G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married and have one daughter, Stephanie.  In 1995, Sharon obtained from the Illinois Court a divorce decree against the petitioner. The Illinois court dissolved the marriage and awarded Sharon sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.

In 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order “relinquishing” jurisdiction to Philippine courts.

In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, to enforce the Agreement. He submits the following arguments (a) the divorce decree obtained by respondent is void; (b) the Agreement novated the valid divorce decree, modifying the terms of child custody from sole (maternal) to joint; or (c) the Agreement is independent of the divorce decree obtained by respondent.

Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.

The trial court sustained the respondent’s motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that: 

1. it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; 
2. the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the “nationality rule” prevailing in this jurisdiction; and 
3. the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction.

ISSUE: 

(1) whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties’ child.

HELD:

The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void. However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit and call for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.

What the Illinois court retained was “jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution.” Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the “various provisions” of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody.

However, the  trial court cannot enforce the Agreement which is contrary to law. In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.  Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence, deemed “inexistent and void from the beginning.”  For lack of relevant stipulation in the Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine substantive law serve as default parameters to test the validity of the Agreement’s joint child custody stipulations.

Under Article 213 of the Family Code): “no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother x x x.” (This statutory awarding of sole parental custody to the mother is mandatory, grounded on sound policy consideration, subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here. The Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.

The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together. Upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody or under Article 213 of the Family Code, if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced.

Additionally, petitioner’s reliance on the invalidity of  divorce decree because it was obtained by his Filipino spouse is not meritorious.  In Van Dorn v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad.

“ pursuant to his national law, the private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.”

Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner’s suit, the logical end to its lack of cause of action, we remand the case for the trial court to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.

G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963

FACTS:

Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California but was domiciled in the Philippines at the time of his death. In accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator,  the estate shall be  distributed, which provides Php 3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen and the rest of his estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen. 

Helen filed an opposition insofar as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child under the laws of the Philippines. She insisted that Article 946, California Civil Code should be applicable following the doctrine of renvoi – “if there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile”.

The executor argued that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen’s will. Provided that the  testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable.

ISSUE:

Whether the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, as provided by the laws of California, which is the Philippines.

HELD:

YES. The domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California.

The laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad.

The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

Notes:

• The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe.
• Renvoi takes place when the conflicts rule of the forum makes a reference to a foreign law, but the foreign law is found to contain a conflict rule that returns or refers the matter back to the law of the forum (Remission).

G.R. No. L-22595, November 1, 1927

FACTS:

Joseph G. Brimo, a Turkish citizen,  executed a will which provided that his properties be disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippines. There is also a condition that, if any legatee who must disrespect the will , as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.

Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed on the basis that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo’s will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of article 10 of the Civil Code (now Article 16(2) ) . 

However, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with.

ISSUES: 

(1) Whether the approval of the scheme of partition on the ground that it is not in accordance with the laws of Joseph’s Turkish nationality is erroneous.

(2) Whether the conditions as it is expressed in the will were legal and valid

HELD:

(1) NO, the approval of the scheme of partition in respect was not erroneous. No evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with

The fact is that the Andre did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary on the part of the court to postpone or not to postpone a particular proceeding in a case, and when the person applying for it has already been given ample opportunity to present the evidence that he wishes to introduce, the court commits no abuse of discretion in denying it.

(2) NO . If the condition imposed upon the legatee is that he respect the testator’s order that his property be distributed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines and not in accordance with the laws of his nation, said condition is illegal, because, according to article 10 of the Civil Code, said laws govern his testamentary disposition, and, being illegal, shall be considered unwritten, thus making the institution unconditional.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective, not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator’s national laws.

G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. He executed a will in the Philippines, that a portion of his distributable asset amounting should be divided, in the following order and manner: 

1. $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; 
2. P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and
3. The remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wife.

Maria Cristina and Miriam filed their oppositions to the partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased..

The lower court, under Art. 16 of the Civil Code, applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Appellants contend that :

1. Art. 17(3), of the Civil Code stating that – “ Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.”,  prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code. 
2. The decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.

ISSUE/S: 

(1) Whether Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code. 

(2) Whether the will executed in the Philippines shall be governed by the Philippine law.

HELD:

(1) NO. Congress deleted the phrase, “notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article” when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that the capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent’s national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

(2) NO. Assuming that such was the decedent’s intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, a provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.