G.R. No. 141853. February 7, 2001.

FACTS:

On March 21, 1994, Idolor secured a loan of 520,000 and executed a Real Estate Mortgage with the right of extrajudicial foreclosure in favor of De Guzman. Due to Idolor’s failure to settle the account, De Guzman filed a complaint which resulted in “Kasunduang Pagaayos. Despite the extension provided, Idolor failed to comply with the undertaking. De Guzman filed an extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage pursuant to the parties’ agreement. On May 23, 1997, the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to respondent De Guzman, as the highest bidder. the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997.

On June 25, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of Sheriffs Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction against private respondents. She alleged irregularity and lack of notice in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings subject of the real estate mortgage.

The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
Spouses de Guzman filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking annulment of the trial court’s order. The CA granted the petition and annulled the assailed writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner has no more proprietary right to the issuance of the writ of injunction. YES

HELD: 

YES. The petitioner has no more proprietary right to speak of over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction.  Petitioner had one year from the registration of the sheriff’s sale to redeem the property but she failed to exercise her right on or before June 23, 1998, thus spouses de Guzman are now entitled to a conveyance and possession of the foreclosed property. When the petitioner filed her complaint for annulment of sheriff’s sale against private respondents with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on June 25, 1998, she failed to show sufficient interest or title in the property sought to be protected as her right of redemption had already expired on June 23, 1998, i.e. two (2) days before the filing of the complaint. 

It is always a ground for denying injunction that the party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the ultimate relief sought—in other words, that she shows no equity. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.

Notes: 

Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated.

G.R. No. 195540. March 13, 2013

DOCTRINE:

The new redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.

FACTS:

In 1985, Goldenway Merchandising executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Equitable PCI Bank over 3 of its real properties. The mortgage secured the Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) loan granted by respondent to petitioner and was duly registered.

As petitioner failed to settle its loan obligation –  

1. respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on December 13, 2000. 
2. In a public auction, the mortgaged properties were sold for P3,500,000.00 to respondent. Accordingly, a Certificate of Sale was issued on January 26, 2001.
3. On February 16, 2001, the Certificate of Sale was registered and inscribed on TCT Nos. T-152630, T-151655 and T-214528.

On March 8, 2001, petitioner offered to redeem the foreclosed properties by tendering a check in the amount of P3,500,000.00. However, petitioner was told that such redemption is no longer possible because the certificate of sale had already been registered. The foreclosed properties had already been consolidated in favor of respondent and that new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondent on March 9, 2001.

On December 7, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the respondent, asserting that it is the one-year period of redemption under Act No. 3135 which should apply and not the shorter redemption period provided in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8791. That applying Section 47 of R.A. 8791 to the real estate mortgage executed in 1985 would result in the impairment of obligation of contracts and violation of the equal protection clause under the Constitution.

The RTC rendered its decision dismissing the complaint as well as the counterclaim. It noted that the issue of the constitutionality of Sec. 47 of R.A. No. 8791 was never raised by the petitioner during the pre-trial and the trial.

The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. According to the CA, petitioner failed to justify why Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 should be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE/S: 

Whether applying Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 to the present case would be a substantial impairment of its vested right of redemption under the real estate mortgage contract.

HELD:

NO. Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.

Petitioner’s claim that Section 47 infringes the equal protection clause as it discriminates mortgagors/property owners who are juridical persons is equally bereft of merit. The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate.

The legislature clearly intended to shorten the period of redemption for juridical persons whose properties were foreclosed and sold in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135. The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons was based on the nature of the properties foreclosed―whether these are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year redemption period is retained, or used for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner of these acquired assets. It must be underscored that the General Banking Law of 2000, crafted in the aftermath of the 1997 Southeast Asian financial crisis, sought to reform the General Banking Act of 1949 by fashioning a legal framework for maintaining a safe and sound banking system.

The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.32 Settled is the rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government.

Notes:

The law governing cases of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. Section 6 thereof provides:

SEC. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; xxx 

However, Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 otherwise known as “The General Banking Law of 2000” which took effect on June 13, 2000, amended Act No. 3135.

XXXX

Notwithstanding Act 3135, juridical persons whose property is being sold pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure, shall have the right to redeem the property in accordance with this provision until, but not after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale with the applicable Register of Deeds which in no case shall be more than three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. Owners of property that has been sold in a foreclosure sale prior to the effectivity of this Act shall retain their redemption rights until their expiration. 

508 F.2d 969; December 23, 1974

FACTS:

In 1962, Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc., (Overseas) entered into a construction agreement with Societe Generale de L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), to construct, and manage and supervise for 1 year a paperboard mill in Alexandria, Egypt. The Agency for International Development (AID), a branch of the United States State Department, would finance the project by supplying RAKTA with funds with which to purchase letters of credit in Overseas favor.

Among the contract’s terms was an arbitration clause, which provided a means to settle differences arising in the course of performance, and a “force majeure” clause, which excused delay in performance due to causes beyond Overseas’ reasonable capacity to control.

G.R. No. 192150. October 1, 2014

FACTS:

In this case, Godofredo Lopez, confronted Frederico Sabay and his daughter Erlinda for their alleged intrusion into his property.  During their verbal altercation, Erlinda hit Godofredo on the head with a hard object, Frederico  joined in by throwing a stone at Godofredo’s face. Both of them allegedly threatened to kill him. 

Jervie Lopez (Jervie) pacified them, however he was hit in the hand with a bolo. Based on the medico legal certificates Godofredo suffered a contusion while Jervie sustained a wound in his right palm.

Godofredo and Jervie filed a complaint against Frederico before the barangay. The parties agreed to settle based on the recommendation of the building inspector and reflected their agreement in their Kasunduang Pag-aayos. The Kasunduan, however, was not implemented because the building inspector failed to make the promised recommendation to resolve the boundary dispute between the parties.