G.R. No. 236725, February 02, 2021

FACTS:

In 2010, SWD, a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), released an aggregate amount of P3,354,123.50 worth of benefits for its Board of Directors. These disbursements were disallowed in Notice of Disallowance (ND) because they were granted to persons employed after June 30, 1989, in violation of DBM CCC No. 10.  The COA Audit Team particularly cited paragraph 5.5 of DBM CCC No. 10, which enumerated the additional allowances that are not integrated in the standardized salary rate, and allowed to be continuously given only to incumbent employees, who are actually receiving such benefits as of June 30, 1989. Considering that the SWD officers and employees who received the additional benefits in 2010 were employed after June 30, 1989, the COA Audit Team concluded that the grants were unauthorized. 

The following persons were charged responsible to settle the disallowed amounts: (1) Ancheta, General Manager, who approved the transaction; (2) Ariel Rapsing (Rapsing), Corporate Budget Specialist, who certified that the expenses were necessary; (3) Agnes Corpuz (Corpuz), Cashier A, as the disbursing officer; and (4) the other officers and employees who received the disallowed benefits, except those incumbents as of June 30, 1989.

Petitioners insisted that the disbursements were authorized by DBM Secretary Benjamin Diokno ‘s (Secretary Diokno) Letter dated November 8, 2000 addressed to certain local water districts. Guided by the foregoing Letters, petitioners contend that the endowment of additional benefits to incumbents as of December 31, 1999 is authorized; and that assuming the disallowance is sustained, they should not be held liable for the refund considering their good faith. In addition to their reliance upon the DBM opinions, petitioners argue that the power to grant allowances is with the Board of Directors, and the approving and certifying officers merely implemented the board resolutions as a matter of duty. 

COA maintains that LWDs are GOCCs upon their creation under PD No. 198. The COA stands firm that only those additional compensations given to incumbents as of July 1, 1989 shall be allowed in accordance with RA No. 6758. The violation of this law renders the approving and certifying officers’ solidarily liable to settle the disallowed amounts.

 ISSUES: 

Whether SWD already covered by RA No. 6758 when the 2010 benefits were granted?

HELD: 

1. YES. Under RA No. 6758,  all allowances are deemed included in the standardized salary rate, unless excluded by law or by a DBM issuance. This rule was premised upon the distinct policy to eliminate multiple allowances and other incentive packages, resulting in differences of compensation among government personnel. However, due to the inequity and injustice that RA No. 6758 may cause to incumbents, the legislature cushioned its effect and adopted the policy of non-diminution of pay as embodied under Sections 12 and 17 of RA No. 6758.

Section 4 of RA No. 6758 provides that its provisions “shall apply to all positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis, now existing and hereafter created in the government, including [GOCCs] and government financial institutions.” SWD is a GOCC with a special charter, created and organized pursuant to PD No. 198, which took effect in 1973. Thus, it is erroneous for petitioners to insist that SWD became a GOCC only on March 12, 1992 or after the finality of the Court’s decision in Davao City Water District.

G.R. No. 246679, June 11, 2021.

FACTS: 

The respondents filed their respective motions for reconsideration impugning the 2019 Decision of Supreme Court and argued that 

1. The Court erred in ruling that Tallado’s removal constitutes as valid interruption of his term sufficient to break the three-term limit rule imposed on local candidates. They point out that the petitioner’s resort to appeal and the eventual modification of the administrative penalty imposed on him shows the lack of permanence of his ouster as governor and should be insufficient to warrant an interruption of his term. 
2. Respondents urge the Court to consider his absence in office as preventive suspension, as the Ombudsman (OMB) Rules provide.
3. They claim that for the Court to allow such construction to continue would reward corrupt and unscrupulous politicians to escape the grasp of the three-term prohibition. 

ISSUES: 

1. Whether the orders of dismissal against the petitioner did not create a permanent, but only a temporary, vacancy

2. Whether the Court’s construction would reward corrupt politicians who will perpetuate their term by escaping the constitutional term limits.

HELD: 

The Court DENIES all motions for reconsideration for lack of merit.

1.  NO.  When an elective local public officer is administratively dismissed by the 0MB and his penalty subsequently modified to another penalty, like herein petitioner, the period of dismissal cannot just be nonchalantly dismissed as a  period for preventive suspension considering that, in fact, his term is effectively interrupted. During said period, petitioner cannot claim to be Governor as his title is  stripped of him by the 0MB despite the pendency of his appeal. Neither does he exercise the power of the office. Said title and power are already passed to the Vice Governor. He also cannot claim that the exercise of his power is merely suspended since it is  not.

Under Section 44 of the LGC, a permanent vacancy arises whenever an elective local officicl;l fills a higher-vacant office, or refuses to assume office, or fails to qualify, or dies, or is removed from office, or voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. In contrast, Section 46 of the LGC enumerates as resulting in a temporary vacancy in the office of the local chief executive leave of absence, travel abroad, and suspension from office. Although Section 46 of the LGC specifically states that the causes of a temporary vacancy are not limited to such circumstances, what is evident is that the enumeration therein share something in common, which is that there is a definite term to be re-assumed. However, the petitioner’s dismissals, even if still not final, were not akin to the instances enumerated in Section 46 of the LGC because the loss of his title to the office denied him the expectancy to re-assume his term.

In the 2019 Decision, dismissal orders of the OMB against petitioner served as permanent removal from office and was not merely temporary. From his dismissal until the Court of Appeals’ modification of his penalty to suspension, petitioner neither had title nor powers to wield as governor of Camarines Norte.

2. NO. The Court’s conclusion is but an application of established jurisprudential concepts and was never intended to reward corrupt politicians who escape dismissal. The OMB ‘s dismissal order is immediately executory and, once executed, the public officer ceases to have title for the time being. Hence, it  should be considered as an interruption of his term. The fact that the public official is  not an ideal one, considering his administrative baggage, does not deprive him of the law’s application.

Imposition of an administrative penalty does not automatically disqualify a public officer from running for public office. Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code does not disqualify a person from running even if he was previously administratively sanctioned.

Lastly, the Court’s construction cannot be construed as a  reward for corrupt politicians as it does not guarantee their prolonged grips on power. It must be remembered that they are still subject to competitive and recurring democratic elections wherein the people decide their political fate. It is presumptuous to say that upon the Court’s decision, public officials would automatically claim their stakes in certain government positions for the foreseeable future. With or without the application of the three-term limit rule, their political futures are still uncertain.

G.R. No. 179786. July 24, 2013

FACTS:

ISSUES:

HELD:

G.R. No. 231383. March 7, 2018

FACTS:

Two (2) Informations were filed before the RTC charging Sanchez with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. A buy-bust operation was organized against a certain alias “Totoy” (later on identified as Sanchez), who was allegedly engaged in illegal drug trade. Tabuyo, the poseur-buyer, was able to meet Sanchez, who, after receiving the marked money, handed over a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance to the former. Sanchez was arrested. He was also found during search two (2) other plastic sachets also containing a white crystalline substance.

The buy-bust team then conducted the markings, inventory, and photography on site before proceeding to their office for documentation purposes. The team was met with representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media, both of whom signed the Certificate of Inventory. The seized plastic sachets were then taken to the PNP Crime Laboratory where it was confirmed that their contents are indeed methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Sanchez pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. He provided that while he was collecting bets for jueteng, 2 unknown men approached him and gave their numbers; and that when they were about to pay, they handcuffed and arrested him for allegedly selling drugs. The men were only able to find money from the bets he collected and that they only made it appear that they recovered sachets containing shabu from him.

The RTC found that the buy-bust team validly arrested Sanchez who was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu to the poseur-buyer; and that after his arrest, the arresting officers discovered two (2) more sachets, also containing shabu, from his pocket.  

The CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arresting officers followed the procedures in conducting buy-bust operation, and that the evidence were preserved as the chain of custody thereof was not broken

HELD:

No. The arresting officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Sanchez. 

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the apprehending officers must follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. The apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation  conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.

While it appears that representatives from the DOJ and the media were present during the conduct of the inventory as evidenced by their signatures on the Certificate of Inventory, a more careful scrutiny of the records shows that the buy-bust team conducted the marking, inventory, and photography where the arrest was made, and merely made the aforesaid representatives sign the Certificate of Inventory upon the buy-bust team’s arrival at their office. Moreover, the said procedures were not done in the presence of any elected public official.

The law requires the presence of an elected public official, as well as representatives from the DOJ and the media during the actual conduct of inventory and photography to ensure that the chain of custody rule is observed and thus, remove any suspicion of tampering, switching, planting, or contamination of evidence which could considerably affect a case. However, minor deviations may be excused in situations where a justifiable reason for noncompliance is explained. In this case, despite the nonobservance of the witness requirement, no plausible explanation was given by the prosecution.

The absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible. The apprehending officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their noncompliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable

Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable grounds or show that special circumstances exist which would excuse their transgression — as in fact the only reason given was that they were conducting a “rush operation” — the Court is constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Sanchez have been compromised.

Ruling:

Joey Sanchez y Licudine is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.