. The test of taxability is the “source”; and the source of an income is that activity x x x which produced the income. Unquestionably, the passage documentations in these cases were sold in the Philippines and the revenue therefrom was derived from a business activity regularly pursued within the Philippines.

National Development Company vs. CIR

G.R. No. 53961; June 30, 1987 FACTS: National Development Company entered into contracts in Tokyo with several Japanese shipbuilding companies for the construction of twelve ocean-going vessels. Upon completion, the NDC remitted to the shipbuilders in Tokyo the total amount of US$4,066,580.70 as interest on the balance of the purchase price. No tax was withheld.  The Commissioner then held the NDC liable for such tax in the total sum of P5,115,234.74. The BIR thereupon served on the NDC a warrant of distraint and levy to enforce collection of the claimed amount.   CTA sustained the assessment of BIR except for a slight reduction of the tax deficiency in the sum of P900.00, representing the compromise penalty. NDC then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari. The petitioner argues that the Japanese shipbuilders were not subject to tax because all the related activities — the signing of the contract, the construction of the vessels, the payment of the stipulated price, and their delivery to the NDC — were done in Tokyo ISSUE: Whether the NDC should have had withheld tax from interest payments made to a foreign corporation. HELD: YES. The law, however, does not speak of activity but of “source,” (the source of the income) which in this case is the NDC. This is a domestic and resident corporation with principal offices in Manila.  SEC. 37. Income from sources within the Philippines. — (a) Gross income from sources within the Philippines. — The following items of gross income shall be treated as gross income from sources within the Philippines:(1) Interest. — Interest derived from sources within the Philippines, and interest on bonds, notes, or other interest-bearing obligations of residents, corporate or otherwise; The Government’s right to levy and collect income tax on interest received by foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines is not planted upon the condition that ‘the activity or labor — and the sale from which the (interest) income flowed had its situs’ in the Philippines.  The residence of the obligor who pays the interest rather than the physical location of the securities, bonds or notes or the place of payment, is the determining factor of the source of interest income. It is not the NDC that is being taxed. The tax was due on the interests earned by the Japanese shipbuilders. It was the income of these companies and not the Republic of the Philippines that was subject to the tax the NDC did not withhold. In effect, therefore, the imposition of the deficiency taxes on the NDC is a penalty for its failure to withhold the same from the Japanese shipbuilders. Such liability is imposed by Section 53(c) of the Tax Code. DOCTRINE: The residence of the obligor who pays the interest rather than the physical location of the securities, bonds or notes or the place of payment, is the determining factor of the source of interest income.

Novecio vs. Lim, Jr;

G.R. No. 193809. March 23, 2015. FACTS: Respondents filed complaints for forcible entry with damages against petitioners for unlawfully squatting and taking possession of several portions of land.  The petitioners allegedly planted crops, erected makeshift shelters, and continued to plant and/or improve the shelters without the consent and/or against the will of the respondents.The respondents anchored their alleged prior possession on the fact that they have applied title for the land as shown by a certification authorizing land survey Petitioners contended that they have already been in possession of the land for more than two years when the complaints were filed.  The MTC ruled in favor of the petitioners.  The RTC reversed the decision of MTC and ruled that the respondents were the actual occupants of the property long before the petitioners had taken possession of the same property.   The respondents sought the execution of the RTC judgment. The petitioners filed an Extremely Urgent Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. The CA issued a TRO but denied petitioners’ application for a preliminary injunction. The CA, without necessarily resolving the petition on the merits, held that the petitioners were not entitled to the relief demanded ISSUE: Whether CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it denied the petitioners’ prayer for preliminary injunction. HELD: YES, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the injunctive relief prayed for by the petitioners. A review of the records, however, shows that the  CA ignored relevant facts that would have justified the issuance of a preliminary injunction. CA also denied the prayer for preliminary injunction without giving the factual and legal bases for such denial. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a preliminary injunction may be granted when the following have been established: That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consist in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; orThat a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual 1. In a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not required to submit conclusive and complete evidence. He is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint.  In this case, the petitioners have adequately shown their entitlement to a preliminary injunction. First, the relief demanded consists in restraining the execution of the RTC decision ordering their ejectment from the disputed land. Second, their ejectment from the land from which they derive their source of livelihood would work injustice to the petitioners. Finally, the execution of the RTC decision is probably in violation of the rights of the petitioners, tending to render the MTC judgment dismissing the forcible entry cases ineffectual.2. Moreover, the court in granting or dismissing an application for a writ of preliminary injunction based on the pleadings of the parties and their respective evidence must state in its order the findings and conclusions based on the evidence and the law. This is to enable the appellate court to determine whether the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in resolving, one way or the other, the plea for injunctive relief.

Solid Builders, Inc. vs. China Banking Corporation;

G.R. No. 179665. April 3, 2013. DOCTRINE: A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights. A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant’s showing of two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury. FACTS: China Banking granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc. (SBI), which amounted to P139,999,234.34, exclusive of interests and other charges. To secure the loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBC’s favor several surety agreements and contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of land. SBI and MFII have made various requests to CBC for restructuring of the loan,  reduction of interests and penalties. In response, CBC explained that the increase in the interest were voluntarily and willingly signed by the parties. Claiming that the interests, penalties and charges imposed by CBC were iniquitous and unconscionable and to enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure proceedings, SBI and MFII filed a Complaint “To Compel Execution of Contract and for Performance and Damages, With Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order” The RTC granted the application of SBI and MFII for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court held that SBI and MFII were able to sufficiently comply with the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ. The CA ruled that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction had no basis and the trial court simply relied on the imposition by CBC of the interest rates to the loans obtained by SBI and MFII.  ISSUE:  Whether or not plaintiffs have the right to ask for an injunctive writ in order to prevent defendant bank from taking over their properties. HELD: NO.  First, there is NO clear right that warrants the extraordinary protection of an injunctive writ has been shown by SBI and MFII to exist in their favor, the first requirement for the grant of a preliminary injunction has not been satisfied.  SBI and MFII do not have a right to prevent the creditor-mortgagee CBC from foreclosing on the mortgaged properties simply on the basis of alleged “usurious, exorbitant and confiscatory rate of interest.” In a usurious loan with mortgage, the right to foreclose the mortgage subsists, and this right can be exercised by the creditor upon failure by the debtor to pay the debt due.  In addition, the default of SBI and MFII to pay the mortgage indebtedness disqualifies them from availing of the equitable relief that is the injunctive writ. SBI’s default or failure to settle its obligation is a breach of contractual obligation which tainted its hands and disqualified it from availing of the equitable remedy of preliminary injunction. As SBI is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, so is MFII. The accessory follows the principal. The accessory obligation of MFII as accommodation mortgagor and surety is tied to SBI’s principal obligation to CBC and arises only in the event of SBI’s default. Thus, MFII’s interest in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is necessarily prejudiced by SBI’s wrongful conduct and breach of contract. Neither has there been a showing of irreparable injury. An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.

Idolor vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 141853. February 7, 2001. FACTS: On March 21, 1994, Idolor secured a loan of 520,000 and executed a Real Estate Mortgage with the right of extrajudicial foreclosure in favor of De Guzman. Due to Idolor’s failure to settle the account, De Guzman filed a complaint which resulted in “Kasunduang Pagaayos. Despite the extension provided, Idolor failed to comply with the undertaking. De Guzman filed an extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage pursuant to the parties’ agreement. On May 23, 1997, the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to respondent De Guzman, as the highest bidder. the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997. On June 25, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of Sheriffs Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction against private respondents. She alleged irregularity and lack of notice in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings subject of the real estate mortgage. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.Spouses de Guzman filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking annulment of the trial court’s order. The CA granted the petition and annulled the assailed writ of preliminary injunction. ISSUE: Whether the petitioner has no more proprietary right to the issuance of the writ of injunction. YES HELD:  YES. The petitioner has no more proprietary right to speak of over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction.  Petitioner had one year from the registration of the sheriff’s sale to redeem the property but she failed to exercise her right on or before June 23, 1998, thus spouses de Guzman are now entitled to a conveyance and possession of the foreclosed property. When the petitioner filed her complaint for annulment of sheriff’s sale against private respondents with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on June 25, 1998, she failed to show sufficient interest or title in the property sought to be protected as her right of redemption had already expired on June 23, 1998, i.e. two (2) days before the filing of the complaint.  It is always a ground for denying injunction that the party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the ultimate relief sought—in other words, that she shows no equity. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. Notes:  Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated.

Camarines Sur Teachers and Employees Association vs Province of Camarines Sur;

G.R. No. 199666, October 07, 2019 DOCTRINE: The perceived single violation by CASTEA when weighed against its substantial compliance of the other “conditions” or prestations of the donation and the avowed purpose of the donation is, as it should be, considered insignificant to trigger the application of the automatic revocation clause. FACTS: In 1966, the Local Government of the Province of Camarines Sur thru then Governor Apolonio G. Maleniza donated a property covered by OCT No. 22 with an approximate area of Six Hundred (600) square meters to the Camarines Sur Teachers’ Association, Inc. (CASTEA) by virtue of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by the parties. The condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the the land for no other purpose except the construction of its building to be used by Camarines Sur Teachers’ Association, Inc., in connection with its functions under its charter and by-laws. Provided that the DONEE shall not sell, mortgage or [e]ncumber the property herein donated including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any party and that the construction of the building shall be commenced within a period of one (1) year from and after the execution of this donation, otherwise, the donation shall be deemed automatically revoked. In 2007, the Province executed a Deed of Revocation of Donation thru Governor Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr. and served a copy thereof to [CASTEA]. The Province’s claim of possession is based on the assertion that CASTEA had violated the condition which triggered an automatic reversion of ownership thereof. In 2008, it filed a case for Unlawful Detainer against CASTEA.  The disputed breach emanates from the 20-year lease between CASTEA and Bodega Glassware, which CASTEA executed on September 29, 199571 or 29 years after the Deed of Donation that the Province executed on September 28, 1966. CASTEA maintains that it is still the owner of the donated property and posits that the revocation of the donation is not valid, and the action therefor has prescribed. It argues that its act of leasing out to Bodega Glassware portion of the building it constructed on the donated property does not constitute selling, mortgaging or encumbering the donated property or any improvements thereof. ISSUES:  1. What kind of donation is involved? 2. Is the automatic revocation clause in the donation valid? 3. May Article 1191 of the Civil Code be applied to determine the propriety of the rescission or resolution of the donation in case of non-compliance with its conditions? 4. Whether CASTEA’s breach of the Deed of Donation, if any, warrants the automatic revocation of the donation HELD:   1. The donation is both modal and onerous. Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa expounded on the different classifications of donations, viz.: According to its effects[,] donation may be classified into –  Pure – Pure donations are those not subject to any future and uncertain event nor to a period.Conditional – Conditional donations are those subject to a future and uncertain event which may either be suspensive or resolutory.with a term –  Donations with a term are those whose demandability [or termination] depends on the arrival of a term which may also be either suspensive or resolutory.Onerous. –  Onerous donations are those where a burden inferior in value to the property donated is imposed on the donee.  This kind of donations includes those  improper donations where a burden equal in value to the property donated is imposed; mixed donations. Mixed donation (negotium mixtum cum donatione) is one which contains an onerous transaction, e.g., a sale of a thing for a price lower than its value, made in the nature of a semi-donation.Modal donations. Modal donation is one which imposes on the donee a prestation.   In this connection the explanation of modal institution in succession provided in Article 882 is applicable. The prestation imposed on the donee may either be a burden or charge inferior in value to the property donated or services to be performed in the future. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) From an obligation point of view, there are two prestations imposed on CASTEA. One is to do, which is to use the donated property for the purpose intended and to construct the required building, and the other is not to do, which is not to sell, mortgage or encumber it to any person.  The prestation to construct a building is undoubtedly modal in nature as it imposed a prestation or obligation on CASTEA. Thus, the donation to CASTEA can properly be classified as a modal donation (because of CASTEA’s obligation to construct the required building) with a prestation not to alienate/encumber and an automatic revocation clause. The donation may also be classified as an onerous donation because there is a burden imposed on the donee in the absence of proof that the burden or charge (cost of the building) is superior or greater than the value of the donated 600 square meters lot at the time of the donation in September 1966. Whether the donation in question is classified as modal or onerous, there is no doubt that the rules governing contracts should prevail in the interpretation of the Deed of Donation pursuant to Articles 732 and 733 of the Civil Code. 2. YES.  Yes, automatic revocation clause is valid under the Principle of autonomy of contracts. Article 1306 of the Civil Code allows the parties “to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.” In contracts law, parties may agree to give one or both of them the right to rescind a contract unilaterally. While the legality of automatic revocation or rescission clauses in deeds of donation has been upheld, the courts are not precluded from determining whether their application or enforcement by the donors concerned are proper if the donees contest the revocation or rescission. If the court sustains its propriety, the court’s decision is not the act that revokes the donation but would be…

Lloyds Industrial vs NAPOCOR;

G.R. No. 190207, June 30, 2021 FACTS: Lloyds Richfield purchased parcels of land within its vicinity and quarried limestones from these areas, which would then be used to manufacture cement. NAPOCOR entered into negotiations with Lloyds Richfield to create an easement of right of way over the parcels of land for the construction of transmission lines.   When negotiations failed, the NAPOCOR filed a Complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Danao City relating to 7 lots owned by Lloyds .  Lloyds Richfield demanded by way of compulsory claim that the NAPOCOR pay the fair market value of the parcels of land, since the construction of transmission lines over its properties would render the properties useless to it. It also demanded to be paid the fair market value ofthe limestone deposits in the parcels of land. The Committee on Appraisal recommended an increase in the safety zone which would require NAPOCOR to  expropriate four more lots that were not originally cited in the Complaint.  NAPOCOR insisted that  That it could not be made to pay just compensation for the limestone deposits as these were minerals, which were owned not by Lloyds Richfield, but by the State. It contended that it may only acquire an easement of right of way over the parcels of land pursuant to Republic Act No. 6395, and thus, may only pay an easement fee equivalent to 10% of the market value of the lands to be expropriated. ISSUES:  Whether Lloyd is entitled to an amount equivalent to the fair market value of its properties expropriated by the National Power Corporation not just a 10% easement fee;Whether the award of just compensation for the limestone deposits shall be granted HELD:  1. YES. Here, constructing transmission lines over Lloyds Richfield’s properties impairs the principal purpose for which the parcels of expropriated land were actually devoted: quarrying activities. Consequently, a right-of-way easement will not suffice. Lloyds Richfield is entitled to the full market value of the properties as just compensation, not just an easement fee, for the taking of its properties. The Constitution mandates the payment of just compensation for the taking of private property for public use. Section 9 of the Bill of Rights provides: SECTION 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.Just compensation is “the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. “Just” means the compensation given to the owner for the taking of the property must be “real, substantial, full and ample.” In monetary terms, just compensation is the fair market value of the property taken. It is that “sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received for such property. Expropriation, however, is not limited to the taking of property with the corresponding transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. Easements of right of way fall within the purview of expropriation, allowed when the restrictions on the landowner’s property rights are not perpetual or indefinite In such a case, a mere easement fee may suffice. Here, expropriation by creating an easement of right of way is impossible. Constructing transmission lines over the expropriated properties placed an indefinite and perpetual restriction on Lloyds Richfield’s proprietary rights. This is especially true since Lloyds Richfield has been perpetually prohibited from conducting dynamite blasting and quarrying activities in the properties expropriated, or else the transmission lines would be damaged or completely destroyed, endangering lives and properties. Therefore, the National Power Corporation has no choice but to expropriate the properties in the traditional sense, to take the properties and acquire title, for which it must pay the full market value of the properties as just compensation. 2. Lloyds Richfield, however, is not entitled to just compensation for the limestone deposits in its properties. Under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution, the State owns all minerals found in Philippine soil. While Lloyds Richfield has title to the properties, it does not own the minerals underneath them, as shown by the permits and the Mineral Production Sharing Agreement it had to secure from the government to conduct quarrying activities in its properties. Article 437 of the Civil Code, which provides that the owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and everything under it, is not without limitations. For one, it is a statute that cannot trump a constitutional provision. Article 437 itself provides that it is “subject to special laws and ordinances.” Certainly, the Constitution can be considered a special law, if not the fundamental law, to which all statutes must conform. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that an owner of a parcel of land may even be ousted of ownership of their land should minerals be found underneath it, in which case, they shall be paid just compensation for the taking of the land, not for the taking of the minerals underneath it. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land devoted to “agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining.” Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong. … [O]nce minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein. For the loss…

Reyes vs. Valentin;

G.R. No. 194488. February 11, 2015. FACTS: Petitioner Reyes, filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, for easement of right of way against respondents, Spouses Valentin. Petitioner alleged that respondents’ 1,500-square-meter property surrounded her property and that it was the only adequate outlet from her property to the highway. A 113-square-meter portion of respondents’ property was also the “point least prejudicial to the [respondents]. The respondents despite demands and willingness to pay the amount, respondents refused to accede to the petitioner’s claims. They contended that the isolation of petitioner’s property was due to her mother’s own act of subdividing the property among her children without regard to the pendency of an agrarian case between her and her tenants. The property chosen by the petitioner as an easement was also the most burdensome for respondents. Respondents pointed to an open space that connected the petitioner’s property to another public road. The RTC denied the prayer and noted that the proposed right of way would pass through improvements, such as the respondents’ garage, garden, and grotto. The trial court also noted the existence of an irrigation canal that limited access to the public road ISSUE: Whether the petitioner has the compulsory easement of right of way over the respondents’ property. HELD: NO. Petitioner failed to satisfy the Civil Code requirements for the grant of easement rights The acts of petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest necessarily affect petitioner’s rights over the property. One of the requirements for the grant of an easement of right of way is that the isolation of the property is not due to the acts of the dominant estate’s owners. Assuming, however, that petitioner or her mother did not cause the isolation of petitioner’s property, petitioner still cannot be granted the easement of right of way over the proposed portion of respondents’ property. This is because she failed to satisfy the requirements for an easement of right of way under the Civil Code. Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code provide the requisites of an easement of right of way: An immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons, and is without adequate outlet to a public highway;Payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the surrounding immovable;The isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner’s acts; andThe proposed easement of right of way is established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance of the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. An easement of right of way is a real right. When an easement of right of way is granted to another person, the rights of the property’s owner are limited. An owner may not exercise some of his or her property rights for the benefit of the person who was granted the easement of right of way. Hence, the burden of proof to show the existence of the above conditions is imposed on the person who seeks the easement of right of way.  Petitioner failed to establish that there was no adequate outlet to the public highway and that the proposed easement was the least prejudicial to respondents’ estate. There is an adequate exit to a public highway. In Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos, the convenience of the dominant estate’s owner is not the basis for granting an easement of right of way, especially if the owner’s needs may be satisfied without imposing the easement.Based on the Ocular Inspection Report, petitioner’s property had another outlet to the highway. In between her property and the highway or road, however, is an irrigation canal, which can be traversed by constructing a bridge, similar to what was done by the owners of the nearby properties. The outlet referred to in the Ocular Inspection Report may be longer and more inconvenient to petitioner because she will have to traverse other properties and construct a bridge over the irrigation canal before she can reach the road. However, these reasons will not justify the imposition of an easement on respondents’ property because her convenience is not the gauge in determining whether to impose an easement of right of way over another’s property. Imposing an easement on the part of respondents’ property for petitioner’s benefit would cost respondents not only the value of the property but also the value of respondents’ opportunity to use the property as a garage or a garden with a grotto.

Aquino vs. Delfin;

G.R. No. 227917, March 17, 2021 FACTS: The Fernandez Spouses once owned five contiguous parcels of land in Dagupan City. Two of their properties were located in front of their three other properties. These two front properties provided the other properties sole access to the national highway. In 1980, the Fernandez Spouses annotated on the transfer certificates of title of the front properties an easement of right of way in favor of the back properties. The Fernandez Spouses later obtained a loan from the Philippine National Bank and mortgaged the front properties. When they failed to pay their loan, the bank foreclosed and eventually acquired the front properties. Later on, Spouses Delfin purchased the front properties. The Delfin Spouses refused to recognize the annotated right of way, enclosing the properties to prevent the Fernandez Spouses from accessing the national highway through the front properties. Fernandez Spouses filed before the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for specific performance, right of way, and damages, arguing that they were entitled to use the right of way to access the national highway. Delfin Spouses countered that they acted within their rights as the properties’ owners. They claimed that despite the annotations, the right of way was invalid as it was constituted by the Fernandez Spouses for their own sake. They alleged that the easement had already been extinguished when the Philippine National Bank acquired the properties after foreclosure. Besides, they said, the Fernandez Spouses had other ways to access the national highway. They added that they were willing to grant a right of way if they would be indemnified. ISSUE/S:  Whether or not a valid easement of right of way was constituted on the front properties formerly owned by the Spouses HELD: YES. An easement of right of way in favor of petitioners was validly constituted. Discussion: An easement is an encumbrance on a property for the benefit of another property owned by another. It involves a grant to use a portion or aspect of the property, without relinquishing ownership or possession over it. The property on which the easement is imposed, and which will be used by the other, is called the servient estate. The property to which the use is granted is the dominant estate. In an easement of right of way, there is a portion of the servient estate dedicated to the passage of the dominant estate’s owner. It is thus a discontinuous easement, used only in intervals and depending on whether a person needs to pass through another person’s property. In Bogo-Medellin Milling Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: Easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised. Thus, an easement is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without the intervention of any act of man, like the easement of drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends on the act of man, like the easement of right of way. The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised only if a person passes or sets foot on somebody else’s land. The presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an easement into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a right of way) and a window (which evidences a right to light and view) are apparent easements, while an easement of not building beyond a certain height is non-apparent. An easement cannot be constituted if both the dominant estate and the servient estate is owned by only one person. In such an instance, the owner only exercises the right of dominion over their property. However, the easement is created when the property is divided when the ownership of either the dominant or servient estate is transferred to another.  Article 624 applies in case one person who owns two properties established an apparent sign of an easement between them. When the ownership of either property is transferred to another, the existence of the apparent sign of easement shall be considered as a title over an easement, unless the contrary is provided in the deed of transfer, or if the apparent sign is removed before the deed of transfer’s execution. The created easement is considered accepted and subsisting if no issues were raised against it or against the manner by which it is used. When the new owner made no stipulation contrary to the apparent easement, they are deemed to have acquiesced to its continuation. The easement becomes a burden they willingly accepted In the case of Spouses Garcia v. Santos: The mode of acquiring an easement under Article 624 is a “legal presumption or apparent sign.” Article 624 finds application in situations wherein two or more estates were previously owned by a singular owner, or even a single estate but with two or more portions being owned by a singular owner. Originally, there is no true easement that exists as there is only one owner. Hence, at the outset, no other owner is imposed with a burden. Subsequently, one estate or a portion of the estate is alienated in favor of another person, wherein, in that estate or portion of the estate, an apparent visible sign of an easement exists. According to Article 624, there arises a title to an easement . . . , even in the absence of any formal act undertaken by the owner of the dominant estate, if this apparent visible sign,… continues to remain and subsist, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, (1) the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or (2) the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. An easement need not be annotated on the title before it may be acknowledged to exist. Every buyer of a registered land who takes a certificate of title for value and in good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate. It has…

Atty. Bulatao vs. Zenaida Estonatoc;

G.R. No. 235020, December 10, 2019. FACTS: Zenaida executed a  Deed of Mortgage of Real Property [(DMRP)] in favor of [Atty. Bulatao] covering a parcel of land as security for a loan in the amount of P200,000.00. When [Zenaida] defaulted in her obligation, [Atty. Bulatao] foreclosed the mortgage and petitioned the court for the sale of the subject property in a public auction.  Zenaida filed a Complaint for Injunction, Annulment of Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and Damages against Atty. Bulatao seeking to declare the [DMRP] as illegal, inexistent and null and void because the interest (5%/month) imposed is excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, exorbitant and contrary to public policy.  In addition, she raised that the sale is invalid because she  falsely indicated that she is the registered owner of the subject property despite the fact that it is co-owned by her late husband, Adolfo T. Estonactoc. ISSUE/S:  1. Whether the payment of the 5% monthly interest was voluntarily agreed upon by him and Zenaida and absent fraud committed upon Zenaida, the stipulated interest rate should stand. 2. Whether the DMRP must be held invalid since the interest rate agreed upon is void 3. Since Zenaida is a co­-owner to the extent of 3/4 (1/2 portion representing her share in the conjugal property and 1/4 portion as her legitime in the estate of her husband Adolfo Estonactoc) of the subject property and the remaining 1/4 portion being co-­owned by her son Jose Rafael Estonactoc, Atty. Bulatao has the right to foreclose Zenaida’s 3/4 share. HELD: 1. NO. SC affirmed the finding of the Court of Appeals (CA) that five percent (5%) per month or sixty percent (60%) per annum interest rate is highly iniquitous and unreasonable; and since the interest rate agreed upon is void, the rate of interest should be twelve percent (12%) per annum (the then prevailing interest rate prescribed by the Central Bank of the Philippines for loans or forbearances of money) from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. The interest rate prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) for loans or forbearances of money, credits or goods will be the surrogate or substitute rate not only for the one-year interest period agreed upon but for the entire period that the loan of Zenaida remains unpaid. 2.  The invalidity of the 5% per month interest rate does not affect the obligation of Zenaida to repay her loan of P200,000.00 from Atty. Bulatao. The applicable interest is the BSP-prescribed rate of 12% per annum from the execution of the DMRP on June 3, 2008, wherein the parties agreed to the payment of interest, to June 30, 2013 and at the rate of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment. Taking into account Article 2212 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[i]nterest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon this point,” the interest due on the principal amount (computed as mentioned above) accruing as of judicial demand (the filing of the counterclaim, in this case) shall separately earn interest at the rate prescribed by the BSP from time of judicial demand up to full payment. 3. While Article 493 of the Civil Code may not squarely cover the situations wherein a co-owner, without the consent of the other co-owners, alienate, assign or mortgage: (1) the entire co-owned property; (2) a specific portion of the co-owned property; (3) an undivided portion less than the part pertaining to the disposing co-owner; and (4) an undivided portion more than the part pertaining to the disposing co-owner, the principle of estoppel bars the disposing co-owner from disavowing the sale to the full extent of his undivided or pro indiviso share or part in the co-ownership, subject to the outcome of the partition. The CA was correct when it limited the validity of the DMRP only to the portion belonging to Zenaida. As to the share of Zenaida, Atty. Bulatao is correct that Zenaida is a co-owner to the extent of 3/4 undivided portion (1/2 portion representing her share in the conjugal property and 1/4 portion as her legitime in the estate of her husband Adolfo Estonactoc) of the subject property, with the remaining 1/4 undivided portion being co-owned by her son Jose Rafael Es

Aratea vs. COMELEC;

G.R. No. 195229. October 9, 2012 FACTS: Antipolo (candidate for Mayorality) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (3) consecutive terms. COMELEC Second Division hold that Aratea, the duly elected Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, should be declared Mayor pursuant to the Local Government Code’s rule on succession. While Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration is pending with COMELEC en banc, Lonzanida and Efren Aratea (Aratea) were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor. Aratea wrote to the DILG to allow him to take the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales since Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office . Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as “the permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases pending before the [COMELEC].” The COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because Lonzanida. ISSUE/S: Whether Aratea is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or made a false material representation under Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio HELD: 1. NO. Antipolo, the alleged “second placer,” should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor. The nature of the eligibility requirements for a local elective office and the disqualifications that may apply to candidates necessarily create distinctions on the remedies available, on the effects of lack of eligibility and on the application of disqualification. 2. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy. The Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a “Section 78” petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.  Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the three-term limit rule, or his conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, does not constitute a ground for a petition under Section 68.  Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections—Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.

Republic vs. Andaya

G.R. No. 160656. June 15, 2007 DOCTRINE: While the plaintiff in an action for expropriation may enforce against the owner’s property the legal easement of right-of-way in its favor without paying for it, it is liable to pay the owner consequential damages if in enforcing the legal easement on the owner’s property, the remaining area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable. FACTS: Andaya is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Butuan.  These properties are subject to a 60-meter wide perpetual easement for public highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other similar works of the government or public enterprise, at no cost to the government, except only the value of the improvements existing thereon that may be affected. The Republic instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City to enforce the easement of right-of-way or eminent domain.  The property will be subject to easement of 60-meter easement to 10 meters, or an equivalent of 701 square meters. In 1998, the Board reported that the project would affect a total of 10,380 square meters of Andaya’s properties, 4,443 square meters of which will be for the 60-meter easement. The Board also reported that the easement would diminish the value of the remaining 5,937 square meters. As a result, it recommended the payment of consequential damages amounting to P2,820,430 for the remaining area. Andaya contended that the consequential damages should be based on the remaining area of 9,679 square meters. Thus, the just compensation should be P11,373,405. The trial court ruled that Republic must pay P 2,820,430.00 as fair and reasonable severance damages; Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. Andaya demanded just compensation for his entire property minus the easement. Andaya alleged that the easement would prevent ingress and egress to his property and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan River. As a result, his entire property would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable. The Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s decision by imposing a 6% interest on the consequential damages from the date of the writ of possession or the actual taking, and by deleting the attorney’s fees. ISSUE/S: Is the Republic liable for just compensation if in enforcing the legal easement of right-of-way on a property, the remaining area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable? HELD: YES. The Republic is liable to pay consequential damages if in enforcing the legal easement on Andaya’s property, the remaining area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable. Andaya is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land. Taking,” in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, occurs not only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction or material impairment of the value of his property. Using this standard, there was undoubtedly a taking of the remaining area of Andaya’s property. While it is true that the owner retained title and possession of the remaining property, he would be entitled to just compensation if the enforcement of the legal easement on a portion of his property would deprive him of the normal use of the remaining areas. In the instant case, the enforcement of the legal easement on a portion of the owner’s property prevented ingress and egress to his remaining property and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan River. NO person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. Noteworthy, Section 9, Article III of our Constitution mandates that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.14 It is settled that Republic is legally entitled to a 60-meter wide easement or an equivalent of 4,443 square meters. Clearly, although the Republic will use only 701 square meters, it should not be liable for the 3,742 square meters, which constitute the difference between this area of 701 square meters and the 4,443 square meters to which it is fully entitled to use as easement, free of charge except for damages to affected existing improvements, if any, under Section 112 of the Public Land Act.  In effect, without such damages alleged and proved, the Republic is liable for just compensation of only the remaining areas consisting of 5,937 square meters, with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of the writ of possession or the actual taking until full payment is made.

Goldenway Merchandising Corporation vs. Equitable PCI Bank;

G.R. No. 195540. March 13, 2013 DOCTRINE: The new redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135. FACTS: In 1985, Goldenway Merchandising executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Equitable PCI Bank over 3 of its real properties. The mortgage secured the Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) loan granted by respondent to petitioner and was duly registered. As petitioner failed to settle its loan obligation –   respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on December 13, 2000. In a public auction, the mortgaged properties were sold for P3,500,000.00 to respondent. Accordingly, a Certificate of Sale was issued on January 26, 2001.On February 16, 2001, the Certificate of Sale was registered and inscribed on TCT Nos. T-152630, T-151655 and T-214528. On March 8, 2001, petitioner offered to redeem the foreclosed properties by tendering a check in the amount of P3,500,000.00. However, petitioner was told that such redemption is no longer possible because the certificate of sale had already been registered. The foreclosed properties had already been consolidated in favor of respondent and that new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondent on March 9, 2001. On December 7, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the respondent, asserting that it is the one-year period of redemption under Act No. 3135 which should apply and not the shorter redemption period provided in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8791. That applying Section 47 of R.A. 8791 to the real estate mortgage executed in 1985 would result in the impairment of obligation of contracts and violation of the equal protection clause under the Constitution. The RTC rendered its decision dismissing the complaint as well as the counterclaim. It noted that the issue of the constitutionality of Sec. 47 of R.A. No. 8791 was never raised by the petitioner during the pre-trial and the trial. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. According to the CA, petitioner failed to justify why Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 should be declared unconstitutional. ISSUE/S:  Whether applying Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 to the present case would be a substantial impairment of its vested right of redemption under the real estate mortgage contract. HELD: NO. Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135. Petitioner’s claim that Section 47 infringes the equal protection clause as it discriminates mortgagors/property owners who are juridical persons is equally bereft of merit. The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. The legislature clearly intended to shorten the period of redemption for juridical persons whose properties were foreclosed and sold in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135. The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons was based on the nature of the properties foreclosed―whether these are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year redemption period is retained, or used for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner of these acquired assets. It must be underscored that the General Banking Law of 2000, crafted in the aftermath of the 1997 Southeast Asian financial crisis, sought to reform the General Banking Act of 1949 by fashioning a legal framework for maintaining a safe and sound banking system. The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.32 Settled is the rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. Notes: The law governing cases of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. Section 6 thereof provides: SEC. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; xxx  However, Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 otherwise known as “The General Banking Law of 2000” which took effect on June 13, 2000, amended Act No. 3135. XXXXNotwithstanding Act 3135, juridical persons whose property is being sold pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure, shall have the right to redeem the property in accordance with this provision until, but not after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale with the applicable Register of Deeds which in no case shall be more than…

Planters Development Bank vs. Lubiya Agro Industrial Corporation

G.R. No. 207976. November 14, 2018 FACTS: Planters Development Bank (Planters Bank) granted two (2) loans to respondent Lubiya Agro Industrial Corporation (Lubiya) in the amounts of P6,500,000.00 and P5,000,000.00, respectively. The said loans were secured by real estate mortgages over two (2) parcels of land with improvements thereon located in General Santos City. When Lubiya defaulted, Planters Bank sent a letter dated June 8, 1998 to it demanding payment and informing the latter that failure to heed such demand shall prompt Planters Bank to institute a legal action against it. Due to Libuya’s failure to settle its obligation, Planters Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the properties offered as security by Lubiya. In the public auction, Planters Bank emerged as the sole and highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale was thereafter issued in its favor and recorded with the Registry of Deeds on November 11, 1998. On January 23, 2001, Lubiya filed a complaint for nullification of the loan agreement, foreclosure proceedings, and damages xx on Planters Bank’s alleged failure to furnish Lubiya with notices regarding the foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged properties despite being obligated in their mortgage contract to do so. Lubiya moved for a summary judgment alleging that no genuine issues exist as to the material facts of the case. The RTC granted the motion however, the summary judgment was adversed to Lubiya as the RTC dismissed its complaint against Planters Bank. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and nullified the foreclosure sale. Lubiya insists that the demand letter dated June 8, 1998, which Lubiya received on June 24, 1998 prior to the auction sale on October 6, 1998, duly satisfied the notice requirement agreed upon by the parties. ISSUE: whether or not the lack of personal notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings upon the mortgagor renders foreclosure null and void. HELD: As a general rule, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary. Section 3 of Act No. 313514 governing extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages only requires the 1) posting of the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale in three public places; and 2) publication of the said notice in a newspaper of general circulation.  Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality and city. However, despite the above provisions of the law, the parties to a mortgage contract are not precluded from imposing additional stipulations. This includes the requirement of personal notification to the mortgagor of any action relative to the mortgage contract, such as the institution of an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding. Thus, the exception to the rule is when the parties stipulate that personal notice is additionally required to be given the mortgagor. Failure to abide by the general rule, or its exception, renders the foreclosure proceedings null and void.  The June 8, 1998 demand letter that Planters Bank sent to Lubiya satisfies the bank’s additional obligation to provide personal notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale to the mortgagor. The purpose of stipulations of such nature is to precisely apprise the mortgagors of any action which the mortgagees might take on the mortgaged properties in order to accord the former of an opportunity to safeguard their rights. Thus, when Planters Bank failed to send the notice of foreclosure sale to Lubiya, it committed a contractual breach sufficient to render the foreclosure sale on October 6, 1998 null and void. Besides, the loan agreements and mortgage contracts are standard contracts of adhesion prepared by petitioner itself. If the parties did not intend to require personal notice in addition to the statutory requirements of posting and publication, the said provision should not have been included in the mortgage contracts.

LBP vs. Dalauta

G.R. No. 190004. August 8, 2017. FACTS: Eugenio Dalauta (Dalauta) was the registered owner of agricultural land in Florida, Butuan City, with an area of 25.2160 hectares. In 1994, the land was placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under compulsory acquisition of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). LBP offered P192,782.59 as compensation for the land, but Dalauta rejected such valuation for being too low. The DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) through the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), in a summary administrative proceeding, determined the appropriate just compensation for the subject property. It affirmed the valuation made by LBP. In 2000, Dalauta filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting as SAC. It constituted the Board of Commissioners (Commissioners) tasked to inspect the land and to make a report thereon. The report recommended that the value of the land be pegged at P100,000.00 per hectare. The SAC taking into consideration the Commissioners Report directed LBP to pay – (a) 2,639,557.00 value of the land; (b) P100,000 for the farmhouse; (c) Reasonable legal fees and litigation expenses. LBP filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA, arguing –That the SAC erred in taking cognizance of the case when the DARAB decision sustaining the LBP valuation had long attained finality;that the SAC erred in taking judicial notice of the Commissioners’ Report without conducting a hearing; andthat the SAC violated the Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 and DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, in fixing the just compensation. The CA ruled that the SAC correctly took cognizance of the case. It sustained the valuation by the SAC for being well within R.A. No. 6657. ISSUE/S: Whether the trial court had properly taken jurisdiction over the case despite the finality of the PARAD Resolution.Whether or not the case already prescribed. HELD: YES. The RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), may exercise its exclusive original jurisdiction under Section 57 of R. A. No. 6657 to determine just compensation to landowners despite the lapse of 15 days from receipt by the landowner of the adjudicator’s decision fixing the just compensation.  SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision. In all these cases, it was uniformly decided that the petition for determination of just compensation before the SAC should be filed within the period prescribed under the DARAB Rules, that is, “within fifteen ( 15) days from receipt of the notice thereof.” In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay,  the Court ruled that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function that cannot be vested in administrative agencies. “The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination, but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heir of Trinidad S. V da. De Arieta :  In both voluntary and compulsory acquisitions, wherein the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR opens an account in the name of the landowner and conducts a summary administrative proceeding. If the landowner disagrees with the valuation, the matter may be brought to the RTC, acting as a special agrarian court. But as with the DAR-awarded compensation, LBP’s valuation of lands covered by CARL is considered only as an initial determination, which is not conclusive, as it is the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, that should make the final determination of just compensation, taking into consideration the factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the applicable DAR regulations. xxx DARRTC – SACIn agrarian reform cases, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR, specifically, in the DARAB as provided in Sec. 50 RA 6557. EO No. 229 also vested the DAR with(1) quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those under DA and DENR. Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision (Sec. 57, RA 6657). 2. NO. While R.A. No. 6657 itself does not provide for a period within which a landowner can file a petition for the determination of just compensation before the SAC, it cannot be imprescriptible. Considering that the payment of just compensation is an obligation created by law, it should only be ten (10) years from the time the landowner received the notice of coverage. (Article 1144, NCC). Nevertheless, any interruption or delay caused by the government like proceedings in the DAR should toll the running of the prescriptive period. In this case, Dalauta received the Notice of Coverage on February 7, 1994.43 He then filed a petition for determination of just compensation on February 28, 2000. Clearly, the filing date was well within the ten year prescriptive period under Article 1141. Notes:  Concurrent Exercise of Jurisdiction –  There may be situations where a landowner, who has a pending administrative case before the DAR for determination of just compensation, still files a petition before the SAC for the same objective. Such recourse is not strictly a case of forum shopping, the administrative determination being not resjudicata binding on the SAC.  Nevertheless, the…

Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA)

508 F.2d 969; December 23, 1974 FACTS: In 1962, Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc., (Overseas) entered into a construction agreement with Societe Generale de L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), to construct, and manage and supervise for 1 year a paperboard mill in Alexandria, Egypt. The Agency for International Development (AID), a branch of the United States State Department, would finance the project by supplying RAKTA with funds with which to purchase letters of credit in Overseas favor. Among the contract’s terms was an arbitration clause, which provided a means to settle differences arising in the course of performance, and a “force majeure” clause, which excused delay in performance due to causes beyond Overseas’ reasonable capacity to control.

Sabay vs. People

G.R. No. 192150. October 1, 2014 FACTS: In this case, Godofredo Lopez, confronted Frederico Sabay and his daughter Erlinda for their alleged intrusion into his property.  During their verbal altercation, Erlinda hit Godofredo on the head with a hard object, Frederico  joined in by throwing a stone at Godofredo’s face. Both of them allegedly threatened to kill him.  Jervie Lopez (Jervie) pacified them, however he was hit in the hand with a bolo. Based on the medico legal certificates Godofredo suffered a contusion while Jervie sustained a wound in his right palm. Godofredo and Jervie filed a complaint against Frederico before the barangay. The parties agreed to settle based on the recommendation of the building inspector and reflected their agreement in their Kasunduang Pag-aayos. The Kasunduan, however, was not implemented because the building inspector failed to make the promised recommendation to resolve the boundary dispute between the parties.

Loreche-Amit vs. Cagayan De Oro Medical Center, Inc.

G.R. No. 216635. June 3, 2019. TOPIC Corporate Officers DOCTRINE To be considered as a corporate officer, the designation must be either provided by the Corporation Code or the by-laws of the corporation FACTS Dr. Mary Jean P. Loreche-Amit (petitioner) started working with Cagayan De Oro Medical Center, Inc. (CDMC), sometime in May 1996, when she was engaged by the late Dr. Jose N. Gaerlan (Dr. Gaerlan) as Associate Pathologist in the Department of Laboratories. Upon the demise of Dr. Gaerlan, CDMC’s Board of Directors formally appointed petitioner as Chief Pathologist for five years or until May 15, 2011.

Kho, Sr. v. Magbanua, G.R. No. 237246. July 29, 2019

TOPIC Doctrine of Piercing of the Veil of Corporate Fiction DOCTRINE When the shield of a separate corporate identity is used to commit wrongdoing and opprobriously elude responsibility, the courts and the legal authorities in a labor case have not hesitated to step in and shatter the said shield and deny the usual protections to the offending party, even after final judgment. The key element is the presence of fraud, malice or bad faith.

Eguaras vs. Great Eastern 33 Phil. 263 (1916)

Defenses not Barred by Incontestability FACTS Dominador Albay got the insurance company to insure his life for the sum of P5,000 and that through the representations and statements made by said Dominador Albay in his application and the favorable medical examination made by Dr. Jose A. Vidal (record, p. 126), the company agreed to the life insurance sought, and on November 6,1912, issued the policy No. 5592, the value whereof was payable to the insured’s motherin-law, Francisca Eguaras. One month after said insurance policy had been issued, that is, on December 6, 1912, the insured Dominador Albay died in the municipality of Santa Cruz, Laguna, of intestinal occlusion, On December 6, 1912, said policy being in force, the insured died in Laguna, and defendant company refused to pay to the plaintiff the value of the policy.

Development Insurance vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 62 (1986)

Kinds of Policy; Open, Sec 60. FACTS “SEC. 60. An open policy is one in which the value of the thing insured is not agreed upon, and the amount of the insurance merely represents the insurer’s maximum liability. The value of such thing insured shall be ascertained at the time of the loss. This case will require an examination of Policy No. RY/F-082, as renewed by virtue of which the petitioner Development Insurance insured Philippine Union Realty Development Corporation’s building against fire for ₱2,500,000.00.

Sun Insurance vs. CA, 195 SCRA 193 (1991)

G.R. No. 89741. March 13, 1991. FACTS Emilio Tan took from Sun Insurance a P300,000.00 property insurance policy to cover his interest in the electrical supply store of his brother housed in a building in Iloilo City. Four (4) days after the issuance of the policy, the building was burned including the insured store. On August 20, 1983, Tan filed his claim for fire loss with the petitioner, but on February 29, 1984, petitioner wrote Tan denying the latter’s claim. On April 3, 1984, Tan wrote to the petitioner, seeking reconsideration of the denial of his claim, but still denied the claim.  Sun Insurance alleged Condition 27 of the Insurance Policy which provides that: If a claim be made and rejected and an action or suit shall be commenced within twelve (12) months from receipt of notice of such rejection, or in case of arbitration taking place as provided herein, within twelve (12) months after due notice of the award made by the arbitrator or arbitrators, then the claim shall for all purposes be deemed to have been abandoned and shall not thereafter be recoverable hereunder.”

Guia vs Cosico

G.R. No. 246997, May 05, 2021 FACTS: Cecilia was born in 1932 with a physical disability and was known in the locality as a “lumpo.” Corazon passed away when Cecilia was just one (1) year old and the latter was left in the care and custody of her maternal aunt, Mercedes Esguerra Guia (Mercedes). Because of her physical condition, Cecilia spent most of her days in her bedroom. She never attended school nor learned to read or write.  In 1996, when she was sixty-four (64) years old, Cecilia decided to execute her last will and testament. Cecilia asked Atty. Bueser, then a notary public for assistance in preparing the last will. The finished copy of her last will and testament denominated Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya which consisted of four (4) pages.  Mercedes was left all the properties. 

Reyes vs. Valentin

G.R. No. 194488. February 11, 2015 FACTS: Petitioner Reyes, filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, for easement of right of way against respondents, Spouses Valentin. Petitioner alleged that respondents’ 1,500-square-meter property surrounded her property and that it was the only adequate outlet from her property to the highway. A 113-square-meter portion of respondents’ property was also the “point least prejudicial to the [respondents]. The respondents despite demands and willingness to pay the amount, respondents refused to accede to the petitioner’s claims. They contended that the isolation of petitioner’s property was due to her mother’s own act of subdividing the property among her children without regard to the pendency of an agrarian case between her and her tenants. The property chosen by the petitioner as an easement was also the most burdensome for respondents. Respondents pointed to an open space that connected the petitioner’s property to another public road.

Camarines Sur Teachers and Employees Association vs Province of Camarines Sur;

G.R. No. 199666, October 07, 2019 FACTS: In 1966, the Local Government of the Province of Camarines Sur thru then Governor Apolonio G. Maleniza donated a property covered by OCT No. 22 with an approximate area of Six Hundred (600) square meters to the Camarines Sur Teachers’ Association, Inc. (CASTEA) by virtue of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by the parties. The condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the the land for no other purpose except the construction of its building to be used by Camarines Sur Teachers’ Association, Inc., in connection with its functions under its charter and by-laws. Provided that the DONEE shall not sell, mortgage or [e]ncumber the property herein donated including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any party and that the construction of the building shall be commenced within a period of one (1) year from and after the execution of this donation, otherwise, the donation shall be deemed automatically revoked.

Lloyds Industrial vs NAPOCOR

G.R. No. 190207, June 30, 2021 FACTS:  Lloyds Richfield purchased parcels of land within its vicinity and quarried limestones from these areas, which would then be used to manufacture cement. NAPOCOR entered into negotiations with Lloyds Richfield to create an easement of right of way over the parcels of land for the construction of transmission lines.   When negotiations failed, the NAPOCOR filed a Complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Danao City relating to 7 lots owned by Lloyds .  Lloyds Richfield demanded by way of compulsory claim that the NAPOCOR pay the fair market value of the parcels of land, since the construction of transmission lines over its properties would render the properties useless to it. It also demanded to be paid the fair market value ofthe limestone deposits in the parcels of land.

Gaspi vs Pacis-Trinidad

G.R. No. 229010, November 23, 2020 DOCTRINE: If an alien-decedent duly executes a will in accordance with the forms and solemnities required by Philippine law, barring any other defect as to the extrinsic validity of the will, the courts may take cognizance of the petition and allow the probate of the will. FACTS: Lipson, an American citizen temporarily residing in Iriga City, executed her last will and testament and designated Roel R Gaspi (Gaspi) as executor. In 2015, at 70 years old, Lipson passed away due to lymphoma.Gaspi filed a Petition for the probate of Lipson’s will and the issuance of letters testamentary without bond on his behalf.

Palaganas vs. Palaganas

G.R. No. 169144. January 26, 2011 FACTS: Ruperta, a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S. In 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas, another brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.

Amadea Angela Aquino vs Rodolfo Aquino

G.R. No. 208912, December 07, 2021. FACTS: In 1999, Migued died intestate leaving personal and real properties. In his first marriage with Amadea, he was survived by (1) Abdulah C. Aquino (Abdulah) and Rodolfo C. (Rodolfo) Aquino, his sons with Amadea; (2) the heirs of Wilfredo C. Aquino, his son with Amadea who also died earlier; (3) predeceased son with Amadea, Arturo C. Aquino (Arturo) and (4) Enerie B. Aquino, his second wife; Angela moved that she be included in the distribution and partition of Miguel’s estate. She alleged that she was Arturo’s only child. According to Angela, Arturo died before she was born. Her parents were planning to marry before Arturo died. (illegitimate grandchild). Angela claimed that her grandfather, Miguel, took care of her mother’s expenses during her pregnancy. Moreover, Angela lived with her mother and the Aquino family at their ancestral home. Since her birth, her father’s relatives had continuously recognized her as Arturo’s natural child. In support of this, Angela presented her baptismal certificate stating that she was Arturo’s daughter. Rodolfo opposed Angela’s Motion, claiming that Arturo never legally recognized Angela as his natural child in his lifetime.

Treyes vs. Larlar

G.R. No. 232579. September 8, 2020. FACTS: Rosie, the wife of petitioner Treyes, passed away. Rosie, who did not bear any children with petitioner Treyes, died without any will. Rosie also left behind seven siblings, i.e., the private respondents Antonio, Emilio, Heddy, Rene, Celeste, Judy, and Yvonne. At the time of her death, Rosie left behind 14 real estate properties, situated in various locations in the Philippines, which she owned together with petitioner Treyes as their conjugal properties (subject properties). Petitioner Treyes executed two Affidavits of Self-Adjudication which transfers the estate of Rosie unto himself, claiming that he was the sole heir of his deceased spouse, Rosie. 

Rosanna Tan-Andal vs Mario Andal

GR No. 196359; May 11, 2021. DOCTRINE: Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personal disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. FACTS: Rosanna filed for a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Mario’s psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to her.  Mario was diagnosed with narcissistic antisocial personality disorder and substance abuse disorder with psychotic features.  The RTC voided the marriage. The CA reversed RTC’s ruling on the ground that the psychiatric evaluation of Mario is “unscientific and unreliable” since he was not interviewed. 

Republic v. Ontuca

G.R. No. 232053, July 15, 2020 FACTS: In 2000, Ontuca gave birth to Zsanine. Carabeo, registered midwife, volunteered herself to register Zsanine’s birth with the Parañaque Civil Registrar. After several days, the midwife delivered the birth certificate to Annabelle. Annabelle was, however, dismayed to see the erroneous entries in the certificate. To correct these entries, Annabelle filed a Petition under Rule 108 praying that  Her name “Mary Annabelle Peleño Ontuca” be corrected by removing “Mary” and changing “Paliño” to “Peleño;” That the date and place of marriage of parents be changed from “May 25, 1999 at Occ. Mindoro” to “NOT MARRIED.”

Anaban v. Anaban-Alfiler

G.R. No. 249011; March 15, 2021. DOCTRINE: The Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. FACTS: In 1942, Pedrito Anaban (Pedrito) and Virginia Erasmo (Virginia) got married in accordance with the native customs of the lbaloi Tribe to which they both belonged. They had three (3) children, i.e., respondents Betty Anaban-Alfiler, Mercedes Anaban, and Marcelo Anaban. In 1947, however, the council of tribe elders took notice of Virginia’s insanity and based thereon approved the couple’s divorce and allowed Pedrito to remarry. In 1952, Pedrito got married to fellow lbaloi Pepang still in accordance with their tribe’s customs. They begot eight (8) children.

David vs Calilung

G.R. No. 241036, January 26, 2021 FACTS: Lucila married Rene and begot 5 children, the Aguas heirs in this case. Rene filed a petition to declare his marriage with Lucila null and void on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity and was ruled in affirmative by the court in December 2005. Rene contracted a second marriage with Cherry in 2006 and died intestate in 2015. Cherry filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Rene raffled to RTC-Angeles City, Branch 56 (Branch 56).  Lucila and the Aguas heirs (petitioners) filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Rene and Cherry on the ground that the said subsequent marriage was entered into without complying the provisions in Articles 52 and 53 of the Family Code on the partition and distribution of the properties of the previous marriage and the delivery of the presumptive legitimes. It was raffled to RTC-Angeles City, Branch 59 (Branch 59), the designated Family Court. 

Pulido vs People

G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021 FACTS: Pulido married Arcon on September 5, 1983. Thereafter, he contracted a second marriage with Baleda on July 31, 1995 without having his first marriage with Arcon legally dissolved. Pulido was charged of Bigamy.  During the pendency of the bigamy case, Pulido obtained a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage with Arcon. Pulido insisted that he could not be held criminally liable for bigamy because both his marriages were null and void. He claimed that his marriage with Arcon in 1983 is null and void for lack of a valid marriage license while his marriage with Baleda is null and void for lack of a marriage ceremony.

St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc. vs. LWV Construction Corporation

G.R. No. 217426. December 4, 2017 FACTS: The respondent is engaged in the business of recruiting Filipino workers for deployment to Saudi Arabia. The petitioner is authorized to conduct medical examinations of prospective applicants for overseas employment. Respondent referred prospective applicant Jonathan V. Raguindin (Raguindin) to the petitioner for a pre-deployment medical examination. The petitioner cleared Raguindin and found him “fit for employment,” as evidenced by a Medical Report.Respondent deployed Raguindin to Saudi Arabia, allegedly incurring expenses of P84,373.41. Unfortunately, when Raguindin underwent another medical examination in Saudi Arabia, he purportedly tested positive for HCV or the hepatitis C virus. This leads to repatriation.

Domestic Petroleum Retailer Corp. v. Manila International Airport Authority;

G.R. No. 210641, March 27, 2019 FACTS: The parties entered into a Contract of Lease whereby DPRC (petitioner) was obliged to pay monthly rentals of P75,357.74 for the land and P33,310.46 for the building. In 1998, MIAA passed Resolution No. 98-30 which increased the rentals. DPRC protested in writing to [respondent MIAA] the increased rentals and the computation on the ground that it was decreed without prior notice. However, it also signified its intention to comply in good faith with the terms and conditions of the lease contract by paying the amount charged. DPRC stopped paying the increased rental rate but continued paying the original rental rate prescribed in the lease contract. The decision to stop paying the increased rental rate was based on the [Court’s] Decision in the case of Manila International Airport Authority vs. Air span Corporation. DPRC demanded for a refund of its overpayment in the amount of P9,593,179.87. In 2008, DPRC filed a Complaint for “Collection of Sums of Money”.

People vs. Escote, Jr.

G.R. No. 140756. April 4, 2003 FACTS:  In 1996, Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote while on board of Five Star Passenger Bus suddenly announced a holdup and fired their guns upward. Both of them took the money and valuables of the passengers, including the bus conductor’s collections in the amount of P6,000.00. Thereafter, fired several shots to one of the passengers, a policeman, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr.  The trial court rendered its Decision judgment finding Juan and Victor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of robbery with homicide, meting on each of them the supreme penalty of death, and ordering them to pay the heirs of the victim, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., the total amount of P300,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages and to pay to Five Star Bus, Inc., the amount of P6,000.00 by way of actual damages.

People vs. Tulagan

G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019 FACTS:  In September 2011, Tulagan, by means of force, intimidation and with abuse of superior strength forcibly laid complainant AAA, a 9-year-old minor in a cemented pavement and  inserted his finger into the vagina of the said AAA, against her will and consent. In a separate incident (October 2011),  AAA testified that she was raped by Tulagan while playing with her cousin.  The Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City found accused Tulagan guilty of  sexual assault and statutory rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraphs 2 and 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), respectively, in relation to Article 266-B.

New Life Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 94071. March 31, 1992

FACTS Newlife Enterprises insured its stocks with Western Guaranty Corporation, Reliance Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., and Equitable Insurance Corporation. In 1982, the building was gutted by fire where the stocks insured are placed. According to the certification issued the cause of fire was electrical in nature. After the fire, the petitioner went to the insurance companies to file a claim. Ultimately, the three insurance companies denied plaintiffs’ claim for payment  for breach of policy conditions. It allegedly violated Conditions No. 3 & 27 of the insurance contract where it provides that it must state or endorse thereon the other insurance coverage obtained or subsequently effected on the same stocks. Petitioners contend that they are not to be blamed for the omissions, alleging that insurance agents knew about the existence of the additional insurance coverage d that they were not informed about the requirement that such other or additional insurance should be stated in the policy, as they have not even read policies

Geogonia vs. CA

FACTS Armando Geagonia  is the owner of Norman’s Mart located in the public market of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. He obtained from Country Bankers Insurance Corporation  a fire insurance policy for P100,000.00. The period of the policy was from 1989 to 1990 and covered the stock-in-trade consisting principally of dry goods such as RTW’s for men and women wear and other usual to assured’s business.” Geagonia declared in the policy under the subheading entitled CO-INSURANCE that Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc. was the co-insurer for P50,000.00.  Thereafter, fire of accidental origin broke out at the public market of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Geagonia’s insured stocks-in-trade were completely destroyed prompting him to file with the CBIC a claim under the policy. CBIC denied the claim because it found that at the time of the loss of the stocks-in-trade were likewise covered by fire insurance policies for P100,000.00 each, issued by the Cebu Branch of the Philippines First Insurance Co., Inc. (hereinafter PFIC). These policies indicate that the insured was “Messrs. Discount Mart (Mr. Armando Geagonia, Prop.)” with a mortgage clause. The basis of CBIC’s denial was the alleged violation of Condition 3 of the policy which states that the insured shall give notice to the Company of any insurance or insurances already effected, or which may subsequently be effected, covering any of the property or properties consisting of stocks in trade, goods in process. 

Tai Tong Chuache & Co. vs. Insurance Commission ; G.R. No. L-55397 February 29, 1988

FACTS Complainants acquired from Rolando Gonzales a parcel of land and a building in Davao City. Complainants assumed the mortgage of the building in favor of S.S.S., which building was insured with respondent S.S.S. Accredited Group of Insurers for P25,000.00. On April 19, 1975, Azucena Palomo obtained a loan from Tai Tong Chuache Inc. in the amount of P100,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan, a mortgage was executed over the land and the building in favor of Tai Tong Chuache & Co. Arsenio Chua, representative of Thai Tong Chuache & Co. insured the latter’s interest with Travellers Multi-Indemnity Corporation for P100,000.00. Pedro Palomo secured a Fire Insurance Policy with other insurance companies. On July 31, 1975, the building and the contents were totally razed by fire.

Equitable Insurance vs. Rural Insurance

FACTS Equitable and Rural entered into a reciprocal facultative reinsurance agreement, wherein they agreed to cede to each other, by way of facultative reinsurance on policies of insurance or reinsurance issued by their respective fire insurance departments on risks situated in the Philippines, subject to the stipulations of the agreement.  The stock insured and covered by said Policy No. 5880 by Equitable was burned, and the share of the loss assumed by defendant as per reinsurance agreement was computed at P2,024.87.  Another stock was burned which insurance policy was issued by Equitable. Despite repeated demands by plaintiff, defendant refused and failed to pay the sum of P2,024.87. On

Fieldmen’s Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc; No. L-23447. July 31, 1970

FACTS The Asian Surety & Insurance (Asian) and the Fieldmen’s Insurance Company (Fieldmen), as the reinsurer, entered into seven (7) reinsurance agreements or treaties.  The agreements or treaties were to take effect from certain specific dates and were to be in force until cancelled by either party upon previous notice of at least three (3) months by registered mail to the other party, the cancellation to take effect as of the 31st of December of the year in which the notice was given. On September 19, 1961, FIELDMEN’S, by means of registered mail, served notice to ASIAN to be relieved from all participation in various treaties effective December 31, 1961. On December 7, 1961, FIELDMEN’S sent another letter expressing such intention. However, Asian did not acknowledge the letters.

Philippine American Life Insurance (PHILAM) v. Auditor General; No. L-19255. January 18, 1968

There should not be any misapprehension as to the distinction between a reinsurance treaty, on the one hand, and a reinsurance policy or a reinsurance cession, on the other. A reinsurance policy is thus a contract of indemnity one insurer makes with another to protect the first insurer from a risk it has already assumed.A reinsurance treaty is merely an agreement between two insurance companies whereby one agrees to cede and the other to accept reinsurance business pursuant to provisions specified in the treaty. The practice of issuing policies by insurance companies includes, among other things, the issuance of reinsurance policies on standard risks and also on substandard risks under special arrangements.

Artex Development Co. vs. Wellington Ins. Co.; No. L-29508. June 27, 1973

FACTS The defendant, Wellington Insurance Co., Inc. insured for P24,346,509.00 the buildings, stocks and machinery of plaintiff Artex Development Co., Inc., against loss or damage by fire or lighting upon payment by plaintiff of the corresponding premiums. On August 2, 1963, said properties were insured for an additional sum of P883,034.00. On May 12, 1963 defendant insured plaintiff against business interruption (use and occupancy) for P5,200,000.00. On September 22, 1963, the buildings, stocks and machineries of plaintiff’s spinning department were burned. The notice of the loss and damage was given the defendant, and the loss was referred to the H. H. Bayne Adjustment Co. and the Allied Adjustment Co. 

Malayan Insurance Co., v. Phil. First Insurance Co., Inc. et al, G.R. No. 184300, July 11, 2012

FACTS Wyeth procured Marine Policy No. MAR 13797 (Marine Policy) from respondent Philippines First Insurance Co., Inc. (Philippines First) to secure its interest over its own products. Wyeth executed its annual contract of carriage with Reputable Forwarder Services. It turned out, however, that the contract was not signed by Wyeth’s representative/s. Nevertheless, it was admittedly signed by Reputable’s  representatives, the terms thereof faithfully observed by the parties and, the same contract of carriage had been annually executed by the parties every year since 1989. The contract also required Reputable to secure an insurance policy on Wyeth’s goods. Thus, on February 11, 1994, Reputable signed a Special Risk Insurance Policy (SR Policy) with petitioner Malayan for the amount of P1,000,000.00.

Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. v. Yap; 61 SCRA 426 (1974)

FACTS Respondent Oliva Yap was the owner of a store in a two- storey building located at No. 856 Juan Luna Street, Manila, where in 1962 she sold shopping bags and footwear, such as shoes, sandals and step-ins. Chua Soon Poon, Oliva Yap’s son-in-law, was in charge of the store.  On April 19, 1962, Yap took out Fire Insurance Policy No. 4216 from  Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation with a face value of P25,000.00 covering her stocks, office furniture, fixtures and fittings of every kind and description. At the time of the insurance on April 19, 1962 of Policy No. 4219 in favor of respondent Yap, an insurance policy for P20,000.00 issued by the Great American Insurance Company covering the same properties was noted on said policy as co-insurance. Still, Oliva Yap took out another fire insurance policy for P20,000.00 covering the same properties, this time from the Federal Insurance Company, Inc., which new policy was, however, procured without notice to and the written consent of petitioner Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation and, therefore, was not noted as a co-insurance in Policy No. 4219. 

Great Pacific Life vs. CA and Teodoro Cortez ; G.R. L57308, April 23, 1990

FACTS Teodoro Cortez, upon the solicitation of Mrs. Siega, applied for a 20-year endowment policy for P30,000, and his application was accepted and approved. Thus, a policy was issued in his name. The effective date indicated on the face of the policy was December 25, 1972. The annual premium was P1,416.60. Mrs. Siega assured him that the first premium may be paid within the grace period of thirty (30) days from date of delivery of the policy. The first premium of P1,416.60 was paid by him in three (3) installments. In a letter date June 1, 1973, insurer advised Teodoro that the policy was not in force, and to make in enforceable and operative, he must remit the balance of P1,015.60 to complete the initial annual premium due December 15, 1972, and to see Dr. Remollo for another full medical examination at his own expense. Teodoro immediately informed the insurer that he was cancelling the policy and demanded the return of his premium plus damages. Insurer ignored the demand. Teodoro filed a complaint for damages praying for the refund, moral damages and atty’s fees. TC granted. CA affirmed

South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 102253. June 2, 1995

Effect – Payment Through an Agent FACTS An insurer which delivers to an insurance agent or insurance broker an insurance policy shall be deemed to have authorized such agent to receive on its behalf payment of any premium which is due on such policy. On 16 January 1984, Valenzuela Hardwood entered into an agreement with Seven Brothers Shipping to load on board in its vessel M/V Seven Ambassador,  lauan round logs numbering 940 for shipment in Manila. On January 20, Hardwood insured the logs against loss and/or damage with defendant South Sea Surety for 2 Million. On January 24, Hardwood paid the premium for the insurance policy to Victorio Chua. On January 25, M/V Seven Ambassador sank resulting in the loss of the plaintiff’s insured logs. However, it was only in the morning of 30 January 1984 or 5 days after the vessel sank when his messenger tendered the check to defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.

Malayan Insurance Co., v. Cruz Arnaldo

Topic: Payment through Agent  FACTS Malayan Insurance Company (MICO) issued to Coranacion Pinca Fire Insurance Policy on her property for the amount of P100K effective July 22, 1981 to July 22, 1982. On October 15, 1981, MICO cancelled the policy for non-payment of the premium and sent the corresponding notice to Pinca. On December 24, 1981, Pinca paid the premium to Dominador Adora, MICO’s agent. The payment was remitted by Adora to MICO on January 15, 1982. On January 18, 1982, Pinca’s property was completely burned. On February 5, the payment made by Pinca was returned by MICO to Adora, which Adora refused, on the ground that her policy was cancelled. Pinca made demands for payment, which MICO rejected. With that, Pinca went to the Insurance Commission.

UCPB General Insurance v. Masagana Telemart Inc., G.R. 137172, April 4, 2001

FACTS Masagana obtained  five (5) insurance policies covering various property described therein against fire, for the period from May 22, 1991 to May 22, 1992.  In March 1992, petitioner evaluated the policies and decided not to renew them upon expiration of their terms on May 22, 1992. Petitioner advised respondent’s broker, Zuellig Insurance Brokers, Inc. of its intention not to renew the policies.  On April 6, 1992, petitioner gave written notice to respondent of the non-renewal of the policies at the address stated in the policies.  On June 13, 1992, fire razed respondent’s property covered by three of the insurance policies petitioner issued. 

Tibay, et. al. vs. CA., G.R. 119655, May 24, 1966

Topic: Effect: Partial payment FACTS On 22 January 1987, Fortune Life and General Insurance Co., Inc. (FORTUNE) issued Fire Insurance Policy No. 136171 in favor of Violeta R. Tibay and/or Nicolas Roraldo on their two-storey residential building, together with all their personal effects therein. The insurance was for P600,000.00 covering the period from 23 January 1987 to 23 January 1988. On 23 January 1987, of the total premium of P2,983.50, petitioner Violeta Tibay only paid P600.00 thus leaving a considerable balance unpaid. On 8 March 1987 the insured building was completely destroyed by fire. Two days later, Violeta Tibay paid the balance of the premium. On the same day, she filed with FORTUNE a claim on the fire insurance policy.  She relied heavily on the 1967 case of Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance Inc. v. Woodworks, Inc. where the Court through Mr. Justice Arsenio P. Dizon sustained the ruling of the trial court that partial payment of the premium made the policy effective during the whole period of the policy.

Philippine Phoenix Surety vs. Woodworks, Inc. ; G.R. L-22684, August 31, 1967

FACTS Phoenix issued a Fire Policy insurance to Woodworks for the amount of P300,000.00 which was paid by the latter under official receipt. However, for some reason, Woodworks stopped payment, thus, Phoenix made several demands on Woodworks to pay the amount of P3,522.09. Phoenix Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. then commenced an action to recover from Woodworks, Inc. the sum of P3,522.09, representing the unpaid balance of the premiums on a fire insurance policy it issued for a term of one year from April 1, 1960 to April 1, 1961.  The MTC ruled in favor of Woodworks and which was reversed by the CoFI ordering Woodworks, Inc. to pay’ Philippine Phoenix Surety & Insurance, Inc., the sum of P3,522.09 with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid, and costs of the suit. Hence, this petition. 

Marquez and Maxilite v. Far East Bank and Trust Company;  GR No. 171379, January 10, 2011

Premium Payment FACTS Maxilite and Marques entered into a trust receipt transaction with FEBTC, in the sum of US$80,765.00, for the shipment of various high-technology equipment from the United States, with the merchandise serving as collateral. Maxilite paid the premiums for these policies through debit arrangement. Far East Bank Insurance Brokers, Inc. (FEBIBI), subsidiary of FEBTC, upon the advice of FEBTC facilitated the procurement and processing from Makati Insurance Company of four separate and independent fire insurance policies over the trust receipted merchandise. Finding that Maxilite failed to pay the insurance premium in the sum of P8,265.60 for one of the insurance policy, covering the period 24 June 1994 to 24 June 1995, FEBIBI sent written reminders to FEBTC, to debit Maxilite’s account.  FEBTC failed to transmit the premium payments on subject insurance coverage.

Velasco vs. Apostol;  G.R. No. 44588. May 9, 1989

FACTS In  November 27, 1973, petitioners Laura Velasco and Greta Acosta while riding in their Mercury car and driven by their driver Guarra collided with N/S taxicab driven by defendant Dominador Santos registered in the name of Alice Artuz c/o Norberto Santos. In July 20, l974,  petitioners sued Santos, Artuz and N. Santos for actual, moral and exemplary  damages plus attorney’s fees. Maharlika Insurance Co., Inc. was impleaded as a defendant with an allegation that the N/S taxicab involved was insured against third party liability for P20,000.00 at the time of the accident.  Both the accident and filing of the suit happened before effectivity on December 18, 1974 of Presidential Decree No. 612, the subsequent insurance law which repealed its predecessor.

Harding vs. Commercial Union Assurance, 38 Phil. 464 (1918)

Topic : Parties – Others In 1916, Mr Harding gifted his wife a Studebaker automobile. While being repaired in Luneta Garage, Mrs Harding insured the automobile with the latter (Smith Bell local agent of Commercial) for P150 and declared the amount of mobile being P3000.  The said assessment was estimated by Mr. Server, Luneta Garage’s manager. The automobile was totally destroyed by fire; the plaintiff, Mrs. Henry E. Harding furnished the defendant the proof and performed all conditions of said policy.   HOWEVER Defendant refused to pay and prayed that the policy be declared null and void on the ground that (1) the petitioner had misrepresented herself to be the owner of the automobile and deceived the defendant to issue the said policy of insurance; (2) that under the Civil Code, “All gifts between spouses during the marriage shall be void and (3) the car’s present value was only 2.8T and not 3T.

SSS vs. Davac; G.R. No. L-21642 , July 30, 1966

Topic : Parties – Beneficiaries Petronilo Davac designated in SSS form respondent Candelaria Davac as his beneficiary and indicated his relationship to her as that of “wife”. In 1959, Petronilo died, and, thereupon, each of the respondents (Candelaria Davac and Lourdes Tuplano) filed their claims for death benefit with the SSS. It appears that the deceased contracted two marriages, the first, with claimant Lourdes Tuplano, who bore him a child, Romeo Davac, and the second, with Candelaria Davac, with whom he had a minor daughter.  SSS declared Candelaria as the person entitled to receive the benefit since she is the one declared to

Consuegra vs. GSIS; G.R. No. L-28093 January 30, 1971

Topic : Parties – Beneficiaries In his lifetime, Jose Consuegra contracted two marriages, the first with herein respondent Rosario Diaz, out of which two children were born, and the second which was contracted in good faith with herein petitioner Basilia Berdin. When Consuegra died on September 26, 1965, the proceeds of his life insurance under policy No. 601801 were paid by the GSIS to petitioner Basilia Berdin and her children who were the beneficiaries named in the policy. However,  Consuegra failed to designate any beneficiary who would receive the retirement insurance benefits from GSIS. Respondent Rosario Diaz, the widow by the first marriage, filed a claim with the GSIS asking that the retirement insurance benefits be paid to her as the only legal heir of Consuegra. Petitioner Basilia Berdin and her children, likewise, filed a similar claim with the GSIS, asserting that being the beneficiaries named in the life insurance policy of Consuegra, they are the only ones entitled to receive the retirement insurance benefits.

Insular vs. Ebrado, G.R. No. L-44059 October 28, 1977

Topic : Parties – Beneficiaries Buenaventura Ebrado applied for life and accident insurance where Carponia (common law wife)  was made as the revocable beneficiary in his policy. Ebrado died as a result of an accident when he was hit by a falling branch of a tree. Carponia T. Ebrado filed with the insurer a claim for the proceeds of the Policy as the designated beneficiary therein, although she admits that she and the insured were merely living as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Pascuala Vda. de Ebrado also filed her claim as the widow of the deceased insured. She asserts that she is the one entitled to the insurance proceeds, not the common-law wife.

Heirs of Loreto Maramag vs. de Guzman, G.R. 181132, June 5, 2009

Topic : Parties – Beneficiaries FACTS Petitioners,legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag,  filed for revocation and/or reduction of insurance proceeds against respondents for being void and/or inofficious with the Regional Trial Court.  Respondents were Loreto’s illegitimate family – Eva de Guzman Maramag (Eva) was a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the killing of the latter and the illegitimate children of Loreto—Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie. Petitioner claim that  Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being designated as beneficiary of the insurance policies, and that Eva’s children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds of the policies.  Both Insular and Grepalife countered that the insurance proceeds belong exclusively to the designated beneficiaries in the policies, not to the estate or to the heirs of the insured. Grepalife

Filipinas Cia de Seguros vs. Christern Huenefeld & Co.

FACTS Christern Huenefeld, & Co., Inc., after payment of corresponding premium, obtained from the petitioner, Filipinas Cia. de Seguros, fire policy No. 29333 in the sum of P1000,000, covering merchandise contained in a building. During the Japanese military occupation, the building and insured merchandise were burned.  Respondent submitted to the petitioner its claim under the policy. The petitioner refused to pay the claim on the ground that the policy in favor of the respondent had ceased to be in force on the date the United States declared war against Germany, the respondent Corporation (though organized under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines) being controlled by the German subjects and the petitioner being a company under American jurisdiction when said policy was issued on October 1, 1941. 

Pandiman vs. Marine Manning Management Corp. & Singhid, G.R. NO. 143313 : June 21, 2005

FACTS Benito Singhid (Benito) was hired by Fullwin Maritime Limited (Fullwin), through its local agent, respondent Marine Manning and Management Corporation (MMMC), as chief cook on board the vessel MV Sun Richie Five for a term of twelve (12) months. The vessel and its crew were insured with Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Association Limited (OMMIAL), a Protection and Indemnity Club (P&I Club). OMMIAL transacted business in the Philippines through its local correspondent, herein petitioner Pandiman Philippines, Inc. (PPI). While on board, Benito suffered a heart attack, and subsequently died. After Benito’s remains were interred, his widow Rosita filed a claim for death benefits with MMMC, which, however, referred her to herein petitioner PPI. Rosita’s death claims remained unpaid.

White Gold Marine Services vs. Pioneer Insurance & the Steamship Mutual; G.R. NO. 154514. July 28, 2005

FACTS White Gold Marine procured a protection and indemnity coverage for its vessels from The Steamship Mutual Underwriting through Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation. When White Gold failed to fully pay its accounts, Steamship Mutual refused to renew the coverage. Steamship Mutual thereafter filed a case against White Gold for collection of sum of money to recover the latter’s unpaid balance. White Gold on the other hand, filed a complaint before the Insurance Commission claiming that Steamship Mutual is doing business in the country albeit without license.

Gulf Resorts, Inc. vs. Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation; G.R. No. 156167. May 16, 2005

FACTS Gulf Resorts, owner of Plaza Resorts, had its properties insured originally with the American Home Assurance Company. The first 4 policies provides that any loss from earthquake shock was extended only to petitioner’s 2 swimming pool.  The Gulf entered an insurance agreement with PCIC provided that the policy (wording and rates) shall be the same with AHAC. In the policy, the shock endorsement provided that :  In consideration of the payment by the insured to the company of the sum included additional premium the Company agrees, notwithstanding what is stated in the printed conditions of this policy due to the contrary, that this insurance covers loss or damage to shock to any of the property insured by this Policy occasioned by or through or in consequence of earthquake. 

Lalican vs. Insular Life Assurance Company; G.R. No. 183526. August 25, 2009.

FACTS Eulogio applied for a 20 year insurance policy with Insular Life. Violeta, petitioner, was named as the primary beneficiary. However, Eulogio failed to pay the premium therefore, the insurance lapsed and became void. On September 17, 1998, Eulogio applied for reinstatement and paid the overdue premium and interest to Malaluan, agent.  On the same day, just hours after filing his Application died of cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to electrocution. The next day,  Without knowing of Eulogio’s death, Malaluan forwarded to Insular Life Eulogio’s second Application for Reinstatement of Policy No. 9011992 and P17,500.00 deposit for approval.

Rizal Surety & Insurance Company vs. Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 112360. July 18, 2000

FACTS Rizal Surety & Insurance issued Fire Insurance Policy on buildings in favor of Transworld for 1.5M.  The same pieces of property were also insured with New India Assurance. The policy covers all that is “contained and/or stored in the premises occupied or forming part of the building situated in the Compound”. A fire broke out in the compound of Transworld which partly destroyed its four-span building while completely damaged its 2 story annex building. Private respondent brought an action for collection of sum of money and damages, against Rizal Insurance and New India.

Gaisano Cagayan Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, G.R. No. 147839, June 8, 2006

FACTS Intercapitol Marketing Corporation (IMC), maker of Wrangler Blue Jeans and Levi Strauss (Phils.) Inc. (LSPI), the local distributor of products  separately obtained from respondent fire insurance policies with book debt endorsements.  The insurance policies provide for coverage on book debts or those which are unpaid accounts in connection with ready-made clothing materials which have been sold or delivered to various customers and dealers. Gaisano Complex, owned by petitioner, was consumed by fire. Included in the items lost or destroyed in the fire were stocks of ready-made clothing materials sold and delivered by IMC and LSPI.

New Life Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 94071. March 31, 1992.

FACTS Newlife Enterprises insured its stocks with Western Guaranty Corporation, Reliance Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., and Equitable Insurance Corporation. In 1982, the building was gutted by fire where the stocks insured are placed. According to the certification issued the cause of fire was electrical in nature. After the fire, the petitioner went to the insurance companies to file a claim. Ultimately, the three insurance companies denied plaintiffs’ claim for payment  for breach of policy conditions. It allegedly violated Conditions No. 3 & 27 of the insurance contract where it provides that it must state or endorse thereon the other insurance coverage obtained or subsequently effected on the same stocks.

Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. vs. William Lines, Inc.; G.R. No. 132607. May 5, 1999

FACTS In 1992, William Lines, Inc. brought its vessel, M/V Manila City, to the Cebu Shipyard for annual dry-docking and repair. M/V Manila after subject vessel was transferred to the docking quay, it caught fire and sank, resulting to its eventual total loss. At the time of the unfortunate occurrence, the vessel was insured with Prudential for P45,000,000.00 pesos for hull and machinery. William Lines, Inc. filed a complaint for damages against Cebu Shipyard, alleging that the fire which broke out in M/V Manila City was caused by CSEW’s negligence and lack of care. Prudential Insurance was impleaded in the complaint after it paid William Lines, Inc. the value of the hull and machinery insurance on the M/V Manila City.

Philippine Health Care Products vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 600 SCRA 413 (2009)

FACTS Philippine Health is a domestic corporation engaged in the dispensation of the following medical services to individuals who enter into health care agreements with  – Preventive, Diagnostic and Curative medical services. Individuals enrolled in its health care program pay an annual membership fee. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue [CIR] sent the petitioner a formal demand letter and the corresponding assessment notices demanding the payment of deficiency taxes. Petitioner protested and filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) seeking the cancellation of the deficiency VAT and DST assessments. The CTA partially granted the petition ordering the petitioner to pay for the VAT.

Blue Cross Health Care, Inc. vs. Olivares, G.R. No. 169737

February 12, 2008. FACTS Olivares applied for a health care program with petitioner Blue Cross Health Care. In the agreement, ailments due to “pre-existing conditions” were excluded from the coverage. Neomi suffered a stroke and was admitted at the Medical City and incurred hospital expenses amounting to P34,217. Petitioner refused to pay the bills until Olivares attending physician submits a certification that the stroke she suffered was not caused by a pre-existing condition.          Petitioner argues that respondents prevented Dr. Saniel from submitting his report regarding the medical condition of Neomi.

Philamcare Health Systems, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 356 SCRA 379 (2002)

FACTS Ernani, applied for health care coverage with petitioner Philamcare Health. In the standard application form he answered no to the following question: Have you or any of your family members ever consulted or been treated for high blood pressure, heart trouble, diabetes, cancer, liver disease, asthma or peptic ulcer? The application was approved and Health Care Agreement was issued which entitles him to avail of hospitalization benefits, whether ordinary or emergency, “out-patient benefits” and services. During the period of his coverage, Ernani suffered a heart attack. Respondent, Julia, wife of Ernani, tried to claim the benefits under the health care agreement. However, petitioner denied her claim saying that the Health Care Agreement was void. According to the petitioner, there was a concealment regarding Ernani’s medical history. Doctors at the MMC allegedly discovered at the time of Ernani’s confinement that he was hypertensive, diabetic and asthmatic, contrary to his answer in the application form. Thus, the respondent paid the hospitalization expenses herself, amounting to about P76,000.00. Ernani died.

Republic vs. Del Monte Motors, Inc., 504 SCRA 53 (2006)

FACTS The RTC found Insurance Commissioner Eduardo T. Malinis guilty of indirect contempt for refusing to comply with the lawful order allowing the withdrawal of the security deposit of Capital Insurance and Surety Co. (CISCO)

Gercio vs. Sunlife Assurance, 48 Phil. 53 (1925)

FACTS In 1910, Sunlife issued a 20 year life insurance policy in favor of Grecio – whose beneficiary is his wife, Andrea. In 1922, a decree of divorce was issued which dissolved the onds of matrimony contracted by Gercio and Andrea. In 1922, Grecio filed a mandamus to compel Sunlife to change the beneficiary in the policy of  his life insurance from Andrea Zialcita, his former wife to Adela Garcia(present wife). Sunlife refuses to change since the policy did not include any provision reserving to the insured the right to change the beneficiary. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.

Aboitiz Shipping vs. New India Assurance, 488 SCRA 563 (2006)

FACTS Societe Francaise Des Colloides loaded cargoes insured by respondent New India Assurance Company, Ltd. In HK consigned in favor of General Textil. The cargo was transferred to M/V P. Aboitiz for transshipment to Manila. The vessel was advised by the Japanese Meteorological Center that it was safe to travel to its destination. But while at sea, the vessel received a report of a typhoon moving within its general path. To avoid the typhoon, the vessel changed its course. However, its hull leaked causing the vessel sank, but the captain and his crew were saved. Petitioner notified the consignee, General Textile, of the total loss of the vessel and all of its cargoes. General Textile, lodged a claim with respondent for the amount of its loss. Respondent hired a surveyor to investigate the cause of the sinking. In its report, the surveyor concluded that the cause was the flooding of the holds brought about by the vessel’s questionable seaworthiness. Respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Aboitiz, Franco-Belgian Services and the latter’s local agent, F.E. Zuellig, Inc. (Zuellig) alleged that the proximate cause of the loss of the shipment was the fault or negligence of the master and crew of the vessel, its unseaworthiness, and the failure of defendants therein to exercise extraordinary diligence in the transport of the goods.


G.R. Nos. 142732-33             December 4, 2007 FACTS: In 1992, Genuino was employed by Citibank as Treasury Sales Division Head with the rank of Assistant Vice-President.  Citibank sent Genuino a letter charging her with “knowledge and/or involvement” in transactions “which were irregular or even fraudulent.” In the same letter, Genuino was informed she was under preventive suspension. Genuino demanded for a bill of particulars regarding the charges against him.  However the letters did not specify the extent of Genuino’s alleged knowledge and participation in the diversion of bank’s clients’ funds, manner of diversion, and amounts involved; the acts attributed to Genuino that conflicted with the bank’s interests; and the circumstances surrounding the alleged irregular transactions.  Genuino’s employment was terminated by Citibank on grounds of (1) serious misconduct, (2) willful breach of the trust reposed upon her by the bank, and (3) commission of a crime against the bank.

Luna vs. Allado Construction Co., Inc.

G.R. No. 175251. May 30, 2011 FACTS: Luna filed a complaint before the Executive Labor Arbiter, alleging that he continuously rendered services as a warehouseman and a timekeeper in every construction project undertaken by Allado Construction. Sometime in 2001, he was given a travel order to proceed to [respondents’] main office in Davao City for reassignment. Upon arrival at the office,  he was ordered to sign several sets of “Contract of Project Employment”. He refused to sign the said contracts. Because of his refusal, he was not given a reassignment or any other work. Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioner applied for a leave of absence which was granted. Upon expiration of his leave, he was advised to report to the company’s project in Sarangani Province. However, he refused and claimed instead that he had been dismissed illegally. Labor Arbiter dismissed petitioner’s complaint finding that he was deemed to have resigned but ordered Allado Construction to pay him the amount of P18,000.00 by way of financial assistance. Only respondents interposed an appeal with the NLRC,  purely for the purpose of questioning the validity of the grant of financial assistance made by the Labor Arbiter.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

FACTS Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court. The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. It opined that under the nationality principle, Manalo’s cannot file a petition for divorce in court because they have no right to divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect.

Gerbert Corpuz vs. Daisilyn Sto. Tomas, G.R No. 186571, August 11, 2010

FACTS: Gerbert R. Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen,  who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas. When he found that his wife was having an affair, Gerbert filed a petition for divorce in Canada; and was granted.  After 2 years, Gerbert found a new love and decided to marry. He then filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved. RTC denied the petition and concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen.  It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. Gerbert considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office.

Republic of the Philippines v. Cipriano Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005.

FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter. Myros left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. She had been naturalized as an American citizen, obtained divorce decree and married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

Imelda M. Pilapil vs. Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989

FACTS: Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. The couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. On the grounds of alleged failure of their marriage, Geiling filed a divorce against Pilapil in Germany. The divorce of decree was granted. On the other hand, the petitioner filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geilingt filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married, Pilapil had an affair with 2 men. Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because Geiling does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint.

Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122191, October 8, 1998.

FACTS: Morada is  a Flight Attendant for SAUDIA airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. While on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, Morada went to a disco dance with fellow crew members Thamer AlGazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Thamer attempted to rape Morada. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel helped and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice. When plaintiff returned to Jeddah, SAUDIA officials requested her to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah; but she refused to cooperate.   Through the intervention of the Saudi Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah. Eventually, they were again put in service by SAUDIA.  She was forced to drop the cases. After one year and a half, a few minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila, Morada was not allowed to board the plane SAUDIA unless she signed a document written in Arabic. It turned out to be a notice to her to appear before the court. Morada then returned to Manila.

People of the Philippines vs. Wong Cheng

G.R. No. L-18924, October 19, 1922. FACTS: Wong Cheng is accused of having illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city. ISSUE: Whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters.

Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals.

G.R. No. 119602, October 06, 2000 FACTS: The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, was grounded and as a result blocked the passage of Malandrinon, a vessel owned by Wildvalley, which caused its failure to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day. Due to this, Wildvalley filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court of Manila against Philippine President Lines, Inc for damages.  The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the petitioner, The CA reversed the Trial Court’s decision and provided that under the PH Law, no fault or negligence can be attributed to Philippine Roxas.

Karen E. Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines.

G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997 FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old, to go with him to his apartment. Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days and raped the child three times each day.  Greg Bartelli was charged for Serious Illegal Detention and for four (4) counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati for damages with preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli.  A notice of garnishment was served to China Banking Corporation, where the dollar account of the private respondent was deposited. However,  The defendant  – China Banking Corporation, invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever.

The Holy See vs. Hon. Eriberto U. Rosario.

G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994. FACTS: Petitioners sold to Ramon Licup 3 lots namely 5-A, 5-B and 5-D with the agreement that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters who were then occupying the same. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent (Starbright Sales Enterprises).  Starbright demanded the petitioners to fulfill their undertaking and clear the property of squatters; however the petitioner proposed that if Starbright would undertake the eviction of the squatters, the purchase price of the lots should be reduced or if not, that the earnest money be returned. Petitioner and the PRC, without notice to private respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana.  Starbright filed a complaint for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against the petitioner. It states that it is  willing and able to comply with the terms of the contract to sell and has actually made plans to develop the lots into a townhouse project, but in view of the sellers’ breach, it lost profits of not less than P30,000,000.00.

National Development Company vs. Court of Appeals.

G.R. No. L-49407/L-49469, August 19, 1988. FACTS: National Development Company (NDC) appointed Maritime Company of the Phils. (MCP) as its agent to manage and operate the vessel, “Doña Nati,” for and its behalf and account. The vessel Doña Nati figured in a collision at Ise Bay, Japan with a Japanese vessel ‘SS Yasushima Maru’. As a result of which 550 bales of cargo of American raw cotton were lost and/or destroyed.  Development Insurance Surety Corporation (DISC), insurer, paid to the holder of the negotiable bills of lading. It then filed an action of recovery of the said amount against NDC and MCP.

Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue.

G.R. No. 46720, June 28, 1940. FACTS: Birdie Lillian Eye died in Los Angeles, California, the place of her alleged last residence and domicile. Among the properties she left was 35,000 shares of stock in the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, a Philippine corporation.  Her will was duly admitted to probate in California. Wells Fargo was duly appointed trustee. The CIR sought to subject the  shares of stock to the Philippine inheritance tax. Wells Fargo protested. It concedes that  (a) the Philippine inheritance tax is not a tax on property, but upon transmission by inheritance and  (b) intangibles, like the shares of stocks, their situs is in the domicile of the owner thereof, and, therefore, their trans­mission by death necessarily takes place under his domicil­iary laws.

Salvador H. Laurel vs. Ramon Garcia.

G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990. FACTS: President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations’ capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The subject property in this case is the Roppongi property which is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement. The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II. The property has twice been set for bidding.  The petitioners filed petitions for prohibition to enjoin the respondents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the Roppongi property. The following grounds are provided

Severina vda. de Enriquez vs. Miguel Abadia.

G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954 FACTS: On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest executed a holographic will. He died on January 14, 1943 and left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees filed a petition for its probate. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition. At the time of the testator’s death, holographic wills were not permitted by law. However during the hearing, the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills. The trial court  admitted to probate the will for the reason that under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form.  The oppositors are appealing from that decision.

Philippine Trust Co. vs. Magdalena C. Bohanan, G.R. No. L-12105, January 30, 1960

FACTS: Testator Bohonan, a citizen of the State of Nevada at the time of his death declares that his will and testament shall be governed by the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate.  Out  of the total estate of P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of several mining companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000. The wife Magdalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitime that the laws of the forum concede to them. It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will.

Augusto Benedicto Santos III vs. Northwest Orient Lines, G.R. No. 101538 June 23, 1992.

FACTS: The petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco, U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back. For his scheduled departure to Manila to San Francisco, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight from Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed. Petitioner, sued Nortwest Orient Airlines (NOA) for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.  Citing the Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, it contended that the complaint could be instituted only in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, before: the court of the domicile of the carrier;the court of its principal place of business;the court where it has a place of business through which the contract had been made;the court of the place of destination.

Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation vs. V.P Eusebio Construction Inc.

G.R. No. 140047, July 13, 2004; FACTS: Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (hereinafter Philguarantee) filed a complaint for reimbursement  from .P. Eusebio Construction, Inc. (VPECI) of the sum of money it paid to Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait pursuant to a guarantee it issued for respondent. The claim represents  the full payment of the performance bond  to Al Ahli Bank, as a counter-guarantee for the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy-Medical Rehabilitation Center in Iraq. VPECI and 3-Plex allegedly had delays on the construction work due to some setbacks and difficulties. The Project was not completed as scheduled.  VPECI failed to pay prompting Philguarantee to file the case.  The State Organization of Buildings (SOB), Ministry of Housing and Construction, Baghdad, Iraq, awarded the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy-Medical Rehabilitation Center, Phase II, in Baghdad, Iraq, to Ajyal Trading for a total contract price of US$18,739,668.  3-Plex, respondent entered into a joint venture agreement with Ajyal; and undertook the execution of the entire Project, while the latter would be entitled to a commission of 4% of the contract price. 3-Plex, not being accredited by POCB assigned and transferred all its rights and interests under the joint venture agreement to VPECI.

Pan American World Airways, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court.

G.R. No. 70462, August 11, 1988. FACTS: Plaintiff Rene V. Pangan entered into 2 agreements for the exhibition of films and preparation of the required promotional materials in San Francisco and Guam. On the date of his flight, his luggages which contained the promotional materials did not arrive which allegedly caused the cancellation of his agreements. Pangan filed a complaint against Pan American World for actual damages consisting of alleged lost profits due to the loss of baggage. Pan American contends that its liability for the lost baggage as provided in the Warsaw Convention is $20 per kilo, as Pangan did not declare a higher value for his baggage and pay the corresponding additional charges.

Agustino B. Ong Yiu vs. Honorable Court of Appeals.

G.R. No. L-40597, July 29, 1979. FACTS: Yui, a paying passenger, boarded PAL bound for Butuan City. Upon arrival, one his luggages, a blue “maleta” could not be found. Yui demanded the delivery of his baggage because it contained vital documents needed for trial the next day. When the maleta was returned, it was found that a folder containing certain documents needed for the trial were missing. Yui filed a complaint for damages for breach of contract of transportation.  PAL provided that its liability is limited to P100.00 per baggage, not having declared a greater value,  as written on the back of the ticket. 

Parmanand Shewaram vs. Philippine Airlines.

G.R. No. L-20099, July 7, 1966. FACTS: Shewaram instituted an action to recover damages suffered by him due to the alleged failure to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance and carriage of his luggage. He boarded a PAL plane bound for Manila from Zamboanga. One of  his suitcase did not arrive with his flight because it was sent to Iligan. However upon arrival of the suitcase in Manila, it was tampered and the transistor radio and the camera contained therein were lost. The total value of the two articles was P373.00. PAL contended that its liability should be limited to the amount stated in the conditions of carriage printed at the back of the plane ticket – “the liability, if any, for loss or damage to checked baggage or for delay in the delivery  shall be conclusively deemed not to exceed P100.00 for each ticket.”  Since Shewaram failed to declare a higher value and pay for the declared amount, he cannot demand payment in excess of P100.00. 

Pakistan International Airlines Corporation vs. Hon. Blas F. Ople.

G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990 FACTS: Pakistan International, a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed two contracts of employment with private respondents for their services as flight stewardesses. The contract had a term of three years but also with the stipulation that, notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary, the employer reserves the right to pre-terminate it at any time. Before the expiration of the three-year term, Pakistan International sent notices of dismissal to private respondents.  Farrales and Mamasig filed a case for illegal dismissal and recovery of wages and other benefits. PIA invokes paragraphs 5 and 6 of its contract of employment with private respondents Farrales and Mamasig, arguing that its relationship with them was governed by the provisions of its contract rather than by the general provisions of the Labor Code. PIA had the right to terminate the employment agreement at any time by giving one-month’s notice to the employee or, in lieu of such notice, one-month’s salary.

 K.K. Shell Sekiyu Osaka Hatsubaisho and Fu Hing Oil Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals.

G.R. Nos. 90306-07. July 30, 1990 FACTS: Kumagai (Japanese Corporation) filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money against Atlantic Venus (Panama Corporporation), the vessel MV Estella and Crestamonte Shipping Corporation (Philippine corporations). Atlantic is the owner of the MV Estella. Crestamonte appointed N.S. Shipping Corporation (NSS; a japanese corporation), as its general agent in Japan which in turn appointed Kumagai as its local agent in Osaka. Kumagai supplied the MV Estella with supplies and services but despite repeated demands Crestamonte failed to pay the amounts due. Fu Hing Oil Co., Ltd and K.K. Shell (foreign corporations not doing business in the Philippines), filed a motion to intervene, provided that upon request of NSS, it supplied marine diesel oil/fuel to the MV Estella and that despite previous demands, Crestamonte has failed to pay.

Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. vs. American Express International.

G.R. No. 159507, April 19, 2006. FACTS: Ancieto Saludo, Jr., a Filipino citizen and member of HOR,   filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers ; corporation doing business in the Philippines.  The complaint’s cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo’s AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first dishonor happened when petitioner Saludo’s daughter used her supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the United States. The second dishonor occurred when petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan to attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.

Mo Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration.

G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971. FACTS: Lau Yuen Yeung, a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant to take a pleasure trip and visit his great grand uncle.  Originally, she was granted to stay for a month, but due to several extensions she was supposed to leave a year after. However, before her visa was to expire, she married Edilberto Lim (petitioner) , an alleged Filipino citizen. She claims herself to be lawfully naturalized upon her marriage. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections.

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995. DOCTRINES: For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. In Nuval vs. Guray,  the Court held that “the term residence . . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such Domicile means an individual’s “permanent home,” “a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.” Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of “the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place” and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently. 

Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals.

G.R. No. 88831 and 94508 November 8, 1990. FACTS: Cases of disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code are filed against the private respondent, Merito Miguel, for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao. COMELEC dismissed the case. Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there.

Juan G. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections.

G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755, June 28, 1996 FACTS: Raul R. Lee, a candidate for  the position of Governor of Sorsogon, filed a petition with the Comelec for disqualification of Frivaldo by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines.  COMELEC declares Frivaldo disqualified. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division. Frivaldo won the election but Comelec en banc directed the Board of Canvassers to declare candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate. Frivaldo alleged that he had successfully acquired citizenship by repatriation under P.D. No. 725; that he took his oath of allegiance on June 30, 1995.

Rommel Arnado vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 210164. August 18, 2015. FACTS: Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America (USA). Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act No. 9225. He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and on April 3, 2009, he executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.  Balua, another mayoralty candidate, however, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground, among others, that Arnado remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation. Arnado won the election, however, COMELEC declared that Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

Casan Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC.

G.R. No. 195649. April 16, 2013 FACTS: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen however through naturalization he became a US citizen. In 2008, Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines twice. Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.  Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Balua presented a travel record that Arnado has been using his US Passport. The record presents that Arnado after renouncing his foreign citizenship, continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009.

Ernesto Mercado vs. Eduardo Barrios Manzano and COMELEC

G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1996. FACTS: Mercado and Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati. Manzano won the election but his proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides that “those who have dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position”. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation of U.S. citizenship Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jussoli. He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. He is registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997.

Antonio Bengzon III vs. House of Representative Electoral Tribunal.

G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001 FACTS: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. However he enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. After almost 9 years, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. Bengzon claimed that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase “from birth” in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

Norse Management Co. and Pacific Seamen Services vs. National Seamen Board.

G.R. No. L-54204, September 30, 1982 FACTS: N. Abordo died from an apoplectic stroke on board a Singaporean Vessel while in the course of his employment with Norse Management. Abordo’s wife filed for death compensation benefits and reliefs with National Seamen Board (NSB) and alleged that compensation must be based on the law where the vessel is registered. Norse contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied because NSB cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen’s Insurance Law of Singapore, and offered P30,000.00 as death benefits based on the Board’s Memorandum Circular No.

Bienvenido Cadalin vs. Philippine Overseas Employment Agency.

G.R. No. 104776, December 5, 1994 FACTS: Bienvenido M. Cadalin et al, overseas contract workers (OCWs) , instituted a class suit with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII (foreign corporation engaged in construction).   The complaint principally sought the (a) payment of the unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and (b), the payment of the interest on all the unpaid benefits and  (c) the suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII. They worked in Bahrain for BRII and they filed the suit after 1 yr. from the termination of their employment contract. As provided by Art. 156 of the Amiri Decree aka as the Labor Law of the Private Sector of Bahrain: “a claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of 1 year from the date of the expiry of the contract,” it appears that their suit has prescribed.

Richard T. Martel, Allan C. Putong, Abel A. Guiñares, Victoria G. Mier, and Edgar C. Gan  vs. People of the Philippines.

G.R. Nos. 224765-68 FACTS:  The Sandiganbayan found the petitioners  guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. In 2003, it was alleged that the petitioners procured five motor vehicles for the use of the Governor and Vice Governor of Davao del Sur  in a manner violative of procurement laws.   The procurement of the subject vehicles was not subjected to competitive public bidding as it was effected through direct purchase. By preselecting the vehicle models to be procured, petitioners are alleged to have acted with manifest partiality in favor of their preferred suppliers and accorded them unwarranted benefit and advantage, causing undue injury to the government.  Petitioners filed their separate appeals before the Court.  The People of the Philippines contend that the petitions must be denied because the grounds relied upon involve questions of fact.  Moreover, the petitions amount to a collateral attack on the judgment of conviction by raising doubt as to whether the acts of petitioners were sufficient to establish criminal liability, thereby assailing the Sandiganbayan’s appreciation of evidence.

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal vs. Daisy B. Panga-Vega

G.R. No. 228236, January 27, 2021. FACTS: Panga-Vega, then Secretary of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), requested authority to avail of the 15 days of special leave benefit under Republic Act (RA) No. 9710, otherwise known as the Magna Carta of Women to undergo hysterectomy.  The HRET approved Panga-Vega’s request for special leave for a period not exceeding two months starting February 7, 2011.  After a month of availing of the special leave, Panga­ Vega informed the HRET Chairperson that she was reassuring her duties and functions. She also presented a medical certificate that she was already “fit to work”.  The HRET directed Panga-Vega to consume her 2-month special leave given her need for prolonged rest following her hysterectomy, and in view of a pending investigation on her alleged alteration or tampering one minute of the meeting that could subject her to more stress. She sought reconsideration of this HRET Resolution but was denied pointing out the confusion and doubts regarding her true medical condition as caused by her medical certificates.  The CSC ruled that she only needed to present a medical certificate attesting her physical fitness to return to work and need not exhaust the full leave she applied for under RA No. 9710. It was further held that applying the rules on maternity leave, she is entitled to both the commuted money value of the unexpired portion of the special leave and her salary for actual services rendered effective the day she reported back for work. 

Artoo P. Garin, vs. City Of Muntinlupa

G.R. No. 216492, January 20, 2021. FACTS Garin (Garin), a resident of Pasig City, wanted to build a house in Katarungan Village in Muntinlupa City. Per Section 10 of Muntinlupa City Ordinance No. 02-047, one of the prerequisites to secure a building permit is a clearance from the homeowners’ association. Garin requested clearance from Katarungan Village Homeowners Association (Katarungan), but clarified that “he is not a member of the association.” However, Katarungan refused to give the required clearance until he paid an assessment fee and signed up for membership in their association.  Garin filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the City of Muntinlupa to accept his application for processing, even without the required clearance. He also prayed that Section 10 of Muntinlupa City Ordinance No. 02-047 be declared unconstitutional “insofar as it relates to the tasking of the homeowners association for the issuance of clearance. The RTC denied petitioner’s application for preliminary injunction and suspended the case pending petitioner’s exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Mario L. Relampagos vs People of the Philippines.

G.R. No. 235480, January 27, 2021. FACTS: In 2013, following Benhur Luy’s (Luy) rescue from his alleged illegal detention by Napoles and the latter’s brother, by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents, Luy executed an affidavit confirming the allegations regarding the PDAF scam. The Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) likewise conducted a parallel fact-finding investigation.  Thereafter, NBI and the FIO filed their respective complaints against those involved in the complex scheme. Then Undersecretary Mario L. Relampagos (Relampagos) and his staff were indicted by the Ombudsman for violations of Articles 210, 212, and 217 (Malversation) of the RPC and violations of Section 3(b), (e), (g), and (h) and Section 4 of RA 3019, as amended, and RA 6713. After the preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman found probable cause against petitioners for two (2) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, and two (2) counts of Malversation under the RPC. The Ombudsman indicted the petitioners of facilitating with “undue haste” the processing of the Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs) and Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) pertaining to Cagas’ PDAF allocation.

Loreto Tabingo vs People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 241610, February 01, 2021. FACTS:  After the implementation of a search warrant, Tabingo was found to have in his possession, control and custody six (6) opened transparent plastic sachets containing Methamphetamine or shabu residue, a dangerous drug. He was charged with violation of Sections 11 and 12, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. Tabingo pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. He contended that the police officers had to look for him, and later found him in his daughter’s house, where he was informed that they have a search warrant against him. Thereafter, Tabingo complied and opened the door of his house. However, when Tabingo was about to enter, he was ordered to stay at the main door of his house. During the search of the rooms, the police officers summoned Tabingo to take a look at the plastic sachets of shabu that they allegedly found. Later on, Tabingo was arrested and brought to the police station. The trial court rendered a Decision finding Tabingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charge. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. 

Senators Francis “Kiko” N. Pangilinan, Franklin M. Drilon, Paolo Benigno “Bam” Aquino IV, Leila M. De Lima, Risa Hontiveros, And Antonio ‘sonny’ F. Trillanes Iv, Petitioners, vs. Alan Peter S. Cayetano, Salvador C. Medialdea, Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr., And Salvador S. Panelo

G.R. No. 238875, March 16, 2021 FACTS: In 2017, Atty. Jude Sabio filed a complaint before the International Criminal Court pertaining to alleged summary killings when President Duterte was the mayor of Davao City. The Office of International Criminal Court Trial Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda (Prosecutor Bensouda) commenced the preliminary examination of the atrocities allegedly committed in the Philippines pursuant to the Duterte administration’s “war on drugs.  On March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court. It formally submitted its Notice of Withdrawal through a Note Verbale to the United Nations Secretary-General’s Chef de Cabinet. The Secretary General received this communication the following day. Through these actions, the Philippines completed the requisite acts of withdrawal. This was all consistent and in compliance with what the Rome Statute plainly requires. By this point, all that was needed to enable withdrawal have been consummated. Further, the International Criminal Court acknowledged the Philippines’ action soon after it had withdrawn.  Three Petitions for Certiorari and Mandamus were filed, assailing the executive’s unilateral act of withdrawing from the Rome Statute for being unconstitutional. 

People vs Alfredo Casem, Jr.

G.R. No. 242214; June 23, 2021. FACTS:  Alfredo was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11  of RA 9165 for selling and delivering two (2) heat scaled transparent plastic sachets containing shabu to P03 Bersola, who posed as a buyer. In defense, Casem denied the allegations and provided that he was framed up.  The RTC, in its Decision, found Alfredo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged. The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of both crimes. It further ruled that the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 have likewise been complied with by the arresting officers in both cases and that the chain of custody was unbroken.   The CA affirmed the trial court’s Joint Decision.

Leonides Quiap vs People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 229183, February 17, 2021. FACTS:  The authorities organized an entrapment one alias “Kacho”,  on board of a passenger jeepney, who in  his possession, control and custody a dangerous drug. After five minutes, the identified passenger jeepney arrived and was flagged down. At that time, Kacho was about to throw out of the window a small object wrapped with electrical tape but PO2 Garcia held his hand. When unwrapped it contained a white crystalline substance. Kacho was brought to the police station and identified as petitioner Leonides Quiap.  The RTC convicted Leonides of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs and ruled that his denial cannot prevail over the presumption of regularity in the performance of police duties. Moreover, the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated item had been preserved. On appeal, Leonides questioned the validity of his arrest and raised the failure of the police officers to comply with the proper handling and custody of dangerous drug, i.e. the marking was not made at the place of seizure, the insulating witnesses were absent during the physical inventory, and no photograph of the confiscated item was taken.

Republic of the Philippines vs Asuncion

G.R. No. 200772, February 17, 2021. FACTS: In 1976, Paciencia Asuncion (Paciencia) and her children  filed an application for original registration of title over nine parcels of land located in Bambang, Bulakan, Bulacan. They claimed the simple ownership of the aforementioned lands by inheritance, accretion, and open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession under color of title for at least 30 years. The application was opposed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines, on the ground that the lands covered by the application were unclassified forest lands within the public domain; and that certain parts of the lands covered by the application belong to Molina-Enriquez group and their predecessors-in-interest. Due to several postponements and repeated motions to reset filed by the parties’ counsels, the case did not progress until April 29, 1986, when Paciencia and her children moved to amend their application to include another lot. In 1989, Paciencia died;  and was substituted by her children. The Asuncions entered into a compromise agreement with the Molina-Enriquez group whereby the former withdrew certain parcels of land from their application in exchange for the withdrawal of the latter’s opposition thereto.

Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. (Now Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc.), vs. South Rich Acres, Inc., Top Service, Inc.

G.R. No. 202384, May 04, 2021 FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Las Piñas enacted City Ordinance No. 343-97, Series of 1997 (City Ordinance No. 343-97), which declared Marcos Alvarez Avenue as a public road. South Rich Acres (SRA) and Top Service filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Damages against the City of Las Piñas to annul City Ordinance. SRA is the present legal owner of the seven parcels of land (subject lots) which formed part of a private road network, collectively referred to as Marcos Alvarez Avenue and the City Ordinance No. 343-97 in effect deprived SRA of its ownership over the subject lots without just compensation Royal Asia Multi-Properties, Inc. (RAMPI) filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Answer in Intervention on the ground that it has legal interest in the upholding of the validity and constitutionality of City Ordinance No. 343-97 because SRA and Top Service had been unjustifiably demanding payment from them for the use of Marcos Alvarez Avenue. It asserts that under PD 1216, the open spaces and roads in residential subdivisions are beyond the commerce of men, having been automatically and directly identified for public use and vested in favor of the then Municipality of Las Piñas. Consequently, EPCIB substituted RAMPI as intervenor-defendant because all the rights and interests over the Royal South Subdivision had already been transferred, conveyed, and assigned by RAMPI to EPCIB.

People of the Philippines vs Gregorio Villalon Jr.

G.R. No. 249412, March 15, 2021 FACTS: The City Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Group conducted a buy-bust operation acting on confidential information regarding the alleged illegal drug-peddling activities of Villalon.  The accused had  (a) sold and handed over to the police poseur-buyer a sachet containing shabu; (b) in his possession and control 3 transparent plastic sachets of shabu and (c) unlawfully in his possession the following equipments, instruments and paraphernalia intended for use of dangerous drugs – 2 lighter and a tube tooter.  Three (3) separate Informations were filed before the RTC charging Villalon with the crimes of Illegal Sale and Possession of Dangerous Drugs, as well as Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.  For his part, the accused-appellant denied the charges against him and instead, claimed that during that time, he was waiting for his turn to buy soft drinks from a store when two (2) unknown people approached him and asked him if he was Jun-Jun Villalon, which he confirmed. They then held him and instructed him to bring them to his boarding house. Upon arrival they made him sit and then asked him where his money was, which he answered by pointing at the top of the table. One of them then showed him a small wallet with shabu inside that was allegedly his, which he vehemently denied. Subsequently, they brought him to the police station and detained him.

Jasper Tan vs People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 232611, April 26, 2021 FACTS: Two (2) Informations were filed against Jasper charging him with Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Sections 15 and 16, Article III of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425.  On arraignment, Jasper pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. The RTC convicted Jasper of the charges against him. The trial court ruled that denial is a weak defense, and the prosecution was able to prove Jasper’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt in both cases. CA affirmed Jasper’s conviction.  Jasper assailed the following:  the validity of the search warrant because it does not have a specific description of the house and its premisesthe search was invalid because he was already arrested and his movement restricted when the search was conducted, so his right to witness the search was violatedthe prosecution did not comply with the rule on chain of custody. In sum, he posits the seized drugs are not admissible as evidence, and the buy-bust operation as well as his arrest were illegal.

The Province of Nueva Vizcaya vs. CE Casecnan Water And Energy Company, Inc.

G.R. No. 241302, February 01, 2021 FACTS: CE Casecnan, an independent power producer (IPP) entered into a build-operate-transfer contract with National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a GOCC to deliver to Pantabangan Reservoir all water diverted from the Casecnan Watershed and all net electrical energy generated by the project. Provincial Assessor’s Office informed CE Casecnan of the initial appraisal and assessment of the properties for real property tax (RPT) due.  CE Casecnan endorsed the letter to NIA because their agreement provides that all fees paid to the government shall be for the account of NIA. However, NIA did not give any instructions to CE Casecnan regarding the same and instead filed its Protest to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA) of the Province of Nueva Vizcaya. LBAA denied the protest filed by NIA. The Office of the Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Nueva Vizcaya issued a Final Demand addressed to CE Casecnan for the payment of RPT. For failure of NIA to respond to CE Casecnan, the latter paid the RPT delinquency under protest. CE Casecnan sent an invoice to NIA and demanded reimbursement of the amount paid invoking the provisions of their earlier Agreements. 

Irene G. Ancheta, et al. vs. Commission On Audit (COA)

G.R. No. 236725, February 02, 2021 FACTS: In 2010, SWD, a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), released an aggregate amount of P3,354,123.50 worth of benefits for its Board of Directors. These disbursements were disallowed in Notice of Disallowance (ND) because they were granted to persons employed after June 30, 1989, in violation of DBM CCC No. 10.  The COA Audit Team particularly cited paragraph 5.5 of DBM CCC No. 10, which enumerated the additional allowances that are not integrated in the standardized salary rate, and allowed to be continuously given only to incumbent employees, who are actually receiving such benefits as of June 30, 1989. Considering that the SWD officers and employees who received the additional benefits in 2010 were employed after June 30, 1989, the COA Audit Team concluded that the grants were unauthorized.  The following persons were charged responsible to settle the disallowed amounts: (1) Ancheta, General Manager, who approved the transaction; (2) Ariel Rapsing (Rapsing), Corporate Budget Specialist, who certified that the expenses were necessary; (3) Agnes Corpuz (Corpuz), Cashier A, as the disbursing officer; and (4) the other officers and employees who received the disallowed benefits, except those incumbents as of June 30, 1989.

Renato B. Padilla And Maria Louisa Perez-Padilla vs. Commission On Audit

G.R. No. 244815, February 02, 2021. FACTS: In 2012, the PICCI Board of Directors (BOD) approved the grant of PBB for the year 2012 to all PICCI employees at P10,000.00 each or in the total amount of P840,000.00. The PBB was given in recognition of the successful hosting of the events at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC).  The ATL and the SA issued the ND disallowing the payment of the PBB and declared that it constitutes an irregular transaction under COA Circular No. 2012-003. They ordered the settlement of the disallowed amount.  PICCI maintained the following arguments:  PICCI is not covered by E.O. No. 80 and its implementing guidelines since its parent company, the BSP, enjoys fiscal autonomy under Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653;PICCI is not within the jurisdiction of the DBM since it does not derive its budget from the GAA, but from the BSPThe COA failed to show “dishonest purpose” or “moral obliquity” so as to constitute bad faith on the part of the petitioners when they approved the payment and certified the availability of funds and completeness of supporting documents for the grant of the PBB.

Ferdinand “Bongbong” R. Marcos, Jr. vs. Maria Leonor “Leni Daang Matuwid” G. Robredo.

P.E.T. Case No. 005, February 16, 2021 FACTS:  An election protest was filed by Ferdinand Marcos, Jr who challenged the election and proclamation of Maria Leonor Robredo (protestee) as vice president in the 2016 national and local elections.  The Tribunal categorized his causes of action into:  Annulment and Proclamation. The proclamation of Robredo as the duly elected [Vice President] is null and void because the [Certificates of Canvass (COCs)] generated by the [Consolidation and Canvass System (CCS)] are not authentic, and may not be used as basis to determine the number of votes that the candidates for Vice President received.Revision and Recount. Revision and recount of the paper ballots and/or the ballot images as well as an examination, verification, and analysis of the voter’s receipts, election returns, audit logs, transmission logs, the list of voters, particularly the [election day computerized voter’s list], and [voters registration record], the books of voters and other pertinent election documents and/or paraphernalia used in the elections, as well as the automated election equipment and records such as the [vote counting machines], [consolidated canvassing system] units, SD cards (main and backup), and the other data storage devices containing electronic data and ballot images in ALL of the 36,465 protested clustered precincts pursuant to Rules 38 to 45 of the 2010 PET Rules. Annulment of Elections. Annulment of election results for the position of Vice President in the provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur[,] and Basilan, on the ground of terrorism, intimidation[,] and harassment of voters as well as pre-shading of ballots in all of the 2,756 protested clustered precincts that functioned in the aforesaid areas

Pedrito M. Nepomuceno, Former Mayor – BOAC, Marinduque vs. President Rodrigo R. Duterte

UDK No. 16838. May 11, 2021 FACTS: A petition for writ of mandamus is filed by Pedrito Nepomuceno (petitioner) against respondents President Rodrigo Duterte, Health Secretary Francisco Duque, and Gen. Carlito Galvez, Jr. (Ret.), as Chief Implementer of the National Task Force against COVID-19 (respondents), seeking to compel respondents to observe the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) rules on the acquisition, procurement and use of drugs, particularly on the issue of trials and procurement and use of COVID-19 vaccines, namely, the Sinovac vaccines and for them to properly observe the procurement law. At the core of the petition is the concern raised by petitioner over the plan announced by the national government to procure vaccines produced by Sinovac (Sinovac vaccine) for distribution and administration to the Filipino people in order to contain the spread of infection brought about by the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), which causes the coronavirus disease of COVID-19. This is despite reports raising doubts on the efficacy of the Sinovac vaccine and the absence of a concrete study on how it really fares in addressing the COVID-19 disease.

Re: Letter Dated March 9, 2020 of Department of Health Secretary Francisco T. Duque III, MD, MSC.

A.M. No. 20-08-05-SC FACTS: The instant administrative matter stemmed from the Blacklisting Order dated 20 May 2019 issued by the Department of Health (DOH) against JBros Construction Corporation (JBROS) for alleged irregularities and failure to deliver on Phase II of its “Barangay Health Stations Project.” JBROS contested the blacklisting order by filing separate petitions in two (2) Regional Trial Courts, with said courts issuing contrasting orders. First, JBROS filed a Petition for Certiorari with application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Status Quo Ante Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC of Manila. Presiding Judge Renato Z. Encisco denied the prayer of JBROS for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. JBROS withdrew the case.

Governor Edgardo Tallado vs Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 246679, June 11, 2021. FACTS:  The respondents filed their respective motions for reconsideration impugning the 2019 Decision of Supreme Court and argued that  The Court erred in ruling that Tallado’s removal constitutes as valid interruption of his term sufficient to break the three-term limit rule imposed on local candidates. They point out that the petitioner’s resort to appeal and the eventual modification of the administrative penalty imposed on him shows the lack of permanence of his ouster as governor and should be insufficient to warrant an interruption of his term. Respondents urge the Court to consider his absence in office as preventive suspension, as the Ombudsman (OMB) Rules provide.They claim that for the Court to allow such construction to continue would reward corrupt and unscrupulous politicians to escape the grasp of the three-term prohibition. 

Antonio Suba vs Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 235418, March 03, 2021. FACTS: Suba and Navida were charged for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for acting with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, and/or gross inexcusable negligence for requesting, facilitating and receiving cash advances worth P241,478.68 for their trip to Beijing and proceed thereto “despite fully knowing the existence of a letter/order from the [DOTC] denying their application for a travel authority.” Suba argues that there was no evidence that he knew of the lack of travel authority at the time he joined Navida in the Beijing conference. There was also no bad faith, ill motive or fraud on his part because when he processed the cash advances, he was merely following the directive of his superior.  He and Navida actually attended the conference in Beijing on aircraft maintenance which was relevant to their posts in PADC. Suba further advances that he already settled the amount of P241,478.68, which negates the element of damage or injury to the government. 

People of the Philippines vs. Jaynard Agustin; G.R. No. 247718, March 03, 2021

FACTS: Agustin was indicted for the crime of Rape with Homicide of a 12 year-old minor, AAA. Based on the post-mortem examination, the cause of the victim’s death is asphyxia by strangulation. There were also prominent injuries in the genitalia of AAA.  Agustin was brought to the police station; the police officers requested  Atty. Donato, Jr. to render assistance to Agustin who wants to give a confession relative to the commission of a crime. Atty. Donato, Jr. claimed that he was with Agustin during the entire time of the investigation and apprised Agustin of his rights. He also reminded Agustin that whatever statement he will give can be used against him. However, accused was insistent and later, he confessed to the rape and killing of AAA during the investigation. After thoroughly reading the printed copy of Agustin’s extrajudicial confession, he affixed his signature thereon to prove that he assisted the accused while the latter was giving his confession. During the hearing, the prosecution offered as evidence the extrajudicial confession of Jaynard  taken by PO3 Mora in the presence of and with the assistance of Atty. Luis Donato. It was stated therein the exactly the same narration of raping and killing of AAA. The extrajudicial confession bore the thumb mark purportedly of the said accused which was placed above the printed name “JAYNARD P. AGUSTIN.”

More Electric And Power Corporation, vs. Panay Electric Company, Inc.

G.R. No. 248061, September 15, 2020 FACTS:  R.A. No. 11212 grants to MORE a franchise to establish, operate and maintain an electric power distribution system in Iloilo City. Under Section 10, MORE may “exercise the power of eminent domain” when necessary for the efficient establishment of its service. In particular, it may acquire a distribution system consisting of poles, wires, cables, transformers, switching equipment and stations, buildings, infrastructure, machineries and equipment previously, currently or actually used x x x for the conveyance of electric power to end-users in its franchise area. The distribution system which is currently and actually being used in Iloilo City was owned by PECO, the holder of the franchise since 1922. PECO’s franchise expired on January 18, 2019, and no new franchise has been issued to it since. While PECO is allowed to operate the existing distribution system in the interim, the law provides that MORE shall not be prevented from acquiring the system through the exercise of the right of eminent domain.

Chan vs. Chan

G.R. No. 179786. July 24, 2013 FACTS: Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records of Johnny’s confinement, which records she wanted to present in court as evidence in support of her action to have their marriage declared a nullity. Respondent Johnny resisted her request for subpoena, however, invoking the privileged character of those records under Section 24(c), Rule 130. Josielene claims that  the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the “testimonial” evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged.

People vs. Sanchez

G.R. No. 231383. March 7, 2018 FACTS: Two (2) Informations were filed before the RTC charging Sanchez with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. A buy-bust operation was organized against a certain alias “Totoy” (later on identified as Sanchez), who was allegedly engaged in illegal drug trade. Tabuyo, the poseur-buyer, was able to meet Sanchez, who, after receiving the marked money, handed over a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance to the former. Sanchez was arrested. He was also found during search two (2) other plastic sachets also containing a white crystalline substance. The buy-bust team then conducted the markings, inventory, and photography on site before proceeding to their office for documentation purposes. The team was met with representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media, both of whom signed the Certificate of Inventory. The seized plastic sachets were then taken to the PNP Crime Laboratory where it was confirmed that their contents are indeed methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Herald Black Dacasin vs. Sharon del Mundo Dacasin

G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010 FACTS: Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married and have one daughter, Stephanie.  In 1995, Sharon obtained from the Illinois Court a divorce decree against the petitioner. The Illinois court dissolved the marriage and awarded Sharon sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes. In 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order “relinquishing” jurisdiction to Philippine courts. In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, to enforce the Agreement. He submits the following arguments (a) the divorce decree obtained by respondent is void; (b) the Agreement novated the valid divorce decree, modifying the terms of child custody from sole (maternal) to joint; or (c) the Agreement is independent of the divorce decree obtained by respondent. Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.

Adolfo Aznar vs. Helen Christensen Garcia

G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963 FACTS: Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California but was domiciled in the Philippines at the time of his death. In accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator,  the estate shall be  distributed, which provides Php 3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen and the rest of his estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen.  Helen filed an opposition insofar as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child under the laws of the Philippines. She insisted that Article 946, California Civil Code should be applicable following the doctrine of renvoi – “if there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile”.

Juan Miciano vs. Andre Brimo

G.R. No. L-22595, November 1, 1927 FACTS: Joseph G. Brimo, a Turkish citizen,  executed a will which provided that his properties be disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippines. There is also a condition that, if any legatee who must disrespect the will , as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed on the basis that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo’s will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of article 10 of the Civil Code (now Article 16(2) ) .  However, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with.

Testate Estate of Amos G. Bellis vs. Edward A. Bellis

G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967 FACTS: Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. He executed a will in the Philippines, that a portion of his distributable asset amounting should be divided, in the following order and manner:  $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each andThe remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wife. Maria Cristina and Miriam filed their oppositions to the partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.. The lower court, under Art. 16 of the Civil Code, applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001 FACTS: On April 4, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Information against President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official,  for violation of the Plunder Law (Crim. Case No. 26558), Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562), The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Crim. Case No. 26563), Perjury (Crim. Case No. 26564), and Illegal Use Of An Alias (26565). On April 11, 2001, petitioner, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts” found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word “pattern” in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.

United BF Homeowners’ Associations, Inc. vs. The (Municipal) City Mayor, Parañaque City

G.R. No. 141010. February 7, 2007 FACTS BF Homes Parañaque Subdivision is the largest subdivision in the country. On 11 November 1997, the Municipal Council of Parañaque enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 97-085 entitled, “An Ordinance Prescribing the Comprehensive Land Use Plan & Zoning of the Municipality of Parañaque Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991 and Other Pertinent Laws.” Sections 11.5 and 11.6 of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08, reclassifying El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF Homes Parañaque from residential to commercial areas. In 1998, petitioners alleged that the reclassification of certain portions of BF Homes Parañaque from residential to commercial zone is unconstitutional because it amounts to impairment of the contracts between the developer of BF Homes Parañaque and the lot buyers. Petitioners cited the annotation on the lot buyers’ titles which provides that “the property shall be used for residential purposes only and for no other purpose.” Public respondents alleged that the passage of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a valid exercise of police power by the Municipal Council of Parañaque and that such ordinance can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations entered into by the petitioners and the developer. The Court of Appeals held that the enactment was a valid exercise of police power by the Municipality.

People vs. Morial

G.R. No. 129295. August 15, 2001 FACTS In the early evening of January 6, 1996, Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abeñon allegedly committed robbery and to silence any witnesses, they killed the occupants of the house, Paula Bandibas and her three-year old grandson Albert. Gabriel Guilao revealed that he witnessed Paula’s killing and confirmed that the three accused were the perpetrators. At 11:00 p.m., the police arrived to investigate the killing of the Bandibases and brought the accused to the police station for the continuation of the investigation. SPO4 Fernandez testified that the investigation he conducted resulted in an admission by Leonardo Morial that he was one of those who participated in the robbery with homicide. SPO4 Fernandez asked Leonardo whether he was willing to reduce his statement into writing and to sign the same. The suspect answered positively. He also volunteered to obtain a lawyer for the suspect, to which Leonardo Morial consented.

Primicias vs. Fugoso

VOL. 80, JANUARY 27, 1948 FACTS The Philippine Legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the Municipal Board of the City of Manila which is provided in Administrative Code, Sec. 2439. Included among others is the power granted “ (1) to provide prohibition and suppression of riots, affrays, disturbances and disorderly assemblies, (2)  to regulate the use of streets, parks and other public places (3) to enact ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for sanitation and safety…” Under the delegated power of Philippine Legislature, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, enacted Revised Ordinance of 1927 that prohibits any act in public place, meeting or procession tending to disrupt public peace or riot or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly (Sec 844) and to secure permit from the mayor for the use of public places and streets.

People vs. Kimura

G.R. No. 130805. April 27, 2004 FACTS In 1994, Narcotics Command received information that a certain Koichi Kishi and Rey Plantilla were engaged in the selling of illegal drugs at the Cash and Carry Supermarket, Makati City. A buy-bust operation was launched which led to the capture of Koichi and allegedly pointed Kimura and Kizaki as his friends/suppliers  who will fetch him. That in the parking lot Kimura handed a package wrapped in a newspaper which found to contain marijuana to a certain person named Boy. Kimura was arrested however Kizaki allegedly escaped. Department of Justice filed a case against Kimura and Kizaki of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Appellants’ defense is denial and alibi. Kimura claims that he saw marijuana placed at the car trunk and Kizaki was not with him.  On the other hand, appellant Kizaki testified that on the date that the alleged crime was committed, he was in the company of his friends which was corroborated by his housemaid and friend, and he was arrested 2 days after the incident.

People vs. Tee

G.R. Nos. 140546-47. January 20, 2003 FACTS A raid conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by Modesto Tee – a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio City, which yielded huge quantities of marijuana. The PNP NARCOM had received a tip regarding the presence of a huge amount of drugs in a rented room of Tee. They sought the permission of Nazarea Abreau- the owner, to enter the room rented by appellant. She acceded and allowed them entry. Without wherein the NBI agents possessed a total amount of  336.93 kilograms of marijuana. Later that evening, the NBI operatives applied for a search warrant from RTC Judge Antonio Reyes to direct a search on appellant’s residence for marijuana. The search was witnessed by Tee, members of his family, barangay officials, and members of the media. Photographs were taken during the actual search. The law enforcers found  a total weight of  591.81 kilograms of marijuana. Tee was arrested.

Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan

Nos. L-50581-50617. January 30, 1982. FACTS In 1979, Nunez was accused of respondent Court of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. He filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds, which was denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, he filed for petition for certiorari and prohibition claiming that the Presidential Decree No. 1486, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. Nunez contention underlies on the premise that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner’s right to equal protection, because—appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion – there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts,

Camacho vs. Gloria

G.R. No. 138862. August 15, 2003. FACTS Camacho, petitioner is the Dean of the College of Education of the University of Southeastern Philippines (USP). In 1995, several doctorate students complained to petitioner of certain “ghost students” in the class of Dr. Sixto Daleon during the first semester of school year 1994-1995 who were given passing grades despite their unjustified failure to attend classes. Petitioner brought the matter to the attention of the University President and to the Board of Regents (BOR) where Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Secretary Ricardo Gloria sat as chairman which uphold the grade given by Dr. Daleon. Camacho filed a complaint against Dr. Daleon for gross incompetence and insubordination which include the University Board of Regents chaired by then DECS Secretary Gloria, DECS Legal Officer Reno Capinpin, and the three students who received passing marks, despite, numerous absences, namely Aida Agulo, Desiderio Alaba and Norma Tecson which was dismissed.

Republic vs. Salem Investment Corporation

G.R. No. 137569. June 23, 2000 FACTS In 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation of parcels of lands belonging to Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama. In 1988, 5 years after, De la Rama’s agreed to sell to Alfredo Guerrero the entire property for the amount of, in which they received P2,200,000.00 as partial payment. While the case is pending the Republic of the Philippines filed the present case for expropriation pursuant to B.P. Blg. 340 which includes the properties of De la Ramas’.Upon the deposit of P12,970,350.00 representing 10 percent of the approximate market value of the subject lands, a writ of possession was issued on August 29, 1990 in favor of the government. De la Ramas and Guerrero entered into a contract to sell with respect to Lot 834 amounting to P11,800,000.00. The entire lot has an area of 4,075 square meters. This contract was executed on December 14, 1988, 5 years after B.P. Blg. 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation of a portion of the land, consisting of 1,380 square meters, of the De la Ramas.

Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership vs. Feati Bank and Trust Co.

FACTS In March 1952, Ortigas – plaintiff and vendor entered into an agreements of sale over two parcels of land, known as Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision, situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal with Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles, as vendees. The vendees transferred their rights to Emma Chavez and upon completion of payment, executed a deed of sale and agreement which contained stipulations and restrictions as follows : (1) Land shall be used by the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes (2) All buildings and other improvements must be of strong materials and properly painted, modern sanitary installations, and be at a distance of less than 2 meters from the boundary line. Feati Bank, defendant – appellee acquired Lots Nos. 5 and 6 which included the building restrictions annotated therein. Restrictions were imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision. However, area along the western part of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27, dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal.

Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo

G.R. No. 226679. August 15, 2017. FACTS Petitioner Salvador Estipona, Jr. was found to be in possession of (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of shabu, a dangerous drug.  He was accused for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Under Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, plea-bargaining is prohibited in all drug cases. Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. Judge Lobrigo denied the Motion holding that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 expressly prohibits plea-bargaining in drugs cases

Drilon vs. Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 107019. March 20, 1997.

FACTS In a letter-complaint to Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, General Renato de Villa who was then Chief of Staff of the AFP, requested DOJ to order the investigation of several individuals named therein, including private respondent Adaza, for their alleged participation in the failed December 1989 coup d’etat. The complaint is based on the affidavit. There was a preliminary inquiry made by Special Composite Team of Prosecutors created by the DOJ finding that there is a probable cause to hold Adaza et al for trial for the crime of REBELLION WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER. Their Resolution became the basis for the filing of information. Feeling aggrieved by the institution of proceedings against him, Adaza filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Quezon City. In his complaint, Adaza charged petitioners with engaging in a deliberate, willful and malicious experimentation by filing against him a charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder when petitioners, according to Adaza, were fully aware of the non-existence of such crime in the statute books.

San Miguel Properties, Inc. vs. Perez

G.R. No. 166836. September 4, 2013. FACTS Petitioner purchased 130 residential lots from BF Homes represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the transactions were embodied in three separate deeds of sale. BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions. BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957.

Consing, Jr. vs. People

FACTS Petitioner & his mother obtained loan with Unicapital for 18M. The loans were secured by real estate mortgage wherein the title is under the name of “de la Cruz”. Half of the property was purchased by Unicapital & other half was purchased by Plant Builders. However before they can finally develop the property, they found out that the title is spurious. Unicapital demanded for the return of the payment, but petitioner ignored the demand. Consing filed a civil case in RTC Pasig for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him for the collection of the P41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother.

Dreamwork vs Janiola; G.R. No. 184861; 30 June 2009

FACTS In 2004, Petitioner filed for violation of BP Blg 22 against Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. He also filed the same in MTC In 2006, Private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Piñas City. In 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, claiming that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.

Casupanan vs. Laroya; G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002

FACTS 2 Vehicles are involve in an accident. One is driven by the respondent (Laroya) & the other one is driven by Casupanan and owned by Capitulo. Both of them filed separate cases in MCTC in Tarlac. Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is so pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case.

De la Cruz vs. Northern Theatrical Enterprises, Inc., et al. No. L-7089. August 31, 1954

FACTS Northern Theatrical, a domestic corporation, is operating a movie house in Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Domingo De la Cruz, one of it employee, was hired as a special guard to maintain the entrance of the cinema and so as the peace and order of the premises. In July 4 of 1941, a man named Benjamin Martin wanted to crash the entrance of the movie house. Infuriated by the refusal of plaintiff De la Cruz to let him in without first providing himself with a ticket, Martin attacked him with a bolo. De la Cruz defended himself as best he could until he was cornered, at which moment to save himself he shot the gate crasher, resulting in the latter’s death. Domingo was charged with homicide before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte which was dismissed. He was again accused of the same crime of homicide of the same Court which he was finally acquitted. He demanded from his former employer reimbursement of his expenses but was refused, after which he filed the present action against the movie corporation to recover not only the amounts he had paid his lawyers but also moral damages said to have been suffered, due to his worry, his neglect of his interests and his family as well in the supervision of the cultivation of his land, a total of P1 5,000. The case was dismissed for the reason that he has no cause of action.

Bautista vs. Federico O. Borromeo, Inc. No. L-26002. October 31, 1969.

FACTS The Ford truck of petitioner Roberto Tan Ting driven by Abelardo Bautista, the other petitioner, and the Volkswagen delivery panel truck owned by respondent Federico O. Borromeo, Inc. (hereinafter called Borromeo) were involved in a traffic accident which was caused by the negligence of petitioners. Quintin Delgado, a helper in Borromeo’s delivery panel truck, sustained injuries which resulted in his instantaneous death. Borromeo had to pay Delgado’s widow the sum of P4,444 representing the compensation (death benefit) and funeral expenses due Delgado under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Borromeo, filed a suit to recover the compensation and funeral expenses it paid to the widow of Quintin. However, during the trial neither of the petitioners and counsel appeared contended that they had substantial defense since there was no contractual relationship between the parties, whether express or implied.

Leung Ben v. O’Brien; G.R. No. 13602. April 6, 1918

FACTS: P. J. O’Brien instituted an action to in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover of Leung Ben the sum of P15,000, alleged to have been lost by the plaintiff to the defendant in a series of gambling, banking, and percentage games. against the property of the defendant, on the ground that the latter was about to depart from the Philippine Islands with intent to defraud his creditors. The plaintiff  asked for an attachment against the property of the defendant, on the ground that the latter was about to depart from the Philippine Islands with intent to defraud his creditors. The attachment was issued. The petitioner, Leung Ben, moved the court to quash the attachment for the reason that attachment was issued requires that there should be a “cause of action arising upon contract, express or implied.” The contention of the petitioner is that the statutory action to recover money lost at gaming is not such an action as is contemplated in this provision, and he insists that the original complaint shows on its face that the remedy of attachment is not available in aid thereof; that the Court of First Instance acted in excess of its jurisdiction in granting the writ of attachment; that the petitioner has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise; and that consequently the writ of certiorari supplies the appropriate remedy for this relief.

R.S. Tomas, Inc. vs. Rizal Cement Company, Inc. G.R. No. 173155. March 21, 2012.

FACTS On December 28, 1990, respondent and petitioner entered into a contract for the supply of labor, materials, and technical supervision for (3) job orders. Rizal agreed to pay P2,944,000.00 for the job orders while RS Tomas undertook to complete the project within 120 days and 10% of the contract price amount for damages for any delay. RS Tomas failed to fulfill the commitment, thus requested for an extension – despite the lapse of eleven months from the time of the effectivity of the contract entered into between respondent and petitioner, the latter had not completed the projects. Through counsel, the respondent found out that the  financial status of petitioners showed that it could no longer complete the projects as agreed upon which made them decide to terminate the contract.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Philippine Basketball Association vs. Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 119122. August 8, 2000

FACTS: On June 21, 1989, the petitioner received an assessment letter from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the payment of deficiency amusement tax amounted to P5,864,260.84. Petitioner contested the assessment by filing a protest who denied the same by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. On January 8, 1990, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals whom on December 24, 1993, dismissed petitioner’s petition, holding petitioner to pay P5,864,260.84 as deficiency amusement tax for the year 1987 plus 20% annual delinquency interest from July 22, 1989 pursuant to the provision of Sec.248 & 249 Petitioner presented a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but the same was denied by CTA. Petitioner appealed the CTA decision to the Court of Appeals, however, the CA affirmed CTA’s decision.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. American Express International, Inc. (Philippine Branch);  G.R. No. 152609. June 29, 2005.

TOPIC: VAT; Destination Principle And Cross Border Doctrine Doctrines:  As a general rule, the VAT system uses the destination principle as a basis for the jurisdictional reach of the tax. Goods and services are taxed only in the country where they are consumed. Thus, exports are zero-rated, while imports are taxed.An exception to the destination principle; that is, for a zero percent VAT rate for services that are performed in the Philippines, “paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the [BSP]

Law School Notes - Case Digest

National Power Corporation vs. City of Cabanatuan; G.R. No. 149110. April 9, 2003

TOPIC: Local and Property Taxation ; Franchise Tax (Sec. 137, LGC) Doctrine:  As commonly used, a franchise tax is “a tax on the privilege of transacting business in the state and exercising corporate franchises granted by the state. FACTS:  Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation which sells electric power to the residents of Cabanatuan City.  The City of Cabanatuan pursuant to section 37 of Ordinance No. 165-92, assessed the petitioner a franchise tax amounting to P808,606.41, representing 75% of 1% of the latter’s gross receipts for the preceding year. 

Argente vs. West Coast Life; 51 Phil. 725 (1928)

FACTS: In May 1925, West Coast Life Insurance issued a joint life insurance policy for P15,000 to Bernardo Argente, and his wife, Vicenta de Ocampo.  In November 1925, Vicenta de Ocampo died of cerebral apoplexy. Thereafter Bernardo Argente presented a claim in due form to the West Coast Life Insurance Co. for the payment of the sum of P15,000 the amount of the joint life insurance policy. During the investigations, it was found that the answers given by the insured in their medical examinations with regard to their health and previous illnesses and medical attendance were untrue. For that reason, the West Coast Life Insurance Co. refused to pay the claim of Bernardo Argente on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation. Appellant argues that the alleged concealment was immaterial and insufficient to avoid the policy.

Ng vs. Asian Crusader; 122 SCRA 461 (1983)

FACTS: On May 12, 1962, Kwong Nam applied for a 20-year endowment insurance on his life for the sum of P20,000.00, with his wife, appellee Ng Gan Zee, as beneficiary. On the same date, Asian Crusader, upon receipt of the required premium from the insured, approved the application and issued the corresponding policy. On December 6, 1963, Kwong Nam died of cancer of the liver with metastasis. All premiums had been religiously paid at the time of his death. On January 10, 1964, his widow Ng Gan Zee presented a claim in due form to appellant for payment of the face value of the policy. Appellant denied the claim on the ground that the insured was guilty of misrepresentation when he answered “No” to the following question appearing in the application for life insurance—

Innodata Philippines, Inc. vs. Quejada-Lopez

G.R. No. 162839. October 12, 2006 FACTS: Natividad and Quejada’s employment were terminated by Innodata since the employment contract had expired which is effective for a fixed period of one (1) year. They filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and for damages. Claiming that their job was necessary and desirable to the usual business of the company which is data processing/conversion and that their employment is regular pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code. Petitioner contends that the regularity of the employment of respondents does not depend on whether their task may be necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer. It argues that the use of fixed-term employment contracts has long been recognized by this Court. The Labor Arbiter rendered a judgment in favor of the complainants – Natividad and Quejada to have been illegally dismissed by Innodata and ordered to reinstate them to their former position without loss of seniority rights, and to pay them backwages computed from the time they were illegally dismissed up to the date of the decision.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission

G.R. No. 158693. November 17, 2004 FACTS: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 19922 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims. They asserted that they were dismissed because the private respondent refused to give them assignments unless they agreed to work on a “pakyaw” basis. They did not agree on this arrangement because it would mean losing benefits as Social Security System (SSS) members. They also claim that private respondent did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The private respondent maintained that petitioners were not dismissed but had abandoned their work. The petitioners are sent two letters to the last known addresses of the petitioners advising them to report for work. They also talk to Agabon by telephone to inform them of new assignment however did not report since they subcontracted for an installation work for another company.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Montinola vs. Philippine Airlines

G.R. No. 198656. September 8, 2014. FACTS: Nancy Montinola, an employee of PAL, were subjected to custom searches in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA. During the search, 10 crews, including her were found of possession of food items. PAL conducted an investigation. PAL’s Cabin Services Sub-Department required Montinola to comment on the incident. Montinola gave a handwritten explanation, stating that she did not take anything from the aircraft and committed to give her full cooperation should there be any further inquiries on the matter.  She was furnished by a notice of administrative charge. During the Clarificatory hearings, Montinola requested for proper notice of the acts violative of PAL’s Code of Discipline. Instead of giving proper notice, PAL threatened that she would be waiving her right to a clarificatory hearing if she insisted on her request. PAL failed to specify her participation in the alleged pilferage. PAL’s Management found Montinola guilty of 11 violations of the company’s Code of Discipline and Government Regulation. She was meted with suspension for one (1) year without pay.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Hanjin Heavy Ind. And Cons.Ltd v Ibanez

G.R. No. 170181             June 26, 2008 FACTS: Respondents Felicito Ibañez, Aligwas Carolino, Elmer Gacula, Enrique Dagotdot, Ruel Calda, and four other co-workers filed a complaint before the NLRC for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and full backwages against petitioners.  The group alleged that the contract they have is good for three months, subject to automatic renewal if there is no notice of termination from Hanjin, and that the contract would automatically terminate upon the completion of the project. Respondents stated that they are regular employees since their tasks were usual and necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of HANJIN. Hanjin maintained that respondents were hired as project employees for the construction of the LRT/MRT Line 2 Package 2 and 3 Project. HANJIN and respondents purportedly executed contracts of employment, in which it was clearly stipulated that the respondents were to be hired as project employees for a period of only three months, but that the contracts may be renewed Petitioners failed to furnish the Labor Arbiter a copy of said contracts of employment. The Labor Arbiter found merit in the respondents’ complaint and declared that they were regular employees who had been dismissed without just and valid causes and without due process.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Peckson vs. Robinsons Supermarket Corporation;

G.R. No. 198534. July 3, 2013. FACTS: Peckson was holding the position of Category Buyer in RSC when respondent Sarte, RSC’s Assistant Vice-President for Merchandising, reassigned her to the position of Provincial Coordinator. The petitioner refused to turn over her responsibilities claiming that her new assignment was a demotion because it was non-supervisory and clerical in nature. Sarte demanded twice for an  explanation within 48 hours and cited one of its company rules which “disobedience, refusal or failure to do assigned task or to obey superior’s/official’s orders/ins­tructions, or to follow established procedures or practices without valid reason” would be meted the penalty of suspension. She also assigned tasks which Peckson refused to heed. Petitioner filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against RSC, Sarte, Gadia and Alex (respondents).  The petitioner argued before the LA that the position of Category Buyer was one level above that of the Provincial Coordinator thus a demotion.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

St. Luke’s Med. Center Inc. v. Sanchez

Doctrine: The right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, aptly called “management prerogative,” gives employers the freedom to regulate, according to their discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment, including work assignment, working methods, processes to be followed, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. FACTS: Sanchez is a nurse at St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) until her termination on July 6, 2011 for her purported violation of SLMC’s Code of Discipline, particularly Section 1, Rule 1 on Acts of Dishonesty, i.e., Robbery, Theft, Pilferage, and Misappropriation of Funds. At the end of her shift on May 29, 2011, Sanchez passed through the SLMC Centralization Entrance/Exit where she was subjected to the standard inspection procedure by the security personnel.  In the course thereof, the Security Guard on-duty, Jaime Manzanade  (SG Manzanade), noticed a pouch in her bag and asked her to open the same. When opened, said pouch contained assortment of medical stocks which were subsequently confiscated.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Echo 2000 Commercial Corp. v Obrero Filipino Echo 2000 Chapter-CLO

G.R. No. 214092, January 11, 2016 FACTS: Echo received information about shortages in peso value arising from the movement of products to and from its warehouse. After an immediate audit, Echo suspected that there was a conspiracy among the employees in the warehouse. Since an uninterrupted investigation was necessary, Echo, in the exercise of its management prerogative, decided to re-assign the staff. The respondents were among those affected Enriquez issued a memorandum informing the respondents of their transfer to the Delivery Section, which was within the premises of Echo’s warehouse. The transfer would entail no change in ranks, status and salaries.

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G.R. No. 113271 October 16, 1997 FACTS: Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corporation. On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (YSP) in the purchase of bottles of Voren tablets which he described that there was an over price of the bottles of tablets for a total of P640.00. YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice no. 266 as per their check voucher no. 629552, which was paid to Ms. Catolico through China Bank check no. 892068 dated November 9, 1989. Catolico denied having received the check and that she is unaware of the overprice. However, it was confirmed by Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, that the check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms. Catolico. That  Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her “talagang ganyan, bukas.” It appears that the amount in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms. Catolico.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Punzal v ETSI Technologies Inc.

G.R. Nos. 170384-85             March 9, 2007 FACTS: Lorna  Punzal , an employee of Etsi Technologies Inc. , sent an email to her officemates announcing the holding of a Halloween party that was to be held in the office. However, the petitioner’s immediate superior, Remudaro , advised Punzal to first secure for the approval of the Senior Vice president , respondent Werner Geisert, for the holding of the party in the office. The VP did not approve the Halloween party which prompted Punzal  to send another email informing that the VP did not agree to the idea and expressed her disappointment particularly saying: “He was so unfair , para bang palagi syang iniisahan sa trabaho.” Bakit most of the parents na magjoined ang anak ay naka VL naman . Anyway, solohin na lang nya bukas ang office.” The HR  required her to explain in writing within 48 hours why she should not be given disciplinary action for improper conduct or acts of discourtesy concerning a company officer. Punzal replied by letter stating that she never expected that  such kind of words can be considered as acts of discourtesy or disrespect. 

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G.R. No. 191008 April 11, 2011 FACTS: Quirico Lopez (petitioner) is a truck driver of Alturas. 10 years of employment he was dismissed allegedly for attempting to smuggle out of the company premises 60 kilos of scrap iron worth ₱840.  Petitioner, denied the allegations by a handwritten explanation written in the Visayan dialect.  Respondent on the grounds of loss of trust and confidence, and of violation of company rules and regulations terminated his employment. The result of an investigation also showed that petitioner had been smuggling out its cartons, thus prompted the respondent to file  a criminal case for Qualified Theft against him before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol. Petitioner thereupon filed a complaint against respondent company for illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages. He claimed that the smuggling charge against him was fabricated to justify his illegal dismissal

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G.R. No. 168081              October 17, 2008 FACTS: Armando Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine Airlines, who stands at 5’8” with a large body frame (the ideal weight for his size is 166 lbs).  In 1984, due to weight problems of the petitioner, PAL advised him to go on an extended vacation leave from December 1984 to March 1985 to address his weight concern. In many instances, the petitioner  did not meet the weight standards which prompted several leave without pay. After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work but petitioner’s weight problem recurred which made his off duty status retained. He was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks but he refused to do so. PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner in his answer claimed that PAL discriminated against him because “the company has not been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly situated.”

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.

G.R. No. 162994. September 17, 2004. FACTS: Tecson is an employee of Glaxo. Included in the contract of employment he signed is that he agrees to abide all company rules which includes disclosure of any existing future relationships with co-employees and employees of competing drug companies. If management perceives a conflict of interest on the relationship, the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a “transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking position” or preparation for employment outside the company after six months. Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship and married Bettsy, an employee of Astra, a competitor of Glaxo. Tecson’s superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of interest. Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxo’s milk division, thinking that since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. However it was denied. In 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson sought Glaxo’s reconsideration regarding his transfer but Glaxo remained firm in its decision.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

BPI v BPI Employees Union

G.R. No. 164301 : August 10, 2010 FACTS: BPI and FEBTC entered in a merger. Pursuant to which all employees of FEBTC shall be hired by petitioner as its own employees, with their status and tenure recognized and salaries and benefits maintained. The BPI EU invited said FEBTC employees to a meeting regarding the Union Shop Clause of the existing CBA between petitioner BPI and respondent Union. Section 2.  Union Shop  – New employees falling within the bargaining unit as defined in Article I of this Agreement, who may hereafter be regularly employed by the Bank shall, within thirty (30) days after they become regular employees, join the Union as a condition of their continued employment.  It is understood that membership in good standing in the Union is a condition of their continued employment with the Bank The former FEBTC employees who refused to join, as well as those who retracted their membership was called for a hearing for that matter. When these former FEBTC employees refused to attend the hearing, the president of the Union requested BPI to implement the Union Shop Clause of the CBA and to terminate their employment pursuant thereto.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Goya Inc. v GI Employees Union- FFW

G.R. No. 170054               January 21, 2013 FACTS: Goya, Inc., hired contractual employees from PESO Resources Development Corporation (PESO) to perform temporary and occasional services in its factory in Makati. Goya, Inc. Employees Union–FFW (Union) requested for a grievance conference on the ground that the contractual workers do not belong to the categories of employees stipulated in the existing CBA. The Union asserts that  hiring of contractual employees, is not a management prerogative and in gross violation of the CBA tantamount to unfair labor practice (ULP). It noted that the contractual workers engaged have been assigned to work in positions previously handled by regular workers and Union members, in effect violating Section 4, Article I of the CBA. The Company argued that: (a) the law expressly allows contracting and subcontracting arrangements; (b) the engagement of contractual employees did not, in any way, prejudice the Union, since not a single employee was terminated and neither did it result in a reduction of working hours nor a reduction or splitting of the bargaining unit c) Section 4, Article I of the CBA merely provides for the definition of the categories of employees and does not put a limitation on the Company’s right to engage the services of job contractors or its management prerogative to address temporary/occasional needs in its operation.

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G.R. No. 85985 August 13, 1993 FACTS: In 1985, PAL completely revised its 1966 Code of Discipline. The Code was circulated among the employees and was immediately implemented, and some employees were forthwith subjected to the disciplinary measures embodied therein. PALEA filed a complaint before the NLRC for unfair labor practice due to arbitrary implementation of PAL’s Code of Discipline without notice and prior discussion with Union by Management under Article 249 and Article 253 of the Labor Code.  The Union also alleged that the copies of the Code did not conform with the requirements of sufficient publication and was circulated in limited numbers. It argues that PAL should discuss the substance of the Code with PALEA and that employees dismissed under the Code be reinstated and their cases subjected to further hearing.

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Serrano v Gallant Maritime Services Inc.,

G.R. No. 167614 : March 24, 2009 FACTS: Serrano was hired by Gallant Maritime under a POEA approved Contract of Employment. In 1998, on the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated. He had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days. Petitioner filed  a Complaint  with the Labor Arbiter (LA) against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations

No. 46496. February 27, 1940 FACTS: The respondent National Labor Union, Inc prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial. It avers that Teodoro’s claim that there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. It is a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor Union, Inc., from work.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Serrano vs National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

G.R. No. 117040. January 27, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner was hired by private respondent Isetann Department St. ore as a security checker to apprehend shoplifters and prevent pilferage of merchandise. Initially hired on October 4, 1984 on contractual basis, petitioner eventually became a regular employee on April 4, 1985. In 1988, he became head of the Security Checkers Section of private respondent.  Sometime in 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, private respondent decided to phase out its entire security section and engage the services of an independent security agency. The loss of his employment prompted the petitioner to file a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal layoff, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages, and nonpayment of salary and overtime pay. Serrano asserts that the real purpose was to avoid payment of the wage increases provided in the collective bargaining agreement approved in 1990.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Polsotin v De Guia Enterprises

G.R. No. 172624               December 5, 2011 FACTS: Petitioners- Polsotin, Rayala, Limpante, Domdom and Andrin, bus drivers and conductors, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of backwages and damages against De Guia Enterprises because they were allegedly dismissed without cause and due process. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the  complaint for lack of merit. It held that petitioners were validly terminated from employment for violation of company rules and regulations as well as for gross and habitual neglect of duties as supported by petitioners’ employment records submitted by respondent. The  NLRC which dismissed the same for failure to append thereto a certificate of non-forum shopping and proof of service upon the other party. Upon appeal to the CA, it rendered a decision dismissing the same.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Opinaldo vs Ravina

G.R. No. 196573, October 16, 2013 FACTS: Petitioner Victorino Opinaldo is a security guard who had worked for the Agency owned by Ravina. Opinaldo was assigned to PAIJR Furniture. however, PAIJR requested that petitioner be relieved from his work because he was no longer physically fit to perform his duties. Respondent also required petitioner to submit a medical certificate to prove that he is physically and mentally fit for work as security guard. In 2006, Opinaldo was reassigned to Gomez Construction. After working for a period of two weeks and upon receipt of his salary, petitioner ceased to report for work. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent with the (DOLE) for underpayment of salary and nonpayment of other labor standard benefits. The parties agreed to settle and reached a compromise agreement.

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Globe Mackay vs National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992 FACTS: Imelda L. Salazar, employee of Globe-Mackay Cable and Delfin Salvidar, manager for technical operation’s support was allegedly very close. In 1984, an audit report indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership with Richard Yambao, the owner of Elecon who is a supplier of GMCR  recommended by Saldivar. It was also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner’s missing Fedders air-conditioning unit for his own personal use without authorization. During the investigation, it appeared that  Imelda Salazar violated company regulations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company’s interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Pascua vs. Bank Wise, Inc.

G.R. No. 191460. January 31, 2018. FACTS: Pascua was employed by Bankwise as its Executive Vice President for Marketing. In 2004, Philippine Veterans Bank and Bankwise entered into a merger.  Due to this Pascua was re-assigned to another unit but his duties, functions, and responsibilities were not clearly delineated or defined. As part of the merger, Pascual was informed to tender his resignation. In a letter, he pleaded to stay in office until the end of the year. Campa, a director of Bankwise  assured all his money claims will be paid once he tendered resignation. Pascua tendered his resignation. Due to the inaction of respondents for early settlement of his money claims. Pascua filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salary, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, separation pay, retirement benefits, actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees against Bankwise and Philippine Veterans Bank.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Gonzaga

G.R. No. 187722. June 10, 2013 FACTS: Gonzaga, lineman of Surigao Del Norte Electric Cooperative, was questioned regarding his remittance shortages in the total amount of P314,252.23, covering the period from February 2000 to May 2001. During the investigative proceedings, Gonzaga was placed under preventive suspension. The Investigation Committee found Gonzaga guilty of (a) gross and habitual neglect of duty (b) misappropriation of REC funds and (c) failure to remit collections/monies under Code of Ethics. Written notice was sent to Gonzaga informing him of the company’s decision to relieve him from employment, as well as the grounds therefor. Gonzaga filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal claiming that he was denied due process and dismissed without just cause. He alleged that while he was asked to explain the P314,252.23 remittance shortage, he was nonetheless denied due process since the actual grounds for his dismissal, i.e., gross and habitual neglect of duties and responsibilities, misappropriation of REC funds and failure to remit collections/monies, were not indicated in the said memorandum. He also added that the cooperative’s proper procedure for the conduct of investigation, as outlined in Section 16.5 of the Code of Ethics was not followed; hence, he was denied due process

Abbot Laboratories v. Alcaraz

G.R. No. 192571               July 23, 2013 FACTS: Abbott caused the publication in a major broadsheet newspaper of its need for a Regulatory Affairs Manager, indicating therein the job description for as well as the duties and responsibilities attendant to the aforesaid position. Alcaraz signed an employment contract which specifically stated, inter alia, that she was to be placed on probation for a period of six (6) months beginning February 15, 2005 to August 14, 2005. On the day Alcaraz accepted Abbott’s employment offer, Bernardo sent her copies of Abbott’s organizational structure and her job description through e-mail. She also had undergone a pre-employment orientation and training program as part of her orientation. In May , Alcaraz was informed and asked to tender her resignation or they be forced to terminate her services because she failed to meet the regularization standards. She then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against Abbott and its officers.

Vergara v. Coca-Cola Bottlers

G.R. No. 176985. April 1, 2013. FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo E. Vergara, Jr. was an employee of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. from May 1968 until he retired on January 31, 2002 as a District Sales Supervisor (DSS). As stipulated in Retirement Plan Rules and Regulations at the time, the Annual Performance Incentive Pay of DSS shall be considered in the computation of retirement benefits. Petitioner filed a complaint before the NLRC for the payment of his “Full Retirement Benefits and Commission. He claims that respondent allegedly deducted illegally from his retirement package an amount of PhP496,016.67 and entitlement of additional PhP474,600.00 as Sales Management Incentives (SMI). The management argued that Vergera did not qualify for the SMI thus he is not entitled to receive it as part of retirement pay.

Read-Rite Philippines, Inc. vs. Francisco

G.R. No. 195457. August 16, 2017 FACTS: In the Compensation and Benefits Manual of Read-Rite’s predecessor company, among the benefits that an employee is entitled to are (a) Voluntary Separation Benefit (b) Involuntary Separation Benefit (c) In April 1999, Read-Rite began implementing a retrenchment program due to serious business losses. About 200 employees were terminated and they were each given involuntary separation benefits equivalent to one month pay per year of service. From this first batch of retrenched employees, however, there were eight employees – who had rendered at least ten years of service that apparently received additional voluntary separation benefits All of the respondents received involuntary separation benefits equivalent to one month pay per year of service. They each executed a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim[10] (quitclaim), which stated, among others, that they had each received from Read-Rite the full payment of all compensation due them and they will not undertake any action against the company to demand further compensation.

Dole Philippines, Inc. vs. Pawis ng Makabayang Obrero

G.R. No. 146650. January 13, 2003 FACTS: In 1996, five-year Collective Bargaining Agreement for 1996 – 2001 was executed by petitioner Dole Philippines, Inc., and private respondent Pawis Ng Makabayang Obrero-NFL (PAMAO-NFL). One of the provisions of CBA provides that “Company agrees to grant a MEAL ALLOWANCE of TEN PESOS (P10.00) to all employees who render at least TWO (2) hours or more of actual overtime work on a workday, and FREE MEALS, as presently practiced, not exceeding TWENTY FIVE PESOS (P25.00) after THREE (3) hours of actual overtime work.” Some departments of DOLE continued continued the practice of granting free meals only after more than three hours of overtime work. PAMAO-NFL filed a complaint before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board alleging that petitioner Dole refused to comply with the provisions of the 1996-2001 CBA because it granted free meals only to those who rendered overtime work for more than three hours and not to those who rendered exactly three hours overtime work.

Philippine Airlines, Incorporated vs. Philippine Airlines Employees Association

G.R. No. 142399. March 12, 2008 FACTS: PAL and respondent PALEA entered into a CBA covering the period of 1986-1989. Part of said agreement required PAL to pay its rank and file employees 13th month and Christmas Bonus. In 1988, PAL releases a guideline which provides that those who have not yet achieved regular status by the cut-off date, 30 April 1988 shall not be eligible for 13th month. PALEA filed a labor complaint  for unfair labor practices asserting that all employees of PAL, regular or non-regular, must be paid their 13th month pay. It also argues that the guideline is in contravention of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) entered into by petitioner PAL and respondent PALEA. PAL asserts that it did not deny their 13th month pay considering they receive said mandatory bonus in the form of the Christmas Bonus which is in compliance with Presidential Decree No. 851.

Benson Ind. Employees Union v. Benson Ind., Inc.

G.R. No. 200746, August 06, 2014 FACTS: Benson sent its employees, including herein petitioners, a notice informing them of their intended termination from employment on the ground of closure and/or cessation of business operations. Petitioners, through Benson Industries Employees Union-ALU-TUCP (Union), filed a notice of strike, claiming that the company’s supposed closure was merely a ploy to replace the union members with lower paid workers, and, as a result, increase its profit at their expense. The strike did not, however, push through due to the parties’ amicable settlement whereby petitioners accepted Benson’s payment of separation pay, computed at 15 days for every year of service

Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union NUBE v. Confesor

G.R. No. 114974 : June 16, 2004 FACTS: Standard Chartered Bank (the Bank, for brevity) is a foreign banking corporation doing business in the Philippines. The Bank and the Union signed a five-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Prior to the expiration of the 3 year period, the Union initiates negotiation. Divinagracia, president of the Union submitted proposals, then the Bank sent counterproposals. The parties agreed to set meetings to settle their differences on the proposed CBA. Divinagracia, suggested that the bank lawyers should be excluded from the negotiating team. The Bank acceded but suggested to Divinagracia that Jose P. Umali, Jr., the President of the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), the federation to which the Union was affiliated, be excluded from the Union’s negotiating panel. However, Umali was retained as a member thereof.

International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing.

G.R. No. 128845               June 1, 2000 FACTS: International School is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty – they are classified as (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two “significant economic disadvantages” foreign-hires have to endure.

Peñaranda vs. Baganga Plywood Corporation

G.R. No. 159577. May 3, 2006. FACTS: Charlito Peñaranda was an employee of Baganga Plywood Corporation (BPC) supervising the engineering section of the steam plant boiler. In 2001, Peñaranda filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against BPC and its general manager, Hudson Chua, before the NLRC. He alleges that his services [were] terminated without the benefit of due process and valid grounds in accordance with law. Furthermore, he was not paid his overtime pay, premium pay for working during holidays/rest days, night shift differentials and finally claims for payment of damages and attorney’s BPC allege that complainant’s separation from service was done pursuant to Art. 283 of the Labor Code. It was on temporary closure due to repair and general maintenance and it applied for clearance with the Department of Labor and Employment, to shut down and to dismiss employees. They also pay petitioner of separation. When BPC reopened failed to reapply hence, he was not terminated from employment much less illegally.

Maternity Children’s Hospital vs. Secretary of Labor

G.R. No. 78909. June 30, 1989 FACTS: Maternity Children  is a semi-government hospital. mIn May 23, 1986 when E.O. No. 111 was not yet in effect, 10 of its employees filed with DOLE complaint for underpayment of their salaries and ECOLAs with the Office of the Regional Director of Labor and Employment. The Regional Director directed two of his Labor Standard and Welfare Officers to ascertain the truth of the allegations. The Officers confirmed that there was underpayment of wages and ECOLAs of all the employees by the petitioner. The Regional Director issued an Order directing the payment of underpayment of wages and ECOLAs to all the petitioner’s. The Minister of Labor and Employment modified the order that the deficiency wages and ECOLAs should only be computed from May 23, 1983 to May 23, 1986. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Secretary of Labor.

Mariveles Shipyard Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 144134. November 11, 2003 FACTS: Petitioner Mariveles Shipyard Corporation engaged the services of Longest Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc to render security services. Pursuant to their agreement, Longest Force deployed its security guards at the petitioner’s shipyard. However, it found the services being rendered by the assigned guards unsatisfactory and inadequate, causing it to terminate its contract with Longest Force The security guards filed a case for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday, rest day pay and attorney’s fees, against both Longest Force and petitioner. Longest force admitted the non-payment of wage differential but passed the liability to petitione ralleging that the service fee paid was below the required rate.

Rivera v Genesis Transport Service, Inc.

G.R. No. 215568, August 03, 2015 FACTS: Rivera was employed by respondent Genesis Transport Service, Inc. (Genesis) as a bus conductor. Rivera was dismissed by Genesis on account of a discrepancy in the amount he declared on bus ticket receipts. He received a Memorandum giving him twenty-four (24) hours to explain why he should not be sanctioned for reporting and remitting the amount of P198.00 instead of the admittedly correct amount of P394.00 worth of bus ticket receipts. He responded that it was an honest mistake, which he was unable to correct “because the bus encountered mechanical problems. (P196 difference) Rivera filed a complaint of illegal dismissal contending termination was arbitrary and not based on just causes for terminating employment.

Paredes vs. Feed the Children Philippines, Inc.

G.R. No. 184397. September 9, 2015 FACTS: Respondent Feed the Children Philippines, Inc. (FTCP) is a nonstock, nonprofit, and nongovernment organization which objective is to provide food, clothing, educational supplies and other necessities of indigent children worldwide Paredes was FTCP’s National Director. 42 FTCP employees signed a petition letter addressed to the Board expressing their complaints against petitioner’s leadership and management of FTCP. During the Board meeting, the Board decided to establish Supervisory Team that will draw a definite work plan – the Supervisory Team will not replace the functions of the National Director and will hire an independent professional management and financial auditor. The Board resolved to suspend petitioner because of her indifferent attitude and unjustified refusal to submit to an audit. Before it could be implemented, respondent FTCP received her resignation letter effective December 31 2005. The Board accepted her resignation with the condition that its effectivity be moved to November 30, 2005.

American Express Transnational vs Borre

G.R. No. 228320, July 15, 2020 FACTS: In 2005, AITI hired Borre as a company driver.  AITI’s Leisure Team requested for the services of a company driver but Borre refused to drive. Prior to the above-cited incident, Borre also refused to drive for executives on 3 instances. The management gave Borre notice and opportunity to formally explain himself. Borre generally denied the allegations. During the investigation and hearings it was found that Borre failed to drive because he left his drivers license. Borre was dismissed from employment for will disobedience. The Labor Arbiter found Borre to be validly dismissed based on just cause. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s factual findings.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon

No. L-81958. June 30,1988 FACTS: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc (PASEI), engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement, challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment. The Department Order No 1 or the “Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers “ is discriminatory since it “does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;” and that it is violative of the right to travel. It also contended that the passage of the Department Order is not in consonance with Section 3, of Article XIII of the Constitution, providing for worker participation “in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.” Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations.

Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. vs. NLRC & Marilyn Abucay

No. L-80609. August 23, 1988 FACTS: Marilyn Abucay, a traffic operator of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company was accused by two complainants having demanded and received from them the total amount of P3,800.00 in consideration of her promise to facilitate approval of their applications for telephone installation. After investigations and hearings, she was found guilty. Abucay filed a complaint with Ministry of Labor and Employment claiming she had been illegally removed but such complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. However the Labor Arbiter awarded Abucay of financial assistance amounting to one month pay for every year of service. PLDT questioned the validity of award as having been made with grave abuse of discretion. NLRC in its decision finds that award of separation pay as financial assistance is equitable taking into consideration her long years of service to the company.

The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. vs. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration

G.R. No. 114714. April 21, 1995 FACTS: Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., licensed manning agency to recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign shipowner-principals, urge to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994 on the grounds of this 2 main issues – (a) The POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting death and workmen’s compensation of Filipino seamen (b) The resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional because they violate the equal protection and non-impairment of obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution. POEA contended that the issuance of the challenged resolution and memorandum circular was a valid exercise of the POEA’s rule-making authority or power of subordinate legislation which this Court had sustained.

Anflo Management vs. Lagdameo

G.R. No. 141608. October 4, 2002. FACTS: Respondent, Rodolfo Bolanio was employed as company driver of Anflo Corp. and was assigned to the residence of its senior vice-president Lagdameo. His main task is to transport Regina, the daughter of Lagdameo, to and from her work.  Regina and Bolanio got involved in a heated argument stemming from respondent’s failure to follow Regina’s instructions regarding road directions. Linda confronted Bolanio and accused him of verbally abusing her daughter.  Respondent tried to explain that he did not say anything against petitioner’s daughter but Linda would not give him a chance and instead shouted the words “you’re fired” at him. He was then ordered to return company ID, uniform and was allowed to work anymore. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement and payment of monetary claims with Labor Arbiter.

Aris (Phil.) Inc. vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 90501. August 5, 1991 FACTS: In 1988, private respondents, who were employees of petitioner requested for grievance conference concerning their working surroundings which had become detrimental and hazardous. As none was arranged, they protested directly to the management’s office for the inaction on their complaints. The management issued a memorandum to those who were identified by their supervisor as the most active participants in the “rally”, requiring them to explain why they should not be terminated from the service. Despite their explanation, private respondents were dismissed for violation of company rules and regulations, more specifically of the provisions on security and public order and on inciting or participating in illegal strikes or concerted actions. Private respondents filed complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. Labor Arbiter F. Garduque III in its decision ordered that Aris Phil reinstate within ten (10) days the private respondents to their former respective positions or any substantial equivalent positions if already filled up, without loss of seniority right and privileges but with limited backwages of six (6) months. Complainants (herein private respondents) filed a Motion For Issuance of a Writ of Execution.

Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration

No. L-2089. October 31, 1949 Guido filed for prohibition to prevent the Rural Progress Administration and the Court of First Instance of Rizal from proceeding with the expropriation of her land on the ground that to be expropriated is commercial and therefore excluded within the purview of the provisions of Act 539.

Calalang vs. Williams et al.

No. 47800. December 2, 1940 FACTS: Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents – Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila. In pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes the Director of Public Works to prohibit animal-drawn vehicles from passing along certain roads. As a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in such places to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well He contended that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the respondents are authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. It also infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.

De la Cruz vs. Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc

G.R. No. 172038. April 14, 2008 FACTS: Respondent Elite Shipping A.S. hired petitioner Dante D. de la Cruz as third engineer for the vessel M/S Arktis Morning through its local agency in the Philippines, co-respondent Maersk Filipinas Crewing Inc. The contract of employment was for a period of nine months, starting April 19, 1999, with a monthly basic salary of US$1,004.00 plus other benefits. Chief engineer Norman Per Nielsen, twice in a logbook entry, expressed his dissatisfaction over petitioner’s performance. Due to this, petitioner is discharge according to CBA article 1 (7) where in several occasions, he is not qualified for the position as 3rd engineer onboard this vessel. Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for the monetary equivalent of the unexpired portion of his contract, damages and attorney’s fees in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Herma Shipyard, Inc. vs. Oliveros

G.R. No. 208936. April 17, 2017. FACTS: Respondents were Herma Shipyard’s employees occupying various positions such as welder, leadman, pipe fitter, laborer, helper, etc. The respondents filed before the Regional Arbitration Branch III a Complaint for illegal dismissal, regularization, and non-payment of service incentive leave pay with prayer for the payment of full backwages and attorney’s fees against petitioners. Respondents alleged that they are Herma Shipyard’s regular employees who have been continuously performing tasks usually necessary and desirable in its business, however, petitioners dismissed them from employment. They were also made them sign employment contracts for a fixed period ranging from one to four months to make it appear that they were project-based employees. Allegedly petitioners resorted to this scheme to defeat their right to security of tenure, but in truth there was never a time when they ceased working for Herma Shipyard.

San Miguel Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Third Division

G.R. No. 125606. October 7, 1998 FACTS: In 1990, De Guzman, private respondent, was hired by petitioner as helper/bricklayer for a specific project, the repair and upgrading of furnace C at its Manila Glass Plant. His contract of employment provided that said temporary employment was for a specific period of approximately four (4) months. On April 30, 1991, private respondent’s employee contract was terminated on that same day as there was no more work to be done. On May 10, 1991, private respondent was again hired for a specific job for a specific period of approximately three (3) months. In July 1991, after the completion of this task, private respondent’s services were terminated. On August 1, 1991, complainant saw his name in a Memorandum posted at the Company’s Bulletin Board as among those who were considered dismissed.

Valeroso vs. Skycable Corporation

G.R. No. 202015. July 13, 2016. FACTS: Valeroso and Legatona, from being direct hires of Skycable were transferred to Skill Plus Manpower Services. They were also informed that their commissions would be reduced due to the introduction of prepaid cards sold to cable subscribers resulting in lower monthly cable subscriptions. Dismayed,  the petitioners informed Pasta, manager, of their intention to file a labor case with the NLRC. Pasta then informed them that they will be dropped from the roster of its account executives, which act, petitioners claimed, constitutes unfair labor practice. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of 13th month pay, separation pay and illegal deduction against Skycable before Labor Arbiter. Respondent claimed that it did not terminate the services of petitioners for there was never an employer-employee relationship to begin with. It averred that in 1998, it engaged petitioners as independent contractors under a Sales Agency Agreement. In 2007, it decided to streamline its operations, as a result petitioners’ contracts were terminated but they were employed by Armada Agency, an independent contractor.

Universal Rubber Products, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

No. L-30266. June 29, 1984 FACTS: Converse Rubber Corporation and  Edwardson Manufacturing Corporation sued Universal Rubber for unfair competition with damages and attorney’s fees before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The private respondents requested for the  issuance of a subpoena duces tecum against the treasurer of Universal Rubber which was granted.  Universal Rubber filed a motion in the court below praying that the subpoena duces tecum be quashed on the grounds that the said subpoena is both unreasonable and oppressive as (a) there is no good cause shown for the issuance thereof and (b) the question of liability should be determined first before discovery by means of a subpoena duces tecum is allowed. It also assails that private respondent is a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines and that respondent Edwardson is merely its licensee; that respondent Converse has no goodwill to speak of and that it has no registrable right over its own name.

Marvex Commercial Co., Inc. vs. Petra Hawpia & Co.

No. L-19297. December 22, 1966. FACTS: Petra Hawpia & Co., a partnership duly organized under the laws of the Philippines filed a petition for the registration of the trademark “LIONPAS” used on medicated plaster, with the Philippine Patent Office, asserting its continuous use in the Philippines since June 9, 1958. The Marvex Commercial Co., Inc. filed an opposition thereto, alleging that the registration of such trademark would violate its right to and interest in the trademark “SALONPAS” used on another medicated plaster and that both trademarks when used on medicated plaster would mislead the public as they are confusingly similar. The Director of Patents in his decision gave due course to the petition, stating in part that “confusion, mistake, or deception among the purchasers will not likely and reasonably occur.  The Marvex Commercial argued that the application be rejected on the ground that (a) the applicant is not the owner of the trademark “LIONPAS” and (b) “LIONPAS” confusingly similar to the trademark “SALONPAS”. 

La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez

Nos. L-63796-97. May 21, 1984 FACTS: La Chemise Lacoste, S.A., a well known European manufacturer of clothings and sporting apparels sold in the international market and bearing the trademarks “LACOSTE”, “CHEMISE LACOSTE”, “CROCODILE DEVICE” and a composite mark consisting of the word “LACOSTE” and a representation of a crocodile/alligator.  In 1975, Hemandas & Co., a duly licensed domestic firm applied for and was issued the Supplemental Register of the trademark “CHEMISE LACOSTE & CROCODILE DEVICE” by the Philippine Patent Office for use on T-shirts, sportswear and other garment products of the company. Thereafter, it assigned to Gobindram Hemandas all rights, title, and interest in the trademark.  In 1980, La Chemise filed its application for registration of the trademark “Crocodile Device” (Application Serial No. 43242) and “Lacoste” (Application Serial No. 43241).  La Chemise filed with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a letter-complaint alleging therein the acts of unfair competition being committed by Hemandas and requesting their assistance in his apprehension and prosecution. The NBI filed with the trial court two applications for the issuance of search warrants which would authorize the search of the premises used and occupied by the Lacoste Sports Center and Games and Garments both owned and operated by Hemandas.

Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. vs. Bright Future Technologies, Inc.

G.R. No. 169156. February 15, 2007. FACTS:  Inspector Macatlang of the Philippine National Police applied for eight search warrants for copyright and trademark infringement after a complaint was received from Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. (SCEI). After the Search Warrants were issued by Manila Regional Trial Court, a raid was conducted on the premises of Bright Future Technologies, Inc. (BFTI). BFTI filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and/or to Exclude or Suppress Evidence and Return Seized Articles, alleging that (a) The searching team entered the premises and conducted the search without any witness in violation of the Rules of Court; (b) SCEI had no personality to represent the People of the Philippines in the case and to file the opposition to the motion because SCEI’s agents were mere witnesses of the applicant for the issuance of the search warrants (c) the use of bolt cutter to enter into the premises is unnecessary thus violative of  Section 7 of Rule 126

Maguan vs. Court of Appeals

No. L-45101. November 28, 1986 FACTS:  Rosario Maguan,  is doing business under the firm name and style of “SWAN MANUFACTURING”, is a patent holder of powder puff. Maguan informed and ordered Susana Luchan, that the powder puffs she is manufacturing and selling are substantially identical of her. She explained such production and sale constitute infringement of said patents and therefore its immediate discontinuance is demanded, otherwise it will be compelled to take judicial action. Luchan stated that her products are not identical, or even if substantially identical, by way of affirmative defenses, further alleged that Maguan’s patents in question are void on the following grounds: (1) at the time of filing of application for the patents involved, the utility models applied for were not new and patentable  since it existed and were publicly known and used as early as 1963  and (2) the person to whom the patents were issued was not the true and actual author of the utility models applied for, and neither did she derive her rights from any true and actual author of these utility models.

Smith Kline Beckman Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126627. August 14, 2003.* When the language of its claims is clear and distinct, the patentee is bound thereby and may not claim anything beyond them. FACTS:  In 1986, Smith Kline Beckman Corporation,  a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines filed before the Philippine Patent Office an application for patent over an invention entitled “Methods and Compositions for Producing Biphasic Parasiticide Activity Using Methyl 5 Propylthio-2-Benzimidazole Carbamate.” The application bore Serial No. 18989. In 1981,  Letters Patent No. 145611 for the aforesaid invention was issued to petitioner for a term of seventeen (17) years. The letters patent provides in its claims that the patented invention consisted of a new compound named methyl 5 propylthio-2-benzimidazole carbamate and the methods or compositions utilizing the compound as an active ingredient in fighting infections caused by gastrointestinal parasites and lungworms in animals such as swine, sheep, cattle, goats, horses, and even pet animals. Tryco Pharma Corporation (private respondent) is a domestic corporation that manufactures, distributes and sells veterinary products including Impregon, a drug that has Albendazole for its active ingredient and is claimed to be effective against gastrointestinal roundworms, lungworms, tapeworms and fluke infestation in carabaos, cattle and goats.

Paris-Manila, Perfume Co. vs. Phœnix Assurance Co.; No. 25845. December 17, 1926

FACTS: In May 1924, Phœnix Assurance Co., (corporation under Great Britain Law) issued a fire insurance Policy No. 841163 in the sum of P13,000 upon the property of Paris-Manila. With the knowledge of the defendant, the property was also insured in two other companies, one for P12,000, and the other for P5,000.  The property covered by the insurance was completely destroyed by fire for the total loss to the plaintiff of P38,025.56. Upon presentation of the claim, Phoenix unjustly refused to pay. Petitioner also requested the defendant to appoint an arbitrator under the provisions of section 17 of the policy, which was also denied. The denial of Phoenix Insurance is on the ground that (a) the policywas issued “to one Peter Johnson, as proprietor of ParisManila Perfumery Co.,” and that the company was not the insured named in the policy (b) “the policy of insurance did not cover any loss or damage occasioned by explosion, and that the loss was occasioned by an explosion, and was not covered by the policy. (c) the claim of the plaintiff is fraudulent as to the quantity and value of the insured property at the time of the fire, thus all benefits are forfeited. It relies on Sec.6 of the policy which provides that the insurance policy shall not cover any Loss or damage occasioned by explosion.

Bonifacio Bros. vs. Mora; No. L-20853. May 29, 1967.

FACTS: Enrique Mora, owner of an Oldsmobile sedan model 1956, bearing plate No. QC-8088, mortgaged the same to the H.S. Reyes, Inc., with the condition that the former would insure the automobile with the latter as beneficiary. The automobile was thereafter insured on June 23, 1959 with the State Bonding & Insurance Co,, Inc.  During the effectivity of the insurance contract, the car met with an accident. Enrique Mora, without the knowledge and consent of the H.S. Reyes, Inc., authorized the Bonifacio Bros. Inc. to furnish the labor and materials, some of which were supplied by the Ayala Auto Parts Co. The car was delivered to Enrique Mora without the consent of the H.S, Reyes, Inc., and without payment to the Bonifacio Bros. Inc. and the Ayala Auto Parts Co. of the cost of repairs and materials,

New Life Enterprises vs. CA, 207 SCRA 609, (1992)

Doctrine: If such terms are clear and unambiguous, they must be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense. Moreover, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. FACTS: Newlife Enterprises insured its stocks with Western Guaranty Corporation, Reliance Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., and Equitable Insurance Corporation. In 1982, the building was gutted by fire where the stocks insured are placed. According to the certification issued the cause of fire was electrical in nature. After the fire, the petitioner went to the insurance companies to file a claim. Ultimately, the three insurance companies denied plaintiffs’ claim for payment  for breach of policy conditions. It allegedly violated Conditions No. 3 & 27 of the insurance contract where it provides that it must state or endorse thereon the other insurance coverage obtained or subsequently effected on the same stocks. Petitioners contend that they are not to be blamed for the omissions, alleging that insurance agents knew about the existence of the additional insurance coverage d that they were not informed about the requirement that such other or additional insurance should be stated in the policy, as they have not even read policies

Pioneer Insurance and Surety vs. Yap, 61 SCRA 426 (1974)

DOCTRINE A condition in the policy which requires the insured to disclose to the insurer of any insurance that, if violated by the insured, would ipso facto avoid the contract Respondent Oliva Yap was the owner of a store in a two- storey building located at No. 856 Juan Luna Street, Manila, where in 1962 she sold shopping bags and footwear, such as shoes, sandals and step-ins. Chua Soon Poon, Oliva Yap’s son-in-law, was in charge of the store.  On April 19, 1962, Yap took out Fire Insurance Policy No. 4216 from  Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation with a face value of P25,000.00 covering her stocks, office furniture, fixtures and fittings of every kind and description.  In the policy, it was stipulated that the Insured shall give notice to the Company of any insurance or insurances already effected, or which may subsequently be effected, covering any of the property hereby insured, and unless such notice be given and the particulars of such insurance or insurances be stated in or endorsed on this Policy by or on behalf of the Company before the occurrence of any loss or damage, all benefits under this Policy shall be forfeited. 

Qua Chee Gan vs. Law Union, 98 PhiI. 85 (1955)

Where the insurer, at the time of the issuance of a policy of insurance, has knowledge of existing facts which, if insisted on, would invalidate the contract from its very inception, such knowledge constitutes a waiver of conditions in the contract inconsistent with the known facts, and the insurer is stopped thereafter from asserting the breach of such conditions. FACTS: Qua Chee Gan, a merchant, owned 4 warehouses in Albay which were used for the storage of copra and hemp in which the appelle deals with exclusively. The warehouses together with the contents were insured with Law Union since 1937 and the loss made payable to PNB as mortgagee of the hemp and copra. A fire of undetermined cause broke out on July 21, 1940 and lasted for almost 1 whole week. Qua Chee informed the insurer of the unfortunate event and submitted the corresponding fire claims. Insurer refused to pay claiming violations of the warranties and conditions – (a) fire hydrant warranty: the appellee should have 11 fire hydrants in the compound, and that he actually had only two 2 (b) filing of fraudulent claims and that the fire had been deliberately caused by the insured. Insured filed an action before CFI which rendered a decision in favor of the insured.

Pacific Banking vs. CA 168 SCRA 1 (1988)

DOCTRINE: If the whole foundation of the contract fails, the risk does not attach and the policy never becomes a contract between the parties. Representations of facts are the foundation of the contract and if the foundation does not exist, the superstructure does not arise. FACTS: Paramount Shirt Mfg. Co., a shirt factory, had a fire insurance policy (open policy) with Oriental Assurance Corporation for an amount not exceeding P61k. Pacific Banking was Paramount’s creditor for P800k. The goods covered by the insurance were held in trust by Paramount for the benefit of Pacific under a trust receipt. Paramount endorsed the policy to Pacific as mortgagor/trustor with Oriental’s consent. The endorsement stated: “loss if any under this policy is payable to the Pacific Banking Corporation.” The goods insured were then totally destroyed by fire. Pacific demanded indemnity from Oriental. The latter refused on ground that, according to its adjuster, Pacific was yet to file a formal claim with it and submit proof of loss. Pacific then informed the adjuster to verify the loss with the Bureau of Customs, and again demanded payment from Oriental which remained unheeded.

Edillon vs. Manila Bankers Life, 717 SCRA 187 (1982)

FACTS: Carmen O, Lapuz applied with Manila Bankers for insurance coverage against accidents and injuries. She gave the date of her birth as July 11, 1904. She paid the sum of P20.00 representing the premium for which she was issued the corresponding receipt. The policy was to be effective for 90 days. During the effectivity, Carmen O. Lapuz died in a vehicular accident in the North Diversion Road. Petitioner Regina L. Edillon, a sister of the insured and the beneficiary in the policy, filed her claim for the proceeds of the insurance. Her claim having been denied, Regina L. Edillon instituted this action in the trial court.

Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corp. vs. Aban

G.R. No. 175666, July 29, 2013 FACTS: Delia Sotero (Sotero) took out a life insurance policy from Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation (Bankers Life), designating respondent Cresencia P. Aban (Aban), her niece, as her beneficiary. When the insurance policy had been in force for more than two years and seven months, Sotero died. Respondent filed a claim for the insurance proceeds on July 9, 1996.  Petitioner conducted an investigation into the claim and found that Sotero was sickly since 1990 and the respondent was the one who filed the insurance application, and designated herself as the beneficiary. Petitioner denied respondent’s claim on April 16, 1997 and refunded the premiums paid on the policy Petitioner filed a civil case for rescission and/or annulment of the policy. Aban argued that petitioner’s cause of action was barred by prescription pursuant to Section 48 of the Insurance Code, which provides as follows:

Tan vs. CA, 174 SCRA 403 (1989)

FACTS: Tan Lee Siong was issued a policy by Philamlife on Nov. 6, 1973 for P80,000. On April 26, 1975, Tan died of hepatoma.  His beneficiaries then filed a claim with Philamlife for the proceeds of the insurance.The claim was denied on the ground of misrepresentation and concealment of material facts.   The beneficiaries contend that Philamlife can no longer rescind the contract on the ground of misrepresentation as rescission must allegedly be done “during the lifetime of the insured” within two years and prior to the commencement of the action following the wording of Sec. 48, par. 2.

Sunlife vs. CA, 245 SCRA 268 (1995)

FACTS: On April 15, 1986, Bacani procured a life insurance contract for himself from Sun Life. He was issued a life insurance policy with double indemnity in case of accidental death. The designated beneficiary was his mother, Bernarda. On June 26, 1987, the insured died in a plane crash. Bernarda Bacani filed a claim with Sun Life, seeking the benefits of the insurance.  Sun Life rejected the claim on the ground that the insured did not disclose material facts relevant to the issuance of the policy, thus rendering the contract of insurance voidable. A check representing the total premiums paid in the amount of P10,172.00 was attached to said letter. Sun Life discovered that 2 weeks prior to his application, Bacani was examined and confined at the Lung Center of the Philippines, where he was diagnosed for renal failure. During his confinement, the deceased was subjected to urinalysis, ultrasonography and hematology tests.  Sunlife claimed that the insured gave false statements in his application when he answered the following questions:

Great Pacific Life vs. CA, 89 SCRA 643 (1979)

FACTS: A contract of group life insurance was executed between petitioner Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (hereinafter Grepalife) and Development Bank of the Philippines (hereinafter DBP). Grepalife agreed to insure the lives of eligible housing loan mortgagors of DBP.  On November 11, 1983, Dr. Wilfredo Leuterio, a physician and a housing debtor of DBP applied and granted by Grepalife of insurance to the extent of his DBP mortgage indebtedness amounting to eighty-six thousand, two hundred (P86,200.00) pesos. In 1984, Dr. Leuterio died due to massive cerebral hemorrhage. Grepalife denied the claims of DBP alleging that Dr. Leuterio was not physically healthy when he applied for insurance. Grepalife insisted that Dr. Leuterio did not disclose he had been suffering from hypertension, which caused his death. Allegedly, such non-disclosure constituted concealment that justified the denial of the claim.

Canilang vs. CA, 223 SCRA 443 (1993)

After Jaime Canilang was diagnosed with “sinus tachycardia” and “acute bronchitis”, he applied for life insurance with  Great Pacific Life Assurance Company (“Great Pacific”) naming his wife, petitioner Thelma Canilang, as his beneficiary. Jaime Canilang was issued ordinary life insurance Policy No. 345163, with the face value of P19,700, effective as of 9 August 1982. After a year, Jaime died of “congestive heart failure,” “anemia,” and “chronic anemia.”2 Petitioner, widow and beneficiary of the insured, filed a claim with Great Pacific which the insurer denied on 5 December 1983 upon the ground that the insured had concealed material information from it.

Florendo v. Philam Plans, Inc.; G.R. No 186983, Feb. 22, 2012

FACTS: Manuel Florendo obtained a pension plan with Philam Plans. The plan had a pre-need price of P997,050.00, payable in 10 years, and had a maturity value of P2,890,000.00 after 20 years. Manuel signed the application and left to Perla the task of supplying the information needed in the application. Respondent Ma. Celeste Abcede, Perla’s daughter, signed the application as sales counselor. Under the master policy, Philam Life was to automatically provide life insurance coverage, including accidental death, to all who signed up for Philam Plans’ comprehensive pension plan. If the plan holder died before the maturity of the plan, his beneficiary was to instead receive the proceeds of the life insurance, equivalent to the pre-need price. Eleven months later Manuel died of blood poisoning. Subsequently, Lourdes filed a claim with Philam Plans for the payment of the benefits under her husband’s plan. Because Manuel died before his pension plan matured and his wife was to get only the benefits of his life insurance.  Philam declined the claim upon findings that Manuel was on maintenance medicine for his heart and had an implanted pacemaker. Further, he suffered from diabetes mellitus and was taking insulin.


DEFINITION: Art. 725. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. (Civil Code)  It is a tax imposed on the exercise of the donor’s right during lifetime to transfer property to others in the form of a gift. Hence, donor’s tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter-vivos.  Donor’s Tax is a direct tax because it is a tax imposed on the donor and determined with reference to all donor’s gifts.  Applies to both natural and juridical person Completion and Perfection of Donation: The donor’s tax shall apply if there is already completed gift. The transfer of property is perfected from the moment the donor knows the acceptance by the donee. On the other hand, it is completed by delivery of the donated property to the donee. The Law that governs the imposition of donor’s tax is the law at the time of the perfection/completion of the donation. 

Ramie Textiles, Inc. vs. Mathay, Sr.; No. L-32364. April 30, 1979

Topic: Real and Local Property Taxation Doctrine:  Payment was made through error or mistake, in the honest belief that petitioner was liable, and therefore could not have been made under protest, but with complete voluntariness. In any case, a taxpayer should not be held to suffer loss by his good intention to comply with what he believes is his legal obligation, where such obligation does not really exist.

Government Service Insurance System vs. City Treasurer of the City of Manila; G.R. No. 186242.  December 23, 2009

Topic: Real and Local Property Taxation DOCTRINE:  Beneficial Use Rule – the unpaid tax attaches to the property and is chargeable against the taxable person who had actual or beneficial use and possession of it regardless of whether or not he is the owner.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Icasiano, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 95642. May 28, 1992 MAIN TOPIC – Double Jeopardy FACTS On February 17, 1987, Romana Magbago filed an administrative complaint with the Supreme court against then acting Municipal Trial Court Judge of Naic, Cavite, petitioner Aurelio G, Icasiano, Jr. for grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and incompetence. The administrative complaint arose from two (2) orders of detention  issued by Icasiano against Magbago for contempt of court. In 1988, the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 221697 / G.R. Nos. 221698-700  March 8, 2016 MAIN TOPIC – Freedom of Speech and To Peacefully Assemble and Petition Government for Redress of Grievance FACTS Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. When petitioner was five (5) years old, she was legally adopted by celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces). Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. In 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen and obtained U.S. Passport.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals

No. L-77372. April 29, 1988 MAIN TOPIC – Academic Freedom FACTS In 1986, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as part of its “Additional Instructions to Examinees,” to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions: “No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding every examination day including the examination day.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

IDEALS, Inc. v. PSALM Corporation

GR No. 192088, Oct. 9, 2012 FACTS:  PSALM is a GOCC mandated by RA 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 or the EPIRA Law) to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC). In the discharge of its said duties, PSALM held a public bidding for the sale of AHEPP, a 246-MW hydroelectric power plant. After evaluating the submitted bids, PSALM awarded the sale to K-Water, a Korean company. Petitioners filed for a petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction , they alleged that PSALM violated the constitutional provisions on the appropriation and utilization of water as a natural resource, as implemented by the Water Code of the Philippines limiting water rights to Filipino citizens and corporations which are at least 60% Filipino-owned.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Republic vs. Vda. de Joson

FACTS:  The respondent filed application for land registration under  her name by alleging that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, peaceful, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in the concept of owner since time immemorial.   However, at the initial hearing of the application, Fiscal Liberato L. Reyes interposed an opposition in behalf of the Director of Lands and the Bureau of Public Works. The Republic insist that the land was within the unclassified which were denominated as forest lands and thus was public land; and that it could not be acquired by prescription. The CFI rendered its decision, ordering the registration of the land in favor of the respondent on the ground that she had sufficiently established her open, public, continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Walter E. Olsen & Co., Inc. vs. Aldanese

G.R. No. L-18740, March 29, 1922. FACTS Petitioner, a duly licensed domestic corporation, provides that, under the Tariff Act, it had the legal right to export from the Philippine Islands into the United States it’s manufactured tobacco. In 1916, the Philippine Legislature enacted Law No. 2613 entitled “An Act to improve the methods of production and the quality of tobacco in the Philippine and to develop the export trade therein.” The law allegedly empowers the Collector of Internal Revenue to establish rules defining the standard and the type of leaf and manufactured tobacco which may be exported into the United States. It also enjoins it as a duty to issue a certificate of origin and to permit the exportation to the United States of all cigars manufactured of material and tobacco.  

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Bacani vs. National Coconut Corp

G.R. No. L-9657, November 29, 1956. FACTS Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala requested the stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing of Civil Case No. 2293 entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation. Plaintiffs complied with the request and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees amounting to P714.00. The Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the strength of a circular of the Department of Justice wherein the opinion was expressed that the National Coconut Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. The Auditor General issued an order directing the Cashier of the Department of Justice to deduct from the salary of plaintiffs the subject amounts. To prevent deduction of these fees from their salaries and secure a judicial ruling that the National Coconut Corporation is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Peran vs. Presiding Judge, Br. II, CFI of Sorsogon

No. L-57259. October 13, 1983. Main Topic – Rule 70. FACTS Peran personally asked respondents, who has a house erected on the subject land, to remove the same and vacate the premises. The respondents refused so the petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry and Illegal Detainer seeking the ejectment seeking the ejectment of the respondents on the grounds that (a) they are mere squatters (b) that they had prevented him from entering the property and deprived him of possession and (c) and that they were tolerating persons in getting soil and bringing about a gradual erosion of the land to his extreme prejudice.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Rural Bank of Oroquieta (Mis. Occ.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

No. 53466. November 10, 1980. Main Topic – Rule 68. FACTS The failure of Serrano Spouses on paying the mortgaged debt resulted in Trial Court’s order for the sale at public auction of the mortgaged coconut land. The mortgaged lot was sold to the bank as the only bidder and there being no redemption within the one-year period (sec. 78, General Banking Law), the sheriff issued a final certificate of sale. The bank then sold the lot to Eufemia Mejos. Judge Genato issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the bank. 

Law School Notes - Case Digest

National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

No. L-56378. June 22, 1984 Main Topic – Rule 67. FACTS NPC instituted proceedings for eminent domain against the spouses Sadang purpose of constructing an access road to its Angat River Hydroelectric Project.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Garcia vs. Perez

No. L-28184. September 11, 1980 Main Topic – Rule 65. FACTS Garcia filed with the Civil Service Commission, a protest against the appointment of the Perez on the ground that she was next in rank better qualified and entitled to preferential appointment to the position of Senior Clerk. The CSC approved the appointment of Perez.  Garcia then filed a petition for quo warranto with Court of First Instance of Manila, questioning the authority of Perez. to occupy and discharge the duties of the position of Senior Clerk in the Fiscal Management and Budget Division. The court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground that the petitioner does not claim to be entitled to the position but she merely asserted a ‘preferential right’ to be appointed thereto. Under the situation, the petitioner has no cause of action against the respondent. 

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Turqueza vs. Hernando

No. L-51626. April 30, 1980. Main Topic – Rule 65. FACTS Turqueza instituted an action for recovery of damages on the ground of injury sustained involving a Ford pick-up vehicle belonging to the CDCP Mining and a Willy’s passenger jeep owned and operated by M. Pacapac.  No one appeared during the pre-trial despite due notice to both the private respondent and its counsel. On motion of petitioners, respondent judge declared respondent in default and petitioners were allowed to submit their evidence. The trial court rendered Pacapac in default and ordered her to pay for moral and compensatory damages. No appeal was taken and the judgment became final and executory.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Silverio vs. Court of Appeals

No. L-39861. March 17, 1986. Main Topic – Rule 65. FACTS Silverio filed a case for the recovery of the amount he entrusted to Mendoza, in connection with a proposed purchase of a Forbes Park realty. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of Silverio and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration instituted by Mendoza. Aggrieved, Mendoza initiated certiorari proceedings in the Court of Appeals seeking the annulment of the order of the trial court and the issuance of preliminary injunction against the petitioners. The Court of Appeals dismissed Mendoza’s certiorari petition and granted Silverio’s motion for execution for payment of the principal, legal interest and attorney’s fees.  Mendoza filed for a certiorari petition questioning the authority of the court a quo to grant and order the partial execution of a judgment that had not yet acquired finality. Silverio filed a motion to dismiss Mendoza’s appeal with Court of Appeals on the ground that the said appeal rendered moot and academic or barred by the dismissal of the petition for certiorari. Mendoza asserted that the appellate court’s dismissal of his certiorari petition constituted no bar to his appeal, for the decision decreeing the said dismissal resolved not the merits of the controversy subject of the order a quo dated July 17, 1973 but the issue as to the jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of the said court a quo in rendering the said order.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Soriano vs. Atienza

G.R. No. 68619. March 16, 1989. Main Topic – Rule 65. FACTS Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and moral damages against Shellwood Industries (SHELWOOD). It appears that SHELLWOOD entered into a compromise agreement with the petitioners and agreed to give financial assistance amounting to P20,000.00 in lieu of union’s withdrawal of a case. SHELWOOD instead of paying the petitioners, terminated their service. The labor arbiter ordered the company to reinstate the petitioners and extend financial assistance equivalent to six (6) months of their respective salaries. On appeal to the NLRC, affirmed the judgment but deleted the award of financial assistance. The deletion is based on the ground that the company did not act in bad faith in terminating the petitioners since it merely complied with the request of the certified union for the dismissal of employees expelled from the union pursuant to the union security clause in the Collective Bargaining Agreement

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Searth Commodities Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 64220. March 31, 1992. Main Topic – Rule 58. FACTS Searth borrowed from Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) amounting to P370,000 to finance its tomato plantation in La Union. In 1974, Searth failed to pay its agricultural loan which resulted to the foreclosure of the real estate and chattel mortgage executed. Title to the foreclosed properties were thereafter consolidated in the name of DBP. In 1980, DBP advertised to sell some of its acquired assets, including the subject residential properties previously owned by petitioners Camacho, Castro and Taroja. Petitioners filed for annulment of real estate mortgages and foreclosure sale and the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sale of the residential properties. The Trial Court issued an order restraining the bidding of the individual properties of the petitioners. After the expiration of the restraining order the petitioners moved for its extension.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Decano vs. Edu

No L-30070. August 29 1980. Main Topic – Rule 58 FACTS Frederico Decano was temporarily appointed to the position of janitor in the Motor Vehicles Office  in Dagupan City by Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications. The appointment was approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service and Decano served therein for almost four years. In 1966, C. Posadas, as Acting Registrar – Land Transportation Commission (LTC) – Dagupan City , received a telegram from R. Edu, as Acting Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission (LTC), terminating Decano’s services effective as of the close of business on that day.   Decano filed a petition for “Mandamus and Injunction” with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, claiming that the officials of the LTC acted without power and in excess of authority in removing him from the service. He prayed for the annulment of the dismissal order issued. The Court granted the writ of preliminary injunction and ordered the respondents to “to desist and refrain from disturbing, molesting or otherwise ousting the petitioner from his position as janitor and to pay Decano his corresponding salary from the date of notice of said preliminary injunction, until further orders from the Court.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Magaling vs. Ong

G.R. No. 173333. August 13, 2008. Main Topic – Rule 57. FACTS Ong instituted a Complaint for the collection of the sum of money with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Spouses Magaling and Termo Loans Corporation for its failure to pay its signed promissory note. The RTC granted the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment grounded on the allegation that Spouses Magaling and Termo Loans  “were guilty of fraud in contracting the obligation subject of the complaint for sum of money”. The RTC also issued an Order directing the issuance of the writ prayed for upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P390,000.00. 

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Consolidated Plywood Industries, Inc. vs. Breva

No. L-82811. October 18, 1988. Main Topic – Rule 57. FACTS Consolidated Plywood Industries (CPI) filed a suit for collection for reimbursement for the repairs, improvements and guard fees it allegedly spent in the co-owned parcel of land against its co-owner, MHEC. Summons were not served for the reason that MHEC is no longer doing business at said address and nobody around the place knows the present whereabouts of said defendant. The Trial Court ordered the service of summons by publication. Publication was effected in the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer and copy of the alias summons was also sent by registered mail addressed to MHEC. No answer being filed within the sixty-day period after last publication prescribed in the alias summons, MHEC was declared in default and CPII thereafter presented its evidence ex parte. 

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Sps. Padua vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 152150. December 10, 2008. Main Topic – Rule 50. FACTS Unibandcard, engaged in the business of extending credit accommodations, instituted a collection suit against Spouses Padua. During the pre-trial, petitioners filed a motion to declare Unibancard non-suited due to insufficiency of the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Unibancard to authorize Atty. Noel Mingoa to appear in its behalf. The RTC granted the motion and dismissed the case.  Unibancard filed a Notice of Appeal Ad Cautelam with the Court of Appeals, however, they failed to file appellant’s brief within the period provided by the Court. They explained that a computer virus plagued all the computers of its counsel’s law firm and rendered the file containing its appellant’s brief inaccessible. Spouses Padua filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that the Notice of Appeal was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period to appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The CA denied motion to dismiss appeal and Motion for reconsideration for the denial the dismissal of appeal.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Leynes vs. Former Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 154462. January 19, 2011. Main Topic – Rule 45. FACTS Spouses Superales filed a complaint for forcible entry, damages, and attorney’s fees against the Spouses Leynes before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). However, Spouse Leynes filed their Answer with Counterclaim and Motion to Admit Belatedly Filed Answer after the 10-day period for the filing of answer prescribed. Spouses Superales subsequently filed an Ex Parte Motion for Judgment, in which they prayed that since the spouses Leynes failed to file their answer to the Complaint within the prescribed period, then judgment could now be rendered based on the evidence and allegations contained in the Complaint. The MCTC rendered its Judgment denying the Spouses Leynes’ Motion to Admit Belatedly Filed Answer and resolving the case entirely in the Spouses Superales’ favor.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

De Liano vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 142316, November 22, 2001. Main Topic – Rule 44. FACTS Petitioners filed an appeal with the CA with regard to the decision of RTC – Quezon City granting the release of duplicate copy of TCT and the originals of REM contracts in favor of B. Tango. The appellee filed a “Motion to Dismiss Appeal” on the ground that the Appellants’ Brief failed to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court.  In defense, petitioners argued that the omissions were only the result of oversight or inadvertence and as such could be considered “harmless” errors. They prayed for liberality in the application of technical rules, adding that they have a meritorious defense. 

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Luzon Development Bank vs. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees

G.R. No. 120319. October 6, 1995. Main Topic – Rule 43. FACTS Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE’s Position Paper, on the other hand, LDB failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. Without LDB’s Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered decision that LDB has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion.  LDB filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same with the Supreme Court. 

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Neypes vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005. Main Topic – Rule 40. FACTS The petitioners filed a filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land before the RTC – O. Mindoro. The petitioners filed various motions including (a) dismissal of motion and (d) declaration of default of respondents. On February 12, 1998 the trial court upon motion for reconsideration by the respondents granted the dismissal of  petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.  

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Mijares vs. Ranada

G.R. No. 139325. April 12, 2005. MAIN TOPIC – Rule 39. FACTS Petitioners, prominent victims of human rights violations during Marcos Regime, filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court – Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. They alleged that they are members of the plaintiff class in whose favor the US District Court awarded damages. The US District Court rendered a Final Judgment awarding the plaintiff class a total of 1,964,005,859.90.  They argued that since the Marcos Estate failed to file a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the Final Judgment, the decision of the US District Court had become final and executory, and hence should be recognized and enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force. 

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Mocorro vs. Ramirez

G.R. No. 178366. July 28, 2008 MAIN TOPIC – Rule 39. FACTS The Philippine Gamefowl Commission (PGC), declare and recognize D. Mocorro to be the rightful cockpit operator in the Municipality of Caibiran, Leyte. In 1992, Mocorro applied  for the renewal of the registration of his cockpit however, for some reason, Mayor Ramirez refused to issue him a business permit. There is also showing that respondent issued a special permit holding of cockfight in Caibiran in favor of Rosario and Azur. In 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC – Biliran a suit for injunction against the respondent. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent from holding any cockfight within Caibiran until further orders of the court. Despite the injunction, cockfights continued to be staged which prompted the petitioner to file a motion to cite respondent in contempt of court. The RTC held that the defendants are guilty of indirect contempt for contumacious disobedience of and resistance to writ of preliminary injunction issued by this court and was ordered to pay actual damages of P38,000.00 plus 2,000 every Sunday of each week form the date the defendants started to cause the holding of the cockfight. On June 22, 2001, the CA’s May 31, 2001 Decision became final and executory as evidenced by the corresponding Entry of Judgment. In 2002, the sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Properties and set a date for public auction.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

City of Manila vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 100626. November 29,1991 MAIN TOPIC – Rule 38 FACTS The City of Manila filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Army and Navy Club (ANC) for violation of the lease agreement between them over a parcel of land on Roxas Boulevard.  A summary judgment was decided in favor of City of Manila by the Metropolitan Trial Court which is affirmed by the Regional Trial Court. ANC then filed a supersedeas bond and subsequently appealed from the judgment.  The petitioner filed an ex parte motion for execution on the ground that the judgment had already become final and executory under RA 6031. Judge Reyes granted the motion the same day and at 4:00 o’clock that afternoon the writ of execution was served on ANC.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Cayetano vs. Ceguerra

No. L-18831. January 30, 1965. MAIN TOPIC – Rule 38 FACTS Catalina Cayetano filed a case for Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage against Spouses Ceguerra. Within the reglementary period, the defendants filed an Answer in the form of a letter, which provided that the mortgage was deliberately planned. The Court granted the foreclosure instituted on the ground that Spouses Ceguerra was in default due to their failure to file a responsive pleading to the complaint within the reglementary period. It appears that this decision never became known to appellants-spouses, the same having been returned to the Court, as unclaimed.  

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Magno vs. Court of Appeals

No. L-28486. September 10, 1981. MAIN TOPIC – Rule 37. FACTS D.Vergara filed an action for annulment of judgment and of Writ of Execution before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against Magno and the Nueva Ecija Provincial Sheriff on the ground that judgment in the Bulacan Case was procured by means of extrinsic fraud. Vergara insisted that he was lured into inaction because of the assurances made by Magno that he will be excluded from the suit. Additionally, he alleged that he was never informed of the pre-trial thereby misleading the Bulacan Court into believing certain false allegations. Magno moved to dismiss the Annulment Suit on the principal ground that the Nueva Ecija Court had no jurisdiction to interfere by Injunction and to nullify a final judgment of the Bulacan Court, which is a Tribunal of concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Heirs of Amparo del Rosario vs. Santos

No. L-46892. September 30, 1981. MAIN TOPIC – Rule 35 FACTS A complaint for specific performance and damages was filed by Amparo del Rosario for failure of Spouses Santos to execute the Deed of Confirmation of Sale of an undivided 20,000 square meters of land.  The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action and prescription. They also claimed the deed of sale was “only an accommodation graciously extended, out of close friendship which is a mere tentative agreement which was never intended nor meant to be ratified by and acknowledged before a notary public.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Roque vs. Encarnacion, etc. and Reyes

No. L-6505. August 23, 1954 MAIN TOPIC – Rule 34 FACTS Asuncion Roque, due to alleged infidelity of Francisco Reyes, prays for (a) legal separation, (b) legal custody of the children, (c) liquidation of the conjugal property, and (d) alimony and support for the children.  Reyes denied all the allegations and presented a counterclaim alleging that Asuncion was already a married woman when they contracted the marriage and has been squandering money from him. He also filed a motion for summary judgment and submitted the deposition of former husband of the Asuncion in support of the action. Asuncion filed an opposition on the ground that an action for annulment cannot be a ground for summary judgment.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Capitol Hills Golf Country Club

G.R. No. 182738. February 24, 2014. MAIN TOPIC – Rule 29. FACTS Manuel Sanchez, stockholder of Capitol Hills filed a (1) petition for nullification of the annual meeting of stockholders  and the special meeting of stockholders and (2) Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents which includes: list of stockholders, all proxies, specimen signatures of all stockholder and tape recordings of the stockholders’ meeting. The production, inspection and photocopying must be undertaken in the office premises of Capitol within reasonable business hours of a business day before the pre-trial. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court denied the MR and ordered the immediate implementation of inspection and production of documents.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp. vs. Toledo

G.R. No. 190818. November 10, 2014. MAIN TOPIC – Rule 26 FACTS Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion seeking the approval of the terms and conditions of the Universal Compromise Agreement (UCA) dated June 1, 2012 in lieu of the Court’s Decision dated June 5, 2013 which denied petitioners’ claim for tax refund/credit of their local business taxes.  In accordance with the UCA, petitioners alleged that they agreed to amicably settle all cases between them involving claims for tax refund/credit. The UCA provides that there shall be no refunds/tax credit certificates to be given or issued by the City of Manila. City of Manila confirmed the authenticity and due execution of the UCA however, they submitted that the UCA had no effect with the current decision since the taxes involved in the instant case was not included in the agreement

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 156605. August 28, 2007. MAIN TOPIC – Rule 25 FACTS The PCGG, on behalf of the Republic, filed a Complaint for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth with the Sandiganbayan against Marcelo who allegedly took advantage of he’s relationship with the Marcoses to obtain the “favored contract”. The Republic, though the Philippine Navy (PN) entered into a contract with Marcelo Fiberglass Corporation (MFC) for the construction of 55 units of 16.46 fiberglass high-speed boats, at the unit price of P7,200,000.00. The Republic served a Request for Admission on Marcelo, and in response, Marcelo included his own counter-request for admission on matters stated in his response. Republic filed a Third Amended Complaint impleading additional (16) corporations which allegedly are beneficially owned and are dummies of Marcelo. In defense, the other petitioner corporations denied that they are owned, controlled or were acquired by Marcelo who is merely an officer/stockholder.

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Santamaria vs. Cleary

G.R. No. 197122. June 15, 2016. MAIN TOPIC – Rule 23 FACTS Thomas Cleary, an American citizen and Los Angeles resident filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Miranila Land Development Corporation (MLDC) involving shares of stock.  Cleary moved for court authorization to take deposition before the Consulate-General of the Philippines in Los Angeles and be used as his direct testimony. The respondents  argued that the right to take deposition is not absolute and since Cleary chose the Philippine system to file his suit, the court and the parties must have opportunity to observe his demeanor and directly propound questions on him. The trial court denied Cleary’s Motion and held that depositions are not meant to be a substitute for actual testimony in open court. Cleary elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Lozada, Jr. vs. Macapagal-Arroyo

G.R. Nos. 184379-80. April 24, 2012 MAIN TOPIC – Rule 21 FACTS The Senate of the Philippines Blue Ribbon Committee conduct an investigation and issued a subpoena directing Lozada to appear and testify for the alleged anomalies in the NBN-ZTE corruption scandal. Lozada left the country for a purported official trip to London. In effect, Senate issued an Order (a) citing Lozada for contempt; (b) ordering his arrest and detention; and (c) directing the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms to implement the Order and make a return thereon. When Lozada decided to go back to the Philippines however, he was allegedly held and restrained by several men from government. Violeta   filed   a Petition   for   Habeas   Corpus and Arturo likewise filed a Petition for a Writ of Amparo and prayed for the issuance of  (a) the  writ  of  amparo;  (b)  a  Temporary Protection  Order  (TPO);  and  (c)  Inspection and Production Orders as regards documents related to the authority ordering custody  over  Lozada,  as  well  as any  other document that would show responsibility for his alleged abduction. After Lozada was made to sign a  typewritten,  antedated  letter  requesting police     protection, he was drove back to his place.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 112710. May 30, 2001 MAIN TOPIC – Rule 23 FACTS Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Philippine Commission for Good Government, filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint for “Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages”, against group of individuals ( Lucio C. Tan, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos et al).Petitioner filed a “Motion for Leave to Amend and for Admission of Second Amended Complaint” and attached thereto a “Second Amended Complaint.” Petitioner sought to substitute defendant Ferdinand Marcos with his estate, President Marcos having died pendente lite, and include as additional defendants three (3) individuals  and (42) corporations who allegedly participated in the Marcoses’ accumulation of ill-gotten wealth.

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Abenion vs. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation

G.R. No. 200749. February 6, 2017 FACTS In 1996, Plaintiffs identified themselves as a group of banana plantation worker, filed a case for damages against Shell Oil and other foreign corporations that manufactured, sold, distributed, or used the parasite nematode which caused their sterility and other serious and permanent health injuries. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 95-45, Shell Oil entered into a compromise agreement with its claimants for a total consideration of US$17 Million. The copy submitted to the court did not bear the agreement’s exhibits which, according to Shell Oil, indicated the list of 26,328 “worldwide plaintiffs” intended to be covered by the compromise. In view of the compromise, the complaint against Shell Oil was dismissed.  Civil Case No. 95-45 was later transferred to the RTC of Davao City, and the plaintiffs prayed for the enforcement of judgment based on the Compromise Agreement since Shell Oil allegedly failed to fully satisfy its obligations to them. Shell Oil argued that it had fully complied with the terms of the compromise agreement. The approved compromise and amount stated therein covered 26,328 agricultural workers from across the globe who filed various cases against it and not just the 1,843 plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-45. The RTC resolved the motion in favor of the plaintiffs.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Agulto vs. Tecson

G.R. No. 145276. November 29, 2005. FACTS RTC ordered the revival of the complaint priorly decided and required the parties to appear during the pre-trial conference scheduled on April 29, 1999. During the scheduled pre-trial, petitioner Rolando Agulto and his counsel were informed by an employee of the RTC that the presiding judge was on leave. The petitioners suggested that pre-trial to be rescheduled on June 17, 1999, however, the RTC employee informed them that the suggested setting was not yet official since it would depend on the calendar of the court and the counsel of respondent. The pre-trial proceeded on June 17, 1999. For failure of petitioners to appear at the pre-trial and to submit their pre-trial brief, the RTC issued an order allowing the respondent to present his evidence ex parte. Petitioners motion for reconsideration on the ground that they were not notified of the pre-trial was denied by the Court. 

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Pinga vs. Heirs of German Santiago

G.R. No. 170354. June 30, 2006. FACTS The Heirs of German Santiago filed a complaint for injunction against Edgardo Pinga and Vicenta Saavedra for unlawfully entering the coco lands of the respondent, cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting the fruits of the coconut trees therein. The petitioners in their Amended Answer with Counterclaim, asserted that the properties in question had been in possession thereof since the 1930s.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Bautista vs. Causapin, Jr.

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2044. June 22, 2011. FACTS Plaintiffs through counsel, Atty. Bautista, filed a Complaint for Partition before the RTC, which is raffled to Judge Causapin’s branch. Defendants filed a motion for an extension  to file an answer for 3 times which were all granted by Judge Causapin.  Atty. Bautista filed a comment on defendants’ motions for extension and asserted that all three motions did not contain a notice of the time and place of hearing, thus, these should be considered mere scraps of paper. Finally, defendants filed their joint Answer with Counterclaim and Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs countered by filing a motion to declare defendants in default.  During the hearing,  in the Resolution of Motion to Hold Defendants in Default, Judge Causapin dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground that plaintiffs R. Mesina and N. Polangco did not sign the verification and certification on non-forum shopping attached to the complaint, in violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. Judge Causapin held that defendants could not be declared in default for not answering a defective complaint, which in law does not exist.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. Alejandro

G.R. No. 175587. September 21, 2007. FACTS Alejandro, a Hong Kong resident, executed a promissory note in favor of PCIB for the amount of P249,828,588.90. PCIB filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment due to the alleged withdrawal of unassigned deposits. The trial court granted the application and the bank deposits of respondent with RCBC were garnished. Alejandro, through counsel, filed a manifestation informing the court that he is voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction. He also filed a motion to quash the writ contending that the withdrawal of his unassigned deposits was approved by the PCIB. He also alleged that petitioner knew that he maintains a permanent residence in Quezon City and an office address in Makati City. He posits that there was  a regular communication with PCIB since he frequently travels back to the Philippines. Alejandro also filed a claim for damages in the amount of P25 Million on account of the wrongful garnishment of his deposits.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Trimica, Inc. vs. Polaris Marketing Corporation

No. L-29887. October 28,1974 FACTS Polaris instituted a case for the recovery of the price of foam products against Fine Furnitures in the municipal court of Makati however, Fine Furnitures denied all the allegations. The Municipal Court rendered a decision in favor of Polaris. Fine Furnitures appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal  and presented storekeeper of Trimica, Inc. as witnesses. Torre testified that the foam products were received by Trimica Inc. and the two companies have same office address.  Polaris filed its amended complaint impleading Trimica, Inc. as a defendant and by alleging that Trimica, Inc. and Fine Furnitures were solidarily liable for the price of the foam products. The court absolved Fine Furnitures from any liability and ordered Trimica, Inc. to pay Polaris’ claim Trimica filed a motion to set aside the judgment on the ground that the judgment was void for lack of due process since it was never summoned. The court denied the motion since it had been given its day in court through Capistrano’s admission, its president, that the company used the foam products.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Valley Golf and Country Club, Inc. vs. Reyes

G.R. No. 190641. November 10, 2015. FACTS Victor Reyes (Reyes) subscribed and purchased one share in the capital stock of Valley Golf which entitled him exclusive membership to the golf club including playing rights. Reyes’ playing privileges were assigned from 1979 – 1986, wherein the assignee obligated themselves to pay the monthly membership fees for and on behalf of Reyes. However, the payment was discontinued and resulted for the delinquency of Reyes’ account.  Due to delinquency in the payment of monthly membership fees, Valley Golf sold his share at a public auction.  Reyes filed an action for Reinstatement of Playing Rights and Re-issuance of New Certificate of Share of Stocks against Valley Golf before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). He claimed that he was not notified of the delinquency of his account not the sale of his share. Valley Golf insisted that a Notice of Due Account was sent to Reyes which is evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 3384. It further alleged that prior to the scheduled sale, it also published with Philippine Daily Express as evidenced by the Publisher’s Affidavit. Valley Golf argued that Reyes has no right to claim that he was not duly notified and prayed that his complaint be dismissed for evident lack of cause of action.

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Ilano vs. Español

G.R. No. 161756. December 16, 2005 MAIN TOPIC – Rule 12, Section 1 – Bill of Particulars FACTS Amelia Alonzo, private respondent, is a trusted employee of Victoria Ilano. When Ilano left for the United States for medical check-up, Alonzo was entrusted with Ilano‘s Metrobank Check Book which contains both signed and unsigned blank checks. Ilano contends that Alonzo, by means of deceit and abuse of confidence succeeded in procuring Promissory Notes and signed blank checks. She further alleged that there is no consent in the issuance of the PN’s thus must be declared null and void. She also impleaded ESTELA CAMACLANG, ALLAN CAMACLANG and ESTELITA LEGASPI as co-defendants who likewise was able to induce plaintiff to sign several undated blank checks for the total amount of Php 3,031,600.00. A Complaint for Revocation/Cancellation of Promissory Notes and Bills of Exchange (Checks) with Damages and Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against Alonzo et al. before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Central Bank Board of Liquidators vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank

G.R. No. 173399. February 21, 2017. FACTS Central Bank (CB)  issued a resolution placing Banco Filipino under conservatorship. Banco Filipino filed a complaint with the RTC against  the CB for the annulment of MB Resolution No. 955 (Civil Case No. 8108). In 1985, CB issued another ordering the closure of Banco Filipino and placing the latter under receivership. Banco Filipino filed a Complaint with the RTC questioning the act of it placing the bank under receivership (Civil Case No. 9675).  CB issued another Resolution placing Banco Filipino under liquidation. Respondent then filed another Complaint with the RTC to question the propriety of the liquidation. (Civil Case No. 10183). The Court En Banc consolidated the cases and ordered the CB and its MB to reorganize the bank and allow Banco Filipino to resume business. In 1994, Banco Filipino filed a Motion to Admit Attached Amended/ Supplemental Complaint in the three consolidated cases. It sought to substitute the CB-BOL for the defunct CB and its MB. Respondent also aimed to recover at least P18 billion representing damages and fees against petitioner who had allegedly acted with malice and bad faith in placing the bank under conservatorship and eventually closing it down in 1985. The trial court granted the Motion to Admit filed by Banco Filipino and accordingly admitted the latter’s Amended/Supplemental Complaint.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Frilou Construction Inc. vs. Aegis Integrated Structure Corp.

G.R. No. 191088, 2016. FACTS Frilou Construction engaged the services of Aegis Integrated to supply and fabricate structural steel requirements. Aegies instituted a suit against Frilou for its failure to pay the balance despite of repeated demands.The complaint includes four (4) material averments: (1) petitioner contracted with respondent to fabricate and deliver the former’s structural steel requirements in amount of P6,024,306.00; (2) respondent completely performed the agreement under the Purchase Orders; (3) petitioner has only paid the amount of P4,490,014.32; and (4) thus, petitioner had an unpaid balance to respondent in the amount of P1,534,291.68. Petitioner did not make specific denial of each material averments but a general one to the effect that it no longer has any remaining liability to respondent. It asserted that respondent failed to show evidence of its supposed remaining liability.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

BP Oil vs. Total Distribution

G.R. No. 214406.  February 6, 2017. FACTS BP Oil filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against Total Distribution & Logistic Systems, Inc. (TDLSI) seeking to recover the sum of P3, 6440,351.79. The amount represents the total  value of the moneys, stock and accounts receivables that TDLSI has allegedly refused to return to BP Oil arising from the termination of the Agency Agreement.  The RTC ruled in favor of BP Oils. The CA, reversed and set aside the decision on the ground that the admission made by TDLSI in Exhibit “J,” that it was withholding moneys, receivables and stocks from petitioner, has no evidentiary weight, thus, petitioner was not able to preponderantly establish its claim.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Uy vs. Evangelista

G.R. No. 140365. July 11, 2001. FACTS San Roque Purok Onse Neighborhood Association , et al., filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners. In the complaint, private respondents alleged four causes of action. They stated that Spouses Uy for no apparent reason, balked and reneged from their original commitment for plaintiffs to acquire their property at the price fixed by and in accordance with CMP rules and guidelines. Spouses Uy filed a motion to dismiss the complaint stressing (a) that the complaint did not state a valid cause of action (b) that the claim on which the action had been founded was unenforceable and (c) that respondents were not the real parties-in-interest. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City denied the motion to dismiss of petitioners finding a sufficient basis on the allegations with respect to the first, second and third causes of action as embodied in the complaint.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Raymond vs. Court of Appeals

No. L-80380. September 28, 1988. FACTS Santiago Bitera filed  a complaint for damages against Raymond and Alba with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. The petitioners move for the dismissal of the action on the ground of improper venue. They argued that although Bitera’s complaint includes his address in Ilo-ilo City, he has actually residing for many years in Bais City, Dumaguete.  The Trial Court however denied their motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC’s decision on the ground that it is the plaintiff who is given the right to elect where to bring his action.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Private Enterprise Corporation vs. Magada

G.R. No. 149489. June 30, 2006. FACTS In 1990, Private Enterprise and Valentina Magada entered into a lease contract for 1 year with monthly rental of P3,000. The lessor allowed the petitioner to introduce and/or construct any structure of light materials on the leased premises provided the lessee shall remove the same not later than 30 days after the expiration of the contract. In case, where the petitioner failed to remove the structure, the removal shall be done by the lessor at the expense of lessee. Upon the expiry of the lease, Magada asked for the removal of the improvements but the petitioner refused and claimed that it entered a new lease contract with the heirs of Maria Bacud, who is allegedly the real owner of the subject premise. The respondent and his hired men demolished the bunkhouse which petitioner introduced on the leased premises.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Ochoa vs. China Banking Corporation

G.R. No. 192877. March 23, 2011. FACTS Spouses Ochoa mortgaged their real properties located in Paranaque City in favor of China Banking Corporation. The parties agree that the necessary action for the foreclosure  of the mortgage shall be instituted at China Banking’s option which is in the RTC  – Makati City. However, Petitioners insist that it was error for the CA to rule that the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is binding only on petitioners’ complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, but not on respondent bank’s Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, which was filed with the same court.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Lafarge Cement Phil, Inc. vs. Continental Cement Corp

G.R. No. 155173. November 23, 2004 FACTS Petitioner Lafarge Cement Philippines  agreed to purchase the cement business of Respondent Continental Cement Corporation (CCC). Both parties entered into a Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA). At the time of the foregoing transactions, petitioners were well aware that CCC had a case pending with the Supreme Court (Asset Privatization Trust (APT) v. Court of Appeals and Continental Cement Corporation).Under Clause 2 (c) of the SPA, the parties allegedly agreed to retain from the purchase price a portion of the contract price in anticipation of the liability related to the pending case of CCC. However, upon the finality of the decision, Lafarge refused to apply the sum to the payment to APT.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Anama vs. Citibank, N.A. (formerly First National City Bank)

G.R. No. 192048. December 13, 2017. FACTS Douglas F. Anama obtained a loan and executed a promissory note in the amount of P418,000 and a chattel mortgage in favor of Citibank. Due to the failure of Anama to pay the monthly installments, in 1974, Citibank filed a complaint for sum of money and replevin with the Court of First Instance of Manila. Anama filed his answer with counterclaim alleging that his failure to pay was due to the fault of Citibank as it refused to receive the checks he issued, and that the chattel mortgage was defective and void.  The Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued an Order of Replevin over the machineries and equipment covered by the chattel mortgage.  In 1982, the CA rendered a decision in favor of Anama and nullified RTC’s orders of seizure. However, during the pendency of the case in the CA, the court’s records including the records of the subject case was destroyed by fire. 

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Forest Hills Golf and Country Club, Inc. vs. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc.

G.R. No. 206649. July 20, 2016 FACTS Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI) entered into an agreement to finance the development of several parcels of land owned by Kingsville Construction and Development Corporation (Kingsville).  Respondent FEPI was tasked to incorporate petitioner Forest Hills Golf and Country Club, Inc. (FHGCCI), a first-class residential area/golf course/commercial center. Due to delayed construction of the golf course, Rainier Madrid on behalf FHGCCI instituted a derivative suit for specific performance in order to enforce the project agreement between KPC, Kingsville, and respondents FEPI and FEGDI. The complaint was filed with RTC – Antipolo City. However, RTC dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and refer that the case must be refiled in proper special commercial court sitting at Binangonan, Rizal.

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Filinvest Credit Corporation vs. Relova

No. L-50378. September 30, 1982. FACTS  Filinvest Credit Corporation (FILINVEST) filed a complaint against Rallye Motor Co. (RALLYE) for the collection of a sum of money with damages and preliminary writ of attachment. Judge Coquia granted the prayer for a writ of attachment on the ground that defendants have committed fraud in securing the obligation and are now avoiding payment of the same. Salazar, one of the defendants, filed Urgent Motion that the writ of preliminary attachment issued ex parte and implemented solely against his property be recalled and/or quashed since he did not committed fraud when he contracted the obligation. Justice Relova ordered the dissolution and setting aside of the writ of preliminary attachment issued and the return to Salazar of all his properties attached by the Sheriff by virtue of the said writ. FILINVEST filed a Motion for Reconsideration to be allowed to adduce evidence to prove that Salazar committed fraud but the respondent Judge denied the Motion. 

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Yngson, Jr. vs. Philippine National Bank

G.R. No. 171132. August 15, 2012 FINANCIAL REHABILITATION AND INSOLVENCY ACT OF 2010 FACTS ARCAM & Company, Inc.  obtained a loan by respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB).To secure the loan, ARCAM executed a eal Estate Mortgage and a Chattel Mortgage. However, ARCAM defaulted on its obligations to PNB. Thus, PNB initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings of the Real Estate Mortgage and Chattel Mortgage.

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Miles vs. Lao

G.R. No. 209544. November 22, 2017. MAIN TOPIC – Real Estate Mortgage FACTS Petitioners claimed that on March 28, 1983, they became registered owners in fee simple of a parcel of land in Makati City by TCT No. 120427. They averred that before they left for the United States, they entrusted the duplicate of the TCT of the subject property to their niece, defendant Rodora Jimenez (Rodora) so that she may offer it to interested buyers. 

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Cavite Development Bank vs. Lim

G.R. No. 131679. February 1, 2000. MAIN TOPIC – Real Security FACTS Rodolfo Guansing obtained a loan in the amount of P90,000.00 from Cavite Development Bank, to secure which he mortgaged a parcel of land situated in Quezon City and covered by TCT No. 300809 registered in his name. As Guansing defaulted in the payment of his loan, CDB foreclosed the mortgage. Guansing failed to redeem, and the mortgaged property was sold to CDB as the highest bidder. TCT No. 300809 in the name of Guansing was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 355588 was issued in the name of CDB.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 103073. March 13, 2001. MAIN TOPIC – Credit Card FACTS This case is a motion for reconsideration of the decision, dated 14 September 1999, of the Court.See earlier case: Endelo Manufacturing Corporation (Endelo) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of embroidery and apparel articles for export using imported raw materials. To release said materials from the customs warehouse, Endelo secured embroidery re-export bonds from the Communications Insurance Company, Inc. (CICI), and R & B Surety Company and Insurance Co., Inc. (R & B Surety). However, Endelo’s license to operate was subsequently suspended by the Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board on the ground of alleged pilferage of the imported materials. The suspension of its license resulted in its failure to re-export the imported materials or the finished goods.As a consequence, the Commissioner of Customs filed a case against  Endelo, CICI and R & B Surety, for the payment of the customs duties and taxes due to the Bureau of Customs.

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Bankard, Inc. v. Feliciano

G.R. No. 141761. July 28, 2006 MAIN TOPIC – Credit Card FACTS Respondent Feliciano is the holder of PCIBank Mastercard  issued and managed by petitioner Bankard, Inc. An extension of the card  was issued to his wife, Mrs. Feliciano.In 1995, respondent used his PCIBank Mastercard to pay a breakfast bill in Toronto, Canada. The card was, however, dishonored for payment. Respondent’s guest had to pay for the bill. Respondent immediately called the Bankard Inc., to inquire on the cause of dishonor and was informed that the reason was the nonpayment of his last billing statement. Respondent denied that he failed to pay, and requested the person on the line to verify the correct status of his credit card again. Respondent likewise called his secretary

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Gilat Satellite Networks, Ltd. v. United Coconut Planters Bank Insurance Co.

G.R. No. 189563. April 7, 2014 MAIN TOPIC – Interest FACTS One Virtual purchased from Gilat various telecommunications equipment at a total purchase price of US$2,128,250.00. To ensure the prompt payment of this amount, it obtained defendant UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.’s surety bond in favor of Gilat.GILAT shipped and delivered to One Virtual the purchased products and equipment for which payment was secured by the surety bond.

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Spouses Ramon Sy and Anita Ng v. Westmont Bank

G.R. No. 201074. October 19, 2016 MAIN TOPIC – CONTRACT OF LOAN – General Concepts FACTS Petitioners, under the trade name and style of “Moondrops General Merchandising,” obtained a loan from Westmont Bank. They signed blank forms of promissory notes, disclosure statements and continuing suretyship agreements for the purpose of securing any future indebtedness of Moondrops.Westmont filed a complaint because the petitioners allegedly defaulted in the payment of the loan obligation in the amount of P4,000,000.00. Demand letter was sent to them, but it was unheeded. 

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Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 173946. June 19, 2013. MAIN TOPIC – Different Kind Of Obligations FACTS In 1997, Boston Equity filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Respondent (Lolita Toledo) filed an Answer and later filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer in which she alleged, among others, that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo, is already dead. The death certificate of Manuel states “13 July 1995” as the date of death. As a result, petitioner filed a motion to require respondent to disclose the heirs of Manuel. In compliance, Toledo submitted the required names and addresses of the heirs. 

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Domingo vs. Manzano

G.R. No. 201883. November 16, 2016. MAIN TOPIC – Suspensive Condition FACTS Respondents Emmanuel and Tita Manzano (the Manzanos) were the registered owners of a 35,281-square-meter parcel of land with improvements in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City , through their duly appointed attorney-in­-fact Franklin Estabillo (Estabillo), executed a notarized agreement of contract to sell with petitioners Desiderio and Teresa Domingo. However, they failed to tender full payment of the balance when the March 2001 deadline came. In December 2001, petitioners offered to pay the remaining P555,000.00 balance, but Estabillo refused to accept payment; instead, he advised petitioners to await respondent Tita Manzano’s (Tita) arrival from abroad.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Espiritu

52 Phil. 346 [1928] MAIN TOPIC – Obligations with a Penal Clause FACTS Bachrach Motor Co., filed two cases – Nos. 28497 and 28498 which were tried together, against defendants. The cases involve an action for the recovery of total amount of P11,940.37 representing the unpaid balance of White truck purchases within the periods agreed upon. To secure the payment, defendant executed mortgage deeds and promissory note. In both sales it was agreed that 12% interest would be paid upon the unpaid portion of the price at the execution of the contracts, and in case of non-payment of the total debt upon its maturity, 25% thereon, as penalty. The trial courts rendered judgments in favor of the plaintiff. However, the defendants contended that the 25 % penalty upon the debt, in addition to the interest of 12% per annum makes the contract usurious.

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Citibank vs. Sabeniano

G.R. No 156132. October 12, 2006 MAIN TOPIC – Extinguishment of Obligations – Compensation FACTS Modesta R. Sabeniano was a client of both petitioners Citibank and FNCB Finance. Unfortunately, the business relations among the parties subsequently went awry. In 1985, Sabeniano filed a civil case for “Accounting, Sum of Money and Damages”, alleging that petitioners refused to return her deposits and the proceeds of her money market placements despite her repeated demands. Petitioners admitted that respondent had deposits and money market placements with them, including dollar accounts. However, they also alleged that the respondent obtained several loans aggregating to ₱1,920,000.00, for which she executed Promissory Notes and secured by a pledge on her dollar accounts and money market placements. That despite of the repeated demands, respondent failed to pay her outstanding loans. Thus, petitioner Citibank used respondent’s deposits and money market placements to off set and liquidate her outstanding obligations. RTC declared this illegal, null and void and to pay Sabeniano with legal interest, while Sabeniano was ordered to pay her loans.

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Andreas vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands

No. 23836. September 9, 1925 MAIN TOPIC – Contracts – Interpretation Of Documents FACTS The plaintiff applied to the defendant for a foreign credit to enable him to purchase coal in  Sydney, Australia, to be shipped to Manila. In connection therewith, plaintiff signed a written  “request for foreign credit” for the sum of 5,050.00 pounds, payable to the order of the bank of  New South Wales. It appears that in addition to the ¼ of one per cent commission specified in  the contract, that the defendant charged the plaintiff interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum  on the amount of each of said drafts. It is admitted that such charge was made by the defendant  bank without the authority or knowledge of the Australian bank. Plaintiff not only paid the full  amount of the drafts drawn by the Australian bank, but he also paid the 9 per cent interest  charges which the defendant made where he did not know or understand the nature of them or  for whose benefit the charges were made. The plaintiff alleges that through an error, paid to  defendant interest and no part of such money paid has been returned or refunded by the  defendant. For answer the defendant denied the allegations and sought to prove that there was  an established usage and custom of the banks in Manila in like cases of charging and collecting  such interest from the time the draft is paid here, until the money is remitted by the local bank,  in the ordinary course of business, to the London bank. 

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Bañez vs. Court of Appeals

No. L-30351. September 11,1974. MAIN TOPIC – Extinguishment of Obligations – Compensation FACTS In 1956 respondent Pio Arcilla occupied a parcel of land, located in East Avenue Subdivision,  Diliman, Quezon City, owned by the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (hereinafter  referred to as PHHC). He fenced the lot with wire, and erected a house and made some  plantings thereon. His moves to apply for the acquisition of the lot from the PHHC when the  same became available for disposition came to naught because the employees of the PHHC  whose help he sought merely regaled him with promises that the matter would be attended to. 

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Dizon vs. Gaborro

No. L-36821. June 22, 1978 MAIN TOPIC – Contracts – Classification   FACTS Petitioner Jose P. Dizon was the owner of the three (3) parcels of land situated in Pampanga. He  constituted mortgage lien in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines and Philippine  National Bank to secure his indebtedness. Petitioner Dizon having defaulted in the payment of  his debt, the Development Bank of the Philippines foreclosed the mortgage and executed  “Certificate of Sale,” in favor of the said bank. Alfredo G. Gaborro became interested in the  lands of Dizon. They entered into a contract of “Deed of sale with assumption of mortgage” and  “Option to Purchase Real Estate” After the execution of said contracts, Alfredo G. Gaborro took  possession of the three parcels of land. Gaborro made several payments to the DBP and PNB and introduced improvements, cultivated the lands, raised sugarcane and other crops and  appropriated the produce to himself. He also paid the land taxes thereon. 

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Ferrazzini vs. Gsell

34 Phil. 697. August 10, 1916 MAIN TOPIC – Contracts – Freedom to Contract  FACTS Gsell, owner of industrial enterprises in the city of Manila employed Ferrazzini for his skilled  service. They entered into a contract wherein as part of their duties and obligations; the master, shall furnish safe place to work, pay his services and not to discharge him until the expiration of  six months after notice. On the part of the servant shall observe loyalty, faithfulness, and  obedience to all reasonable orders. It further stipulates that for the period of 5 years after the  termination of the employment, the plaintiff shall not enter into the employ of any enterprises  in the Philippine Islands, except after obtaining special written permission. It further stipulated  that the defendant shall pay P10,000 as liquidated damages for each and every breach. 

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Figuera vs. Ang

G.R. No. 204264. June 29, 2016. MAIN TOPIC – Extinguishment of Obligations – Consignation FACTS Maria Remedios Ang, owner of business named “Enhance Immigration and Documentation  Consultants” (EIDC), executed a Deed of Assignment transferring all of her business rights to  Figuera for P150,000.00. The parties also agreed that Ang shall pay the bills for electricity,  telephone, office rentals, and the employees’ salaries up to the month of December 2004. Without Ang’s consent, Figuera paid all the utility bills amounting to P107,903.21 and tendered  only the amount of P42,096.79 after deducting the paid expenses.  

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Korean Air Co., Ltd. vs. Yuson

G.R. No. 170369. June 16, 2010. MAIN TOPIC – Contracts – Essential Requisites of Contract FACTS In July 1975, Korean Air Co., Ltd. hired Adelina A.S. Yuson (Yuson) as reservations agent and  was promoted as passenger sales manager in 1999. Korean Air had an International Passenger  Manual (IPM) which contained, among others, travel benefit to its employees. In 2000, Korean  Air suffered a net loss. In 2001, in order to cut costs offered its employees an early retirement   program (ERP). Yuson accepted the offer for early retirement, however she was excluded from  the ERP because she was retiring on 8 January 2002. Yuson claimed that Korean Air was bound  by the perfected contract and accused the company of harassment and discrimination. Korean  Air answered that ERP was not an absolute offer but rather an invitation to possible qualified  employees subject to the approval and acceptance by the Company. 

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Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 116896. May 5, 1997 MAIN TOPIC: Extinguishment of Obligations – Tender of Payment FACTS On November 18, 1985, PNCC entered into the contract of lease with private respondents for  a period of five (5) years commencing on the date of issuance of the industrial clearance by the  Ministry of Human Settlements for P20,000.00 which shall be increased yearly by Five Percent  (5%). On 7 January 1986, petitioner obtained from the Ministry of Human Settlements a  Temporary Use Permit for the proposed rock crushing project.  

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Victorias Planters Assn., Inc., et al. vs. Victorias Milling Co., Inc.

MAIN TOPIC – Different Kind Of Obligations : Resolutionary FACTS The petitioners Victorias Planters Association, Inc. and North Negros Planters Association, Inc. and the respondent Victorias Milling Co., Inc entered into a milling contract whereby they stipulated a 30-year period within which the sugar cane produced by the petitioner would be milled by the respondent central. The parties also stipulated that in the event of force majuere, the contract shall be deemed suspended during this period. 

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 76509. December 15, 1989 FACTS In 1978, Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation issued general warehousing bonds in favor  of the Bureau of Customs for importation of raw materials on behalf of the private respondents  Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. To secure the bonds, the respondents executed jointly and severally  indemnity agreements. The private respondents failed to comply with their commitment by  reason whereof the Bureau of Customs demanded from the petitioner payment of the value of  the said bonds which eventually reached P9,031,000.00 in 1983. Private respondents settled their obligations to Bureau of Customs through staggered monthly installment payments. Other  than the initial payment of P500,000.00, however, respondents have not made any other  payments thereby violating the terms of the said agreement. Bureau of Customs again  demanded from the petitioner payment of its bonds. No payment has been made. 

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Keppel Cebu Shipyard, Inc. vs. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation

G.R. Nos. 180880-81. September 18, 2012. FACTS In 2000, KCSI and WG&A Jebsens entered into Shiprepair Agreement wherein KCSI to carry out renovation and reconstruction of M/V Superferry 3. Prior to the execution of the Shiprepair Agreement, Superferry 3 was already insured by WG&A with Pioneer for US$8,472,581.78. While undergoing repair, Superferry 3 was gutted by fire. WG&A declared the vessel’s damage as a “total constructive loss” and filed an insurance claim with Pioneer. Pioneer paid the insurance claim of WG&A, and in exchange, WG&A executed a Loss and Subrogation Receipt in favor of Pioneer. Pioneer tried to collect the amount of US$8,472,581.78 from KCSI but it was frustrated. Thus, Pioneer sought arbitration with the CIAC, which found that both WG&A and KCSI were equally guilty of negligence which resulted in the fire and loss of Superferry 3. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of CIAC. 

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Federation of United Namarco Distributors, Inc. vs. National Marketing Corporation

No. L-17819. March 31, 1962. FACTS NAMARCO and the FEDERATION entered into a Contract of Sale for the importation of USD2M worth of controlled goods. Pursuant to the terms, Federation deposited 200,000.00 as partial payment. The new Board of Directors and General Manager of NAMARCO decided to discontinue compliance of the contract of sale. NAMARCO contends that the contract lacks the approval of that body; that it was not approved by the Auditor General; that the contract of sale is inconsistent with Resolution No. 530. The FEDERATION, filed a complaint to compel the latter to perform the Contract of Sale as to what was left after the aforementioned releases of nearly over one-half of the entire quantity of the commodities. After trial, the court rendered judgment obliging NAMARCO to specifically perform the contract of sale to plaintiff FEDERATION’, upon the payment of the procurement cost, plus 5% mark-up.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Han

No. L-1411. September 29, 1953 FACTS On February 2, 1944, Dionisio Rellosa sold to Gaw Chee Hun a parcel of land, together with the  house erected thereon, for the sum of P25,000. The vendor remained in possession of the  property under a contract of lease entered into on the same date between the same parties.  Rellosa instituted action seeking the annulment of the sale and the lease. The Petitioner  contends that the sale in question cannot have any validity under Seirei No. 6 in view of the  failure of respondent to obtain the requisite approval by the Japanese authorities. And Even if  said requirement were met, the sale would at all events be void under article XIII, section 5, of  our Constitution which provides that “no private agricultural land shall be transferred or  assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands  of the public domain in the Philippines”. 

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Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways vs. Tecson

G.R. No. 179334. April 21, 2015 FACTS In 1940, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) took respondents movants’ subject property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings for the construction  of the MacArthur Highway. In 1994, respondents-movants demanded the payment of the fair  market value of the subject parcel of land. DPWH, offered to pay for the subject land at the rate  of Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square meter. Unsatisfied with the offer, respondents-movants  demanded the return of their property, or the payment of compensation at the current fair  market value. Hence, the complaint for recovery of possession with damages filed by  respondents-movants. 

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Uson vs. Del Rosario, et al.

No. L-4963. January 29, 1953 FACTS This is an action for the recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land  situated in the municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against  Maria del Rosario and her four children.  Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, who upon his death in 1945  left the lands involved in this litigation. However, Maria del Rosario, a common law wife of the  late Faustino Nebreda took possession of the said lands. Del Rosario claimed that in 1931, Uson and the late Faustino, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband  and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria was given a parcel of land by way of  alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by  her husband upon his death. Del Rosario also contends that her children are given the status  and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights, and because these  successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given  retroactive effect. 

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Uy Soo Lim vs. Tan Unchuan

No. 12605. September 7, 1918 FACTS  Santiago Pastrano, a Chinese national, is married to Candida Vivares, wherein they have 2  daughters – Francisca and Concepcion. At the time of this marriage, Santiago possessed very  little property and the large estate left by him at his death was acquired by him during his  marriage with Candida Vivares. When Santiago returned to China, he had an illicit relationship  with Chan Quieng. He returned to the Philippines and never saw Chan Quieg again, but  received letters from her informing him that she had borne him a son, Uy Soo Lim, the present  plaintiff. Santiago died without even seeing his son and with the belief that he is his  only son, he dictated the provisions of his will disposing a greater part of his properties to  his son. A couple of suits were filed questioning the distribution of the estate. Francisca and  Concepcion filed that Uy Soo Lim should not be entitled under law to the amount assigned  to him for the reason that the marriage of Chan Quieg with Santiago was null and void and  that Uy Soo Lim was not a son of Santiago, either legitimate or illegitimate 

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Evangelista vs. Alto Surety & Ins. Co., Inc.

No. L-11139. April 23, 1958Concepcion, J., Ponente FACTS In 1949, Santos Evangelista, instituted Civil Case for a sum of money in CFI – Manila. He obtained a writ of attachment, which was levied upon a house, built by Rivera on a land situated in Manila and leased to him, and filed a copy with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The  judgment was rendered in favor of Evangelista, who bought the house at public auction in 1951. The deed of sale was issued to him in October 1952, after expiration of redemption period. 

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Raul V. Arambulo And Teresita A. Dela Cruz vs. Genaro Nolasco And Jeremy Spencer Nolasco

G.R. No. 189420. March 26, 2014Ponente: Perez, J., FACTS Petitioners Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita A. Dela Cruz, along with their mother Rosita Vda. De Arambulo, and siblings Primo V. Arambulo, Ma. Lorenza A. Lopez, Ana Maria V. Arambulo, Maximiano V. Arambulo, Julio V. Arambulo and Iraida Arambulo Nolasco (Iraida) are co-owners of two (2) parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila, with an aggregate size of 233 square meters. When Iraida passed away, she was succeeded by her husband, respondent Genaro Nolasco and their children. 

Law School Notes - Case Digest

City of Batangas vs. Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation

G.R. No. 195003. June 7, 2017Ponente: Caguioa, J., FACTS On May 28, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 3, Series of 2001 which requires heavy industries operating along the portions of Batangas Bay within the territorial jurisdiction of Batangas City to construct desalination plants to facilitate the use of seawater as coolant for their industrial facilities instead of underground fresh water.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Vda. de Bogacki vs. Inserto

No. L-39187. January 30, 1982Ponente: Concepcion JR, J., FACTS The private respondent, Maria Emma Luz Bogacki (Maria Emma), is the owner of four parcels of land situated in Iloilo City over which her mother, herein petitioner Anulina Ledesma Vda. de Bogacki (Anulina) has a usufruct of one-sixth (1/6) each of the said parcels of land. Due to a misunderstanding, Maria Emma left the home of her mother and the latter took possession of all these properties exclusively for herself, without sharing with Maria Emma the rentals she obtained from the said properties. 

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Reyes vs. Valentin

G.R. No. 194488. February 11, 2015.Leonen, J., Ponente FACTS Petitioner Alicia B. Reyes, filed a complaint with RTC – Malolos for easement of right of way against respondents, Spouses Francisco S. Valentin and Anatalia Ramos. She alleged that respondents’ 1,500-square-meter property surrounded her property, and that it was the only adequate outlet from her property to the highway. She also insisted that her property was not isolated because of her own acts but because her uncle, Dominador, who was her mother’s caretaker of property allegedly with fraud caused the titling of the whole 1,500-square-meter property instead of just the 500-square-meter portion under his name.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Adasa vs. Abalos

G.R. No. 168617. February 19, 2007. FACTS Respondent Cecille S. Abalos filed 2 complaints against petitioner for Estafa before the Office of City Prosecutor of Iligan. Adasa allegedly through deceit, received and encashed two checks issued in the name of respondent without respondent’s knowledge and consent. Petitioner filed a counter-affidavit admitting that she received and encashed the two checks issued in favor of respondent. However, after 6 days, she recanted and alleged instead that it was a certain Bebie Correa who received and encashed the two checks; Correa left the country after misappropriating the proceeds of the checks.

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Perez vs. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 131445. May 27, 2004. FACTS Petitioners, members of the Kilusang Bayan ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM), instituted two complaints at the Office of the Ombudsman against several respondents, one of whom was then Mayor Ignacio R. Bunye, for violation of RA 3019 (also known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”). 

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Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr.

G.R. Nos. L-78911-25. December 11, 1987 FACTS It appears that fifteen (15) separate information for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law, were filed against respondent Rosario Claudio before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and originally assigned to Branch 84. The presiding judge of Branch 84 inhibited himself when respondent Claudio, through counsel, filed a petition for recuse dated May 19,1986. 

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Sevilla v. The Court of Appeals

G.R. Nos. L-41182-3. April 15, 1988 FACTS: In 1960, the Tourist World Services Inc. (TWS) and Sevilla entered into  a lease contract for the use as branch office. In the said contract, both parties were held solidarily liable for the prompt payment of the monthly rental agreed on. When the branch office was opened, it was run by appellant Sevilla wherein any airline fare brought in on her efforts, 4% of that would go to her and 3% was to be withheld by TWS.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Pahud vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 160346               August 25, 2009 FACTS: The (8) children : respondents Eufemia, Raul, Ferdinand, Zenaida, Milagros, Minerva, Isabelita and Virgilio, were left a 246-square meter parcel of land. Sometime in 1992, Eufemia, Ferdinand and Raul executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Undivided shares in favor of Pahuds for their respective shares from the lot they inherited from their deceased parents. Eufemia also signed the deed on behalf of her four (4) other co-heirs, namely: Isabelita on the basis of a special power of attorney  and also for Milagros, Minerva, and Zenaida but without their apparent written authority. The deed of sale was also not notarized.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Lim vs Saban

G.R. No. 163720             December 16, 2004 FACTS: Ybañez owner of a 1,000-square meter lot in Cebu City, entered into an Agency Agreement with Saban. Under the Agreement,  Ybañez authorized Saban to look for a buyer of the lot for P200,000 and to mark up the selling price to include the amounts needed for payment of taxes, transfer of title and other expenses incident to the sale, as well as Saban’s commission for the sale.

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Chua vs The Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 70909. January 5, 1994 FACTS: Herrera executed a Contract of Lease in favor of  Tian On, whereby the former leased to the latter lots located in Cebu City for a term of 10 years, renewable for another 5 years. The contract contains a stipulation giving the lessee an option to buy the he leased property after the lease period as long as the lessee faithfully fulfills the terms and conditions of their contract

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In Re: Application For Land Registration, Suprema T. Dumo, Petitioner, V. Republic Of The Philippines, Respondent.

G.R. No. 218269, June 06, 2018 Carpio, J., FACTS:             The Heirs of Espinas filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the Heirs of Trinidad. They alleged that the they are the heirs of Marcelino Espinas and the Subject Property was purchased by Espinas from Carlos Calica through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 19 October 1943. That it had exercised acts of dominion & had also been paying realty taxes.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Bel Air Village Association, Inc. vs. Dionisio

G.R. No. 38354. June 30, 1989 Gutierrez, Jr., J . FACTS:             In 1972, Bel Air filed a complaint for the collection of the amount of P2,100 plus penalty which represent the unpaid association dues on the lot owned by Dionisio, as member of the plaintiff association. The dues collected are intended for garbage collection, salary of security guards, cleaning and maintenance of streets and street lights and establishments of parks.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Jose Modequillio vs. Hon. Augusto V. Breva

G.R. No. 86355. May 31, 1990.* GANCAYCO, J.: FACTS: On January 1988, Court of Appeals rendered a final and executory judgment on a case arising from a vehicular accident finding the petitioner liable to damages.The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land and a parcel of agricultural land registered in his name.

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Florante F. Manacop, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 97898. August 11, 1997.* PANGANIBAN, J.: FACTS: In 1972, petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife purchased a residential lot. The petitioner was later sued by E & L Mercantile, Inc for collection of  indebtedness which instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a compromise agreement. On July 15, 1986, private respondent filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted. The sheriff levied and sold several vehicles and other personal properties of petitioner in partial satisfaction of the judgment debt.

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Spouses Eduardo vs. Hon. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 164740. July 31, 2006.* CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: FACTS: In 1993, Private respondent Dr. Victoria Ong granted a P1,000,000.00 loan to Dolores Ledesma and as a security for said loan, the latter issued a check and executed a deed of real estate mortgage over her house and lot. Thereafter, Ledesma sold the said house and lot to Versola spouses for P2,500,000.00. The petitioner spouses paid P1,000,000 as down payment however, they were only able to pay P50,000 for the remaining amount. To raise the full amount, petitioners spouses applied for a loan with Asiatrust Bank, Inc. The parties convened at a scheme wherein petitioner spouses will pay for obligation of Ledesma to Dr. Ong. However, when Asia­trust tried to register the Real Estate Mortgage there was an existing obligation to a certain Miladay’s Jewels, Inc., in the amount of P214,284.00 that caused the refusal to release the loan.

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Jose E. Honrado vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 166333. November 25, 2005.* CALLEJO, SR., J.: FACTS: In 1997, Premium Agro-Vet Products, Inc. (Premium) filed a complaint for sum of money against Jose Honrado, who was doing business  for failure to pay veterinary products purchased on credit amounting to P240,765.00. For failure of Honrado, as well as his counsel, to appear at the pre-trial conference, he was declared in default. Premium filed a writ of execution for the sale of property in public auction which was later sold to the private respondent. The corresponding Certificate of Sale was issued and annotated at the dorsal portion of the title.

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Vilma G. Arriola vs. John Nabor C. Arriola

G.R. No. 177703. January 28, 2008.* John Nabor C. Arriola, the son of  decedent Fidel Arriola on his first wife for judicial partition of the properties against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola, the second wife and their son. RTC granted the petition and among the properties subject to partition is a land which sought it sale through public auction which the both parties agreed. But it has to be reset due to the petitioners refusal to include the disposal of subject house which is standing on the subject land, the plaintiff argued that it should be considered accessory to the land on which it is built and the subject house was built by the deceased.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Susan Nicdao Cariño, vs. Susan Yee Cariño

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001.* YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: FACTS: SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño , with whom he had two offspring and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño, with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. In 1992,Santiago died under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. The first wife, petitioner was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00. Respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the “death benefits” which she received.

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Antonio A.S. Valdes, vs. Regional Trial Court

G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996.* FACTS: Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married and begotten five children. Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code which was granted. The judgment rendered includes the custody of children and liquidation of  their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52. Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification and asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage.”

Law School Notes - Case Digest

In re: Voluntary Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership of Jose Bermas, Sr. and Filar Manuel Bermas

No. L-20379. June 22, 1965. CONCEPCION, J.: FACTS: In 1962, an Agreement for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and Separation of Property was jointly executed by petitioners states that they are and have been legally married since December 24, 1932, that they have two children and during their marriage  have acquired twelve (12) parcels of land and two (2) buildings. Petitioners have mutually agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership, and to the establishment of a separation of properties in the manner specified in the contract to prevent friction, dissension and confusion among their respective heirs in the future, particularly because petitioner Jose Bermas, Sr. has two (2) sets of children, one by a former marriage, and another by his present wife, the other petitioner. After publication and hearing, the court rendered the appealed decision, denying the petition upon the ground that, under Article 192 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Consequently, said children by first marriage of petitioner Jose Bermas, Sr. do not appear to have been notified personally of the filing of the petition and of the date of the hearing thereof, although the danger of substantial injury to their rights would seem to be remote.

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Alice Reyes Van Dorn vs. Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, Jr

No. L-68470, October 8, 1985.* MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: FACTS: Petitioner, Alicia, is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

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Pastor B. Tenchavez, vs. Vicenta F. Escaño

No. L-19671. November 29, 1965. REYES, J.B.L., J.: FACTS: On Feburary 24, 1948, 27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got secretly married with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer. Parents of Vicenta were disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke so they decided for re-celebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church. A letter was handed disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. June 1948, the newlyweds were already estranged Vicenta had gone to Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition and was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing.

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International Corporate Bank v. Court of Appeals and Philippine National Bank

G.R. No. 129910. September 5, 2006. Ponente: CARPIO, J. FACTS: The Ministry of Education and Culture issued 15 checks drawn against PNB which International Corporate Bank accepted for deposit on various dates. After 24 hours from submission of the checks to PNB for clearing, petitioner paid the value of the checks and allowed the withdrawals of the deposits. However, PNB returned all the checks to the petitioner on the ground that they were materially altered.

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Associated Bank vs. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 107382. January 31, 1996) FACTS: A portion of the funds of the Province of Tarlac is allocated to the Concepcion Emergency Hospital. The checks were payable to the order of the hospital. The allotment checks were released by the Provincial Treasurer and received by the hospital’s admin officer or cashier. During the audit, it was discovered that  the hospital did not receive 30 allotment checks drawn from the province’s current account with PNB. They learned that the checks were encashed by Faustino, a retired admin officer and cashier of payee hospital.  He was able to withdraw the money by forging the signature of Dr. Canlas, the chief of the payee hospital. All the checks bore the stamp of Associated Bank which reads “All prior endorsements guaranteed ASSOCIATED BANK.”

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Jai-Alai Corp. of the Phil. vs. Bank of the Phil.

No. L-29432. August 6, 1975 FACTS: Jai – Alai deposited 10 checks with a total face value of P8,030.58 with BPI. All checks were acquired by the petitioner from one Antonio J. Ramirez, a sales agent of the Inter-Island Gas and a regular bettor at jai-alai games. Inter-Island Gas discovered that all the indorsements made on the checks purportedly by its cashiers were forgeries.  In due time, the Inter-Island Gas advised the petitioner, the respondent, the drawers and the drawee-banks of the said checks about the forgeries, and filed a criminal complaint against Ramirez.

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Republic Bank Vs. Mauricia T. Ebrada

G.R. No. L-40796         July 31, 1975 FACTS: Mauricia Ebrada encashed a check issued by the Bureau of Treasury for the sum of P1246.08 at Republic Bank in 1963. Then, the Bureau of Treasury informed Republic Bank that the alleged indorsement on the reverse side of the check by the payee named Martin Lorenzo was forged because the latter had died last 1952. As a result, the Bureau of Treasury requested Republic Bank to refund the proceeds of the check. After, Republic Bank made verbal demands to Ebrada to account for the sum of P1246.08 in order for the bank to receive a refund of the amount, but she refused to do so.

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Philippine National Bank vs. Quimpo

G.R. No. L-53194, March 14, 1988; FACTS: Francisco S. Gozon II, went to PNB – Caloocan Branch in his car accompanied by his friend Ernesto Santos. He left Santos and transacted his business in the Bank. Santos saw that Gozon left his check book he took a check therefrom, filled it up for the amount of P5,000.00, forged the signature of Gozon, and thereafter he encashed the check in the bank on the same day.

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Philippine Commercial and International Bank vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 121413. January 29, 2001. – Philippine Commercial International Bank (Formerly Insular Bank Of Asia And America) Vs. Court Of Appeals And Ford Philippines, Inc. And Citibank,G.R. No. 121479. January 29, 2001. – Ford Philippines, Inc., Vs. Court Of Appeals And Citibank, N.A. And Philippine Commercial International Bank.G.R. No. 128604. January 29, 2001 – Ford Philippines, Inc., Vs. Citibank, N.A., Philippine Commercial International Bank And The Court Of Appeals. FACTS: This case is composed of three consolidated petitions involving several checks, payable to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, but was embezzled allegedly by an organized syndicate.

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Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Renato D. Cabilzo

[G.R. No. 154469. December 6, 2006.] FACTS: Cabilzo a client of Metrobank, issued a Metrobank Check payable to “CASH” and postdated on 24 November 1994 in the amount of  P1,000.00. The check was drawn against Cabilzo’s Account with Metrobank under Current Account  and was paid by Cabilzo to a certain Mr. Marquez, as his sales commission.

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Far East Realty Investment Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

No. L-36549. October 5, 1988 FACTS: Private Respondents Tat, Chee and An asked petitioner Far East Realty Investment Inc. to extend an accommodation loan in the sum of Php 4500 which they needed in their business. They promised to pay, jointly and severally, in one month time; with 14% payment of interest and they delivered China Banking Corporation Check No. VN-915564, dated September 13, 1960, for P4,500.00, drawn by Dy Hian Tat, and signed by them at the back of said check. In 1964, the check was presented for payment to Chinabank but the check bounced and was not cashed by said bank for the reason that the current account of the drawer had already been closed.

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Salas vs. CA and Filinvest Finance Leasing

G.R. No. 76788. January 22, 1990. FACTS: Petitioner bought a motor vehicle from the Violago Motor Sales Corporation (VMS) evidenced by a promissory note (P58,132). The note was subsequently endorsed to Filinvest Finance & Leasing Corporation which financed the purchase. Petitioner defaulted in her installments because VMS delivered a different engine and chassis numbers compared to which indicated in the Invoice, COR and mortgage.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Ilusorio vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 139130. November 27, 2002 FACTS: Petitioner a businessman was going out of the country, and entrusted to his secretary, Katherine2 E. Eugenio, his credit cards and his checkbook with blank checks. Eugenio was able to encash and deposit to her personal account about seventeen (17) checks drawn against the account of the petitioner at the respondent bank, with an aggregate amount of P119,634.34. One of his business partner apprised him that he saw Eugenio use his credit cards. Petitioner fired Eugenio immediately, and instituted a criminal action against her for estafa thru falsification Petitioner then requested the Manila Banking Corporation to credit back and restore to its account the value of the checks which were wrongfully encashed but respondent bank refused. The Bank contended that they had performed standard operating procedure. Manila Bank also sought the expertise of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in determining the genuineness of the signatures appearing on the checks. Petitioner claims that Manila Bank is liable for damages for its negligence in failing to detect the discrepant checks. Petitioner further contends that under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law a forged check is inoperative, and that Manila Bank had no authority to pay the forged checks CA disposed the case held that petitioner’s own negligence was the proximate cause of his loss ISSUE 1) whether or not Manila Bank had no authority to pay the forged checks because under Sec. 23 of NIL HELD Under Sec 23 True, it is a rule that when a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, the check is wholly inoperative. However, the rule does provide for an exception, namely: “unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority.” In the instant case, it is the exception that applies. In our view, petitioner is precluded from setting up the forgery, assuming there is forgery, due to his own negligence in entrusting to his secretary his credit cards and checkbook including the verification of his statements of account.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Heirs of Narvasa vs Imbornal

G.R. No. 182908. August 6, 2014 Perlas-Bernabe,  J. FACTS: Basilia Imbornal had four (4) children namely, Alejandra, Balbina, Catalina, and Pablo. Basilia owned a parcel of land situated at San Fabian, Pangasinan which she conveyed to her three (3) daughters. Petitioners are the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco, Pedro, and Petra, who are children of Alejandra and Balbina.  On the other hand, respondents Emiliana, Victoriano, Felipe, Mateo, Raymundo, Maria, and Eduardo, all surnamed Imbornal, are the descendants of Pablo.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

In re Voluntary Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership of Jose Bermas, Sr. and Filar Manuel Bermas

No. L-20379. June 22, 1965. CONCEPCION, J.: FACTS: In 1962, an Agreement for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and Separation of Property was jointly executed by petitioners states that they are and have been legally married since December 24, 1932, that they have two children and during their marriage  have acquired twelve (12) parcels of land and two (2) buildings. Petitioners have mutually agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership, and to the establishment of a separation of properties in the manner specified in the contract to prevent friction, dissension and confusion among their respective heirs in the future, particularly because petitioner Jose Bermas, Sr. has two (2) sets of children, one by a former marriage, and another by his present wife, the other petitioner. After publication and hearing, the court rendered the appealed decision, denying the petition upon the ground that, under Article 192 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Consequently, said children by first marriage of petitioner Jose Bermas, Sr. do not appear to have been notified personally of the filing of the petition and of the date of the hearing thereof, although the danger of substantial injury to their rights would seem to be remote.

Law School Notes - Case Digest


G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992.* CRUZ, J.: FACTS: Private respondent, Jose Jo is legally married to the petitioner, who admits to having cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen children. The two agreed that Prima would temporarily leave their conjugal home in Dumaguete City to stay with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for Jose to visit and support her. They never agreed to separate permanently. Prima went back to Dumaguete, but she was not accepted by her husband.

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G.R. No. 137650. April 12, 2000.* PANGANIBAN, J.: FACTS: An action for ejectment was filed against petitioners by  Fernandez spouses who allegedly own the building apartment. However, Guillerma Tumlos the petitioner contends that the respondents had no cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises and being named in the Contract to Sell as the wife of [Respondent] Mario Fernandez. She alleged that she cohabited with the petitioner-husband without the benefit of marriage, and that she bore him two (2) children.  The lower court decided that since she failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the subject apartment building, there is no basis to justify her co-ownership.

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G.R. No. 122823. November 25, 1999.* GONZAGA-REYES, J.: FACTS: SEACOM is a corporation engaged in the business of selling and distributing agricultural machinery, products and equipment. SEACOM and JII entered into a dealership agreement as its exclusive dealer in the City and Province of Iloilo  and Capiz and to make the dealership agreement on a non-exclusive basis. 

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G.R. NO 207175 I. Facts: – In 2002, around 11’oclock in the afternoon petitioner, Eduardo Magsumbol, Erasmo Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria, and Bonifacio Ramirez along with unidentified 7 unidentified others  allegedly cut, take, steal and carry away with them thirty-three (33) coconut trees valued (P44,400.00). The unregistered parcel of land was co-owned by Ernesto Caringal and Menandro Avanzado who then charged with the crime of  Theft against the petitioners.

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No. L-14628. September 30, 1960 CONCEPCIÓN, J.: FACTS: Soledad Cagigas and Francisco Hermosisima, who was almost 10 years younger used to have an intimate relationship. They had sexual intercourse and Soledad then got pregnant, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954 however, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez.

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G.R. No. 119122. August 8, 2000 FACTS: On June 21, 1989, the petitioner received an assessment letter from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the payment of deficiency amusement tax amounted to P5,864,260.84. Petitioner contested the assessment by filing a protest who denied the same by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

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G.R. No. 81262. August 25, 1989.* CORTÉS, J.: FACTS: Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay who discovered the anomalies and reported them to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.

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G.R. No. 112019. January 4, 1995.* VITUG, J.: FACTS: Leouel and Julia were married in 1986 and had a son. They lived at Julia’s parents which caused their quarrel due to interference of the parents on their affairs. In 1988, Julia went to US to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas to so dissuade her. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to underwent training in US, he tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

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LEONILO ANTONIO, petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, respondent. TINGA, J.:

G.R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006. FACTS: On Dec 1990 Leonilo and Marie barely a year after their first meeting got married and had a child who after 5 months died. On March 1993, Leonilo filed a petition for nullity of their marriage alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage because she persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things.

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CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997 FACTS Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao got married and after the reception they went straight ahead to the house of petitioner. According to Gina, contrary to her expectations, that as newly weds they supposed to enjoy making love but the defendant just sleep which repeatedly happened until the fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon in private place they went to Baguio City but defendant invited members of the family and there were no sexual intercourse happened due to defendant avoided it by taking a long walk or sleeping on a rocking chair located in the living room. For almost a year of marriage, they slept together in the same room and on the same bed but there was no attempt for sexual intercourse between them and she claims that they even did not saw the private parts of each other. And because of this they went to urologist which the result of examination and medications of Chi Ming Tsoi was kept confidential to her. Gina Lao claims that the defendant is impotent and a closet homosexual and married her to obtain residency status and to publicly maintain the appearance of normal man. She filed for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity which was granted by RTC and affirmed by CA.

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G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997 FACTS: Roridel, respondent, is married to Reynaldo who was born with a son. After a year of marriage Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” as a husband and a father – since he preferred spending time and squandering money on his friends, dependency on parents and dishonesty in regards to their finances. Reynaldo was relieved from his job, and the respondent then became the breadwinner of the family.  They had a huge fight which resulted to Roridel’s resignation and went to Baguio to live with her parents and after few weeks, Reynaldo left and abandoned them.

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Sharing my personal case digest on Republic vs Albios. FACTS: Petitioner is married to an American citizen, Fringer before MTC- Mandaluyong to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00. In 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.

Law School Notes - Case Digest

Case Digest: Cabarroguis vs Vicente

Sharing my personal digest on the Cabarroguis vs Vicente case. No. L-14304. March 23, 1960

Law School Notes - Case Digest


Sharing my personal digest on the ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP. vs THE COURT OF APPEALS case. 217 SCRA 16, Jan 11, 1993

Law School Notes - Case Digest


Sharing my personal digest on the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC. case. G.R. No. 162155. August 28, 2007