G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1996.

FACTS:

Mercado and Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati. Manzano won the election but his proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

• The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides that “those who have dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position”. 
• He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation of U.S. citizenship

Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jussoli. He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. He is registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997.

COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen. In a motion for reconsideration the COMELEC enbanc reversed the ruling.

ISSUES: 

1. Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification.
2. Whether or not Manzano is disqualified to run.

HELD:

(1) Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.

Instances for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

(2) No, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. 
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001

FACTS:

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. However he enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States.

After almost 9 years, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan.

Bengzon claimed that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation.

Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase “from birth” in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

ISSUE:

Whether Teodoro Cruz, a natural born citizen, who became an American Citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his re-acquisition of PH citizenship.

HELD:

YES. The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:

(1)Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

(2)Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3)Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and

(4)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization.

Cruz lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA. No. 2630. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

Petitioner’s contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.

Notes: 

The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

• Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications17 and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of CA. 473.
• Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political and economic necessity

G.R. Nos. 224765-68

FACTS: 

The Sandiganbayan found the petitioners  guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. In 2003, it was alleged that the petitioners procured five motor vehicles for the use of the Governor and Vice Governor of Davao del Sur  in a manner violative of procurement laws.   The procurement of the subject vehicles was not subjected to competitive public bidding as it was effected through direct purchase. By preselecting the vehicle models to be procured, petitioners are alleged to have acted with manifest partiality in favor of their preferred suppliers and accorded them unwarranted benefit and advantage, causing undue injury to the government. 

Petitioners filed their separate appeals before the Court. 

The People of the Philippines contend that the petitions must be denied because the grounds relied upon involve questions of fact.  Moreover, the petitions amount to a collateral attack on the judgment of conviction by raising doubt as to whether the acts of petitioners were sufficient to establish criminal liability, thereby assailing the Sandiganbayan’s appreciation of evidence.

claim that petitioners are asking the Court to revisit evidentiary matters, which is beyond the pale of an appeal by certiorari

ISSUES: 

1. Whether the petition must be denied

2. Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.

HELD: 

1. NO. While it is the general rule that only questions of law may be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45, there are recognized exceptions, namely:

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;(S) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

The petitions invoke the first, second, third, fourth, eighth, tenth, and eleventh exceptions above. While the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court are accorded weight and respect, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the conclusions reached by the trial court when there appears to be a misappreciation of facts

2. NO. the Court cannot uphold the conviction of the accused. A thorough review of the facts and evidence presented shows that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element for a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.

In order to convict the accused for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the following elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, or evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. 

In the instant case, petitioners justify the eschewing of competitive bidding in procuring the subject vehicles on the reasoning that these were goods of foreign origin that may only be procured directly from the exclusive Philippine distributors or agents.

It is evident that there were irregularities in the procurement of the subject vehicles, in violation of the applicable procurement laws. Be that as it may, it should be emphasized that petitioners were charged and convicted for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. In order to successfully prosecute the accused under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 based on a violation of procurement laws, the prosecution cannot solely rely on the fact that a violation of procurement laws has been committed. The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: (1) the violation of procurement laws caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, and (2) the accused acted with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence. This the prosecution failed to do. Specifically, the prosecution miserably failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners acted with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence in relation to the subject procurements.

G.R. No. 228236, January 27, 2021.

FACTS:

Panga-Vega, then Secretary of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), requested authority to avail of the 15 days of special leave benefit under Republic Act (RA) No. 9710, otherwise known as the Magna Carta of Women to undergo hysterectomy.  The HRET approved Panga-Vega’s request for special leave for a period not exceeding two months starting February 7, 2011.  After a month of availing of the special leave, Panga­ Vega informed the HRET Chairperson that she was reassuring her duties and functions. She also presented a medical certificate that she was already “fit to work”.  The HRET directed Panga-Vega to consume her 2-month special leave given her need for prolonged rest following her hysterectomy, and in view of a pending investigation on her alleged alteration or tampering one minute of the meeting that could subject her to more stress. She sought reconsideration of this HRET Resolution but was denied pointing out the confusion and doubts regarding her true medical condition as caused by her medical certificates. 

The CSC ruled that she only needed to present a medical certificate attesting her physical fitness to return to work and need not exhaust the full leave she applied for under RA No. 9710. It was further held that applying the rules on maternity leave, she is entitled to both the commuted money value of the unexpired portion of the special leave and her salary for actual services rendered effective the day she reported back for work. 

The HRET filed a Petition for Review, but the CA affirmed CSC’s findings. It ruled Panga-Vega may opt not to consume the full leave she applied for upon her submission of the medical certificate.

ISSUES: 

1. Whether the petition should have been filed by the OSG, not by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of the HRET

2.  Whether the rules on maternity leave under the Labor Code, which provides that when the employee returns to work before the expiration of her special leave, she may receive both the benefits granted under the maternity leave law and the salary for actual services rendered effective the day she reports for work, may have a suppletory application.

HELD: 

1.  YES.  The HRET was created by virtue of Section (Sec.) 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which provides that the House of Representatives shall have its own Electoral Tribunal that shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its Members. Meanwhile, the OSG was constituted as the law office of the Government and shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer as such. It shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies, instrumentalities, and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. It is tasked to represent the Government and its officers in the Court, the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government, or any officer thereof, in his official capacity is a party, among others. The OSG, however, may be excused from representing the Government, its agencies, and instrumentalities when there is an express authorization by the OSG, naming therein the legal officers who are being deputized in cases involving their respective offices, subject to its supervision and control, or when the OSG takes a position different from that of the agency it is duty bound to represent.

There was no express authorization by the OSG naming the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the HRET as its deputized legal officers in filing this petition. There was also no proof, let alone an allegation, that the OSG took a position different from the HRET in this case.

2. In accord with the spirit and intent of RA No. 9710 to suppletorily apply the rule on maternity leave to the special leave benefit. Similar to the special leave benefit under RA No. 9710, a maternity leave under the Omnibus Rules on Leave seeks to protect the health and welfare of women, specifically of working mothers, as its primary purpose is to afford them some measures of financial aid, and to grant them a period of rest and recuperation in connection with their pregnancies. The special leave benefit should be liberally interpreted to support the female employee so as to give her further means to afford her needs, may it be gynecological, physical, or psychological, for a holistic recuperation. The recovery period may be a trying time that she needs much assistance and compassion to regain her overall wellness. Nothing in RA No. 9710 and the CSC Guidelines bar this more humane interpretation of the provision on special leave benefit. Anent Panga-Vega’s return to work, while RA No. 9710 and the CSC Guidelines do not require that the entire special leave applied for be consumed, certain conditions must be satisfied for its propriety.

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), acknowledges the need to guarantee the basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of women through the adoption in the political, social, economic, and cultural fields, of appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure their full development and advancement. In fulfillment of the foregoing obligation under the CEDAW, and the 1987 Philippine Constitution to advance the rights of women, RA No. 9710 was enacted. This law acknowledges the economic, political, and socio cultural realities affecting their work conditions and affirms their role in nation-building. It guarantees the availability of opportunities, services, and mechanisms that will allow them to actively perform their roles in the family, community, and society. As a social legislation, its paramount consideration is the empowerment of women. Thus, in case of doubt, its provisions must be liberally construed in favor of women as the beneficiaries