G.R. No. 195540. March 13, 2013

DOCTRINE:

The new redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.

FACTS:

In 1985, Goldenway Merchandising executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Equitable PCI Bank over 3 of its real properties. The mortgage secured the Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) loan granted by respondent to petitioner and was duly registered.

As petitioner failed to settle its loan obligation –  

1. respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on December 13, 2000. 
2. In a public auction, the mortgaged properties were sold for P3,500,000.00 to respondent. Accordingly, a Certificate of Sale was issued on January 26, 2001.
3. On February 16, 2001, the Certificate of Sale was registered and inscribed on TCT Nos. T-152630, T-151655 and T-214528.

On March 8, 2001, petitioner offered to redeem the foreclosed properties by tendering a check in the amount of P3,500,000.00. However, petitioner was told that such redemption is no longer possible because the certificate of sale had already been registered. The foreclosed properties had already been consolidated in favor of respondent and that new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondent on March 9, 2001.

On December 7, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the respondent, asserting that it is the one-year period of redemption under Act No. 3135 which should apply and not the shorter redemption period provided in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8791. That applying Section 47 of R.A. 8791 to the real estate mortgage executed in 1985 would result in the impairment of obligation of contracts and violation of the equal protection clause under the Constitution.

The RTC rendered its decision dismissing the complaint as well as the counterclaim. It noted that the issue of the constitutionality of Sec. 47 of R.A. No. 8791 was never raised by the petitioner during the pre-trial and the trial.

The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. According to the CA, petitioner failed to justify why Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 should be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE/S: 

Whether applying Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 to the present case would be a substantial impairment of its vested right of redemption under the real estate mortgage contract.

HELD:

NO. Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.

Petitioner’s claim that Section 47 infringes the equal protection clause as it discriminates mortgagors/property owners who are juridical persons is equally bereft of merit. The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate.

The legislature clearly intended to shorten the period of redemption for juridical persons whose properties were foreclosed and sold in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135. The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons was based on the nature of the properties foreclosed―whether these are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year redemption period is retained, or used for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner of these acquired assets. It must be underscored that the General Banking Law of 2000, crafted in the aftermath of the 1997 Southeast Asian financial crisis, sought to reform the General Banking Act of 1949 by fashioning a legal framework for maintaining a safe and sound banking system.

The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.32 Settled is the rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government.

Notes:

The law governing cases of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. Section 6 thereof provides:

SEC. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; xxx 

However, Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 otherwise known as “The General Banking Law of 2000” which took effect on June 13, 2000, amended Act No. 3135.

XXXX

Notwithstanding Act 3135, juridical persons whose property is being sold pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure, shall have the right to redeem the property in accordance with this provision until, but not after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale with the applicable Register of Deeds which in no case shall be more than three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. Owners of property that has been sold in a foreclosure sale prior to the effectivity of this Act shall retain their redemption rights until their expiration. 

G.R. No. 207976. November 14, 2018

FACTS:

Planters Development Bank (Planters Bank) granted two (2) loans to respondent Lubiya Agro Industrial Corporation (Lubiya) in the amounts of P6,500,000.00 and P5,000,000.00, respectively. The said loans were secured by real estate mortgages over two (2) parcels of land with improvements thereon located in General Santos City.

When Lubiya defaulted, Planters Bank sent a letter dated June 8, 1998 to it demanding payment and informing the latter that failure to heed such demand shall prompt Planters Bank to institute a legal action against it. Due to Libuya’s failure to settle its obligation, Planters Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the properties offered as security by Lubiya. In the public auction, Planters Bank emerged as the sole and highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale was thereafter issued in its favor and recorded with the Registry of Deeds on November 11, 1998.

On January 23, 2001, Lubiya filed a complaint for nullification of the loan agreement, foreclosure proceedings, and damages xx on Planters Bank’s alleged failure to furnish Lubiya with notices regarding the foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged properties despite being obligated in their mortgage contract to do so.

Lubiya moved for a summary judgment alleging that no genuine issues exist as to the material facts of the case. The RTC granted the motion however, the summary judgment was adversed to Lubiya as the RTC dismissed its complaint against Planters Bank.

The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and nullified the foreclosure sale.

Lubiya insists that the demand letter dated June 8, 1998, which Lubiya received on June 24, 1998 prior to the auction sale on October 6, 1998, duly satisfied the notice requirement agreed upon by the parties.

ISSUE:

whether or not the lack of personal notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings upon the mortgagor renders foreclosure null and void.

HELD:

As a general rule, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary. Section 3 of Act No. 313514 governing extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages only requires the 1) posting of the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale in three public places; and 2) publication of the said notice in a newspaper of general circulation. 

Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality and city.

However, despite the above provisions of the law, the parties to a mortgage contract are not precluded from imposing additional stipulations. This includes the requirement of personal notification to the mortgagor of any action relative to the mortgage contract, such as the institution of an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding. Thus, the exception to the rule is when the parties stipulate that personal notice is additionally required to be given the mortgagor. Failure to abide by the general rule, or its exception, renders the foreclosure proceedings null and void. 

The June 8, 1998 demand letter that Planters Bank sent to Lubiya satisfies the bank’s additional obligation to provide personal notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale to the mortgagor. The purpose of stipulations of such nature is to precisely apprise the mortgagors of any action which the mortgagees might take on the mortgaged properties in order to accord the former of an opportunity to safeguard their rights. Thus, when Planters Bank failed to send the notice of foreclosure sale to Lubiya, it committed a contractual breach sufficient to render the foreclosure sale on October 6, 1998 null and void. Besides, the loan agreements and mortgage contracts are standard contracts of adhesion prepared by petitioner itself. If the parties did not intend to require personal notice in addition to the statutory requirements of posting and publication, the said provision should not have been included in the mortgage contracts.

G.R. No. 190004. August 8, 2017.

FACTS:

Eugenio Dalauta (Dalauta) was the registered owner of agricultural land in Florida, Butuan City, with an area of 25.2160 hectares. In 1994, the land was placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under compulsory acquisition of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). LBP offered P192,782.59 as compensation for the land, but Dalauta rejected such valuation for being too low.

The DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) through the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), in a summary administrative proceeding, determined the appropriate just compensation for the subject property. It affirmed the valuation made by LBP.

In 2000, Dalauta filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting as SAC. It constituted the Board of Commissioners (Commissioners) tasked to inspect the land and to make a report thereon. The report recommended that the value of the land be pegged at P100,000.00 per hectare.

The SAC taking into consideration the Commissioners Report directed LBP to pay – (a) 2,639,557.00 value of the land; (b) P100,000 for the farmhouse; (c) Reasonable legal fees and litigation expenses.

LBP filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA, arguing –
That the SAC erred in taking cognizance of the case when the DARAB decision sustaining the LBP valuation had long attained finality;
that the SAC erred in taking judicial notice of the Commissioners’ Report without conducting a hearing; and
that the SAC violated the Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 and DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, in fixing the just compensation.

The CA ruled that the SAC correctly took cognizance of the case. It sustained the valuation by the SAC for being well within R.A. No. 6657.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the trial court had properly taken jurisdiction over the case despite the finality of the PARAD Resolution.
2. Whether or not the case already prescribed.

HELD:

YES. The RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), may exercise its exclusive original jurisdiction under Section 57 of R. A. No. 6657 to determine just compensation to landowners despite the lapse of 15 days from receipt by the landowner of the adjudicator’s decision fixing the just compensation. 

In all these cases, it was uniformly decided that the petition for determination of just compensation before the SAC should be filed within the period prescribed under the DARAB Rules, that is, “within fifteen ( 15) days from receipt of the notice thereof.”

In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay,  the Court ruled that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function that cannot be vested in administrative agencies. “The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination, but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heir of Trinidad S. V da. De Arieta : 

In both voluntary and compulsory acquisitions, wherein the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR opens an account in the name of the landowner and conducts a summary administrative proceeding. If the landowner disagrees with the valuation, the matter may be brought to the RTC, acting as a special agrarian court. But as with the DAR-awarded compensation, LBP’s valuation of lands covered by CARL is considered only as an initial determination, which is not conclusive, as it is the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, that should make the final determination of just compensation, taking into consideration the factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the applicable DAR regulations. xxx

2. NO. While R.A. No. 6657 itself does not provide for a period within which a landowner can file a petition for the determination of just compensation before the SAC, it cannot be imprescriptible. Considering that the payment of just compensation is an obligation created by law, it should only be ten (10) years from the time the landowner received the notice of coverage. (Article 1144, NCC).

Nevertheless, any interruption or delay caused by the government like proceedings in the DAR should toll the running of the prescriptive period. In this case, Dalauta received the Notice of Coverage on February 7, 1994.43 He then filed a petition for determination of just compensation on February 28, 2000. Clearly, the filing date was well within the ten year prescriptive period under Article 1141.

Notes: 

Concurrent Exercise of Jurisdiction – 

There may be situations where a landowner, who has a pending administrative case before the DAR for determination of just compensation, still files a petition before the SAC for the same objective. Such recourse is not strictly a case of forum shopping, the administrative determination being not resjudicata binding on the SAC. 

Nevertheless, the practice should be discouraged. To prevent such a messy situation, a landowner should withdraw his case with the DAR before filing his petition before the SAC and manifest the fact of withdrawal by alleging it in the petition itself.

No. L-57259. October 13, 1983.

Main Topic – Rule 70.

FACTS

Peran personally asked respondents, who has a house erected on the subject land, to remove the same and vacate the premises. The respondents refused so the petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry and Illegal Detainer seeking the ejectment seeking the ejectment of the respondents on the grounds that (a) they are mere squatters (b) that they had prevented him from entering the property and deprived him of possession and (c) and that they were tolerating persons in getting soil and bringing about a gradual erosion of the land to his extreme prejudice.